Author: Vladimir A. Karamyčev
Publisher:
ISBN: 9789051705997
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 174
Book Description
Essays on Adverse Selection
Author: Vladimir A. Karamyčev
Publisher:
ISBN: 9789051705997
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 174
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN: 9789051705997
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 174
Book Description
Essays on Adverse Selection
Author: Jae Min So
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 298
Book Description
This dissertation addresses the issues of adverse selection in the health insurance market. The literature on adverse selection focuses on consumer responses and their effects on pricing. In contrast to most previous literature, these essays consider not only the demand side but also the supply side of the health insurance markets in investigating the effect of adverse selection and relevant policies. The first chapter provides evidence of the effects of adverse selection on insurers' behavior. I exploit the gradual implementation of risk adjustment from 2004 to 2007 in Medicare Advantage (MA). Under this policy, the government reimburses private insurers proportional to the health risk of their enrollees. I present evidence that benefit generosity and diversity of MA plans are responsive to the incentive of risk selection. The second chapter develops and estimates an oligopoly model of MA to investigate the effects of adverse selection on welfare, allowing for endogenous benefit designs of insurance plans. I exploit information on plan-level average risk scores and market shares as well as plan characteristics from Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to identify the demand for MA plans. My findings show adverse selection, which is based on the generosity of the benefits of MA plans. Specifically, high-risk consumers valued benefit generosity more than low-risk consumers did. The findings of the demand and cost estimates also verified adverse sorting in MA, implying that benefit generosity is vulnerable to under-provisioning. Finally, the third chapter investigates the effects of risk adjustment on welfare. The results of counterfactual analyses show that the effects of risk adjustment on consumer welfare can be underestimated under a fixed contract where the benefit designs of insurance plans are exogenous. Furthermore, I show that even with an increase in benefit generosity under a flexible contract, risk adjustment can decrease consumer surplus because of an increase in premiums and a decrease in the diversity of MA plans. However, these unintended effects of risk adjustment can be mitigated in competitive markets that include a large number of insurers. Finally, I show that risk adjustment decreases overpayments arising from risk selection and thus the total spending on Medicare
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 298
Book Description
This dissertation addresses the issues of adverse selection in the health insurance market. The literature on adverse selection focuses on consumer responses and their effects on pricing. In contrast to most previous literature, these essays consider not only the demand side but also the supply side of the health insurance markets in investigating the effect of adverse selection and relevant policies. The first chapter provides evidence of the effects of adverse selection on insurers' behavior. I exploit the gradual implementation of risk adjustment from 2004 to 2007 in Medicare Advantage (MA). Under this policy, the government reimburses private insurers proportional to the health risk of their enrollees. I present evidence that benefit generosity and diversity of MA plans are responsive to the incentive of risk selection. The second chapter develops and estimates an oligopoly model of MA to investigate the effects of adverse selection on welfare, allowing for endogenous benefit designs of insurance plans. I exploit information on plan-level average risk scores and market shares as well as plan characteristics from Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to identify the demand for MA plans. My findings show adverse selection, which is based on the generosity of the benefits of MA plans. Specifically, high-risk consumers valued benefit generosity more than low-risk consumers did. The findings of the demand and cost estimates also verified adverse sorting in MA, implying that benefit generosity is vulnerable to under-provisioning. Finally, the third chapter investigates the effects of risk adjustment on welfare. The results of counterfactual analyses show that the effects of risk adjustment on consumer welfare can be underestimated under a fixed contract where the benefit designs of insurance plans are exogenous. Furthermore, I show that even with an increase in benefit generosity under a flexible contract, risk adjustment can decrease consumer surplus because of an increase in premiums and a decrease in the diversity of MA plans. However, these unintended effects of risk adjustment can be mitigated in competitive markets that include a large number of insurers. Finally, I show that risk adjustment decreases overpayments arising from risk selection and thus the total spending on Medicare
Essays on Adverse Selection
Author: Rajneesh Sharma
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Stock index futures
Languages : en
Pages : 346
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Stock index futures
Languages : en
Pages : 346
Book Description
Three Essays on Financial Relationships in Credit Markets with Adverse Selection
Author: Charl Kengchon
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 334
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 334
Book Description
Essays in Insurance and Adverse Selection
Author: Vitor Farinha Luz
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Two Essays on the Economics of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
Author: Jay Charles Stewart
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Agency (Law)
Languages : en
Pages : 286
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Agency (Law)
Languages : en
Pages : 286
Book Description
Essays on Information Diffusion and Adverse Selection
Author: Stephen Robert Rush
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Three Essays on Adverse Selection and Labor Contracts
Author: Dorothea Kübler
Publisher:
ISBN: 9783826555749
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 65
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN: 9783826555749
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 65
Book Description
Essays on Privacy and the Value of Information in Adverse Selection Markets
Author: Jeevan Jaisingh
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 112
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 112
Book Description
Three Essays on Adverse Selection with Applications to Central Bank Policy
Author: Patrizia Feubli
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 107
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 107
Book Description