Victories Are Not Enough: Limitations of the German Way of War PDF Download
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Author:
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1428916482
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 103
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Book Description
Author:
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1428916482
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 103
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Samuel J. Newland
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Germany
Languages : en
Pages : 108
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Book Description
Since the early stages of World War II, militaries in general, and the U.S. Army in particular, have studied the German way of war, specifically as practiced in the 20th century. While acknowledging that Germany--and before that nation came into existence, Prussia--produced some excellent armies, major problems with the German way of war must not be ignored. Despite the military prowess of Germany, it lost both of the major wars of the 20th century. The author explores the reasons why a nation with such a strong military reputation was unable to win its wars and achieve its goals. He emphasizes that military power, tactical and operational brilliance, and victories in the field can easily be squandered if a nation has failed to set achievable goals and develop strategies to reach them. This failure should not be lost on modern nations as they proceed into the 21st century.
Author: Dr. Samuel J. Newland
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 1786256363
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 160
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Book Description
Since the early stages of World War II, militaries in general, and the U.S. Army in particular, have studied the German way of war, specifically as practiced in the 20th century. While acknowledging that Germany—and before that nation came into existence, Prussia—produced some excellent armies, major problems with the German way of war must not be ignored. Even the casual observers should have noted that, despite the military prowess of Germany, it lost both of the major wars of the 20th century. This Letort Paper, authored by Dr. Samuel J. Newland, explores the reasons why a nation with such a strong military reputation was unable to win its wars and achieve its goals. He emphasizes that military power, tactical and operational brilliance, and victories in the field can easily be squandered if a nation has failed to set achievable goals and develop strategies to reach them. This failure, which led to Germany’s defeat in these wars, should not be lost on modern nations as they proceed into the 21st century.—Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., Director, Strategic Studies Institute
Author: Samuel J. Newland
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781461193616
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 104
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Book Description
Since the early 1940s, the students of military operations in general, and from the United States in particular, have studied German military operations. While some of these studies have dealt with the wars of the imperial era, particularly the Wars of German Unification (1864- 71), much more study has centered on the wars waged by the Third Reich from 1939-45. From these studies, lessons have been extracted, and military doctrine has been influenced. Regrettably, however, as the German way of war has been studied, too often those studies have focused on the tactical or the operational levels of war. The exploits, the victories of German operational leaders such as Erwin Rommel, Heinz Guderian, and Eric von Manstein have been traditional favorites. And while the Germans have clearly influenced warfare on this level, even the casual observer should have noticed that the Germans fought two major wars in the 20th century and lost both of them, the second with disastrous consequences. Thus the question emerges, What was wrong with the oft-studied German way of war? A significant factor in their military failure can be laid at the top with both their civilian and military leadership. For while the Germans have excelled tactically and operationally, they have exhibited significant weaknesses in developing achievable goals for their nation and appropriate strategies for achieving these goals. In the time that stretched from the beginning of the 1860s until the end of World War II, Germany only had one brief period when it could bask in the glory of the European leadership it so desired. That brief period was from 1871 until 1889 when Otto von Bismarck was Chancellor. Following Bismarck (and Chief of the German General Staff Helmuth von Moltke), the German record of setting achievable goals and developing and following logical strategies is poor. This Letort Paper is designed to explore these issues and provide an overview of the development of Germany as a nation and German military thought in the 19th century. It examines the origins of modern German military thinking and the concepts promoted by some of Germany's key military and political leadership. It emphasizes that, if a nation is unwilling or incapable of designing logical strategies, tactical and operational victories in the field will come to naught.
Author: Robert Michael Citino
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 456
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Book Description
For Frederick the Great, the prescription for warfare was simple: kurz und vives (short and lively) - wars that relied upon swift, powerful, and decisive military operations. Robert Citino takes us on a dramatic march through Prussian and German military history to show how that primal theme played out time and time again. Citino focuses on operational warfare to demonstrate continuity in German military campaigns from the time of Elector Frederick Wilhelm and his great sleigh-drive against the Swedes to the age of Adolf Hitler and the blitzkrieg to the gates of Moscow. Along the way, he underscores the role played by the Prussian army in elevating a small, vulnerable state to the ranks of the European powers, describes how nineteenth-century victories over Austria and France made the German army the most respected in Europe, and reviews the lessons learned from the trenches of World War I.
Author: Samuel J. Newland
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Germany
Languages : en
Pages : 104
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Book Description
Since the early stages of World War II, militaries in general, and the U.S. Army in particular, have studied the German way of war, specifically as practiced in the 20th century. While acknowledging that Germany--and before that nation came into existence, Prussia--produced some excellent armies, major problems with the German way of war must not be ignored. Despite the military prowess of Germany, it lost both of the major wars of the 20th century. The author explores the reasons why a nation with such a strong military reputation was unable to win its wars and achieve its goals. He emphasizes that military power, tactical and operational brilliance, and victories in the field can easily be squandered if a nation has failed to set achievable goals and develop strategies to reach them. This failure should not be lost on modern nations as they proceed into the 21st century.
Author: Antulio J. Echevarria II
Publisher: Oxford University Press on Demand
ISBN: 0199231915
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 223
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Book Description
An engaging new interpretation of Clausewitz's classic On War and its relevance to contemporary world conflicts.
Author: Stephen Robinson
Publisher: Exisle Publishing
ISBN: 1991001010
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 360
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Book Description
Did Nazi war criminals deceive the United States military during the Cold War? A new book by a Canberra-based historian tells the story of how America’s most famous and influential military theorist was seduced by the lies of Hitler’s defeated generals. From the author of Panzer Commander Hermann Balck and False Flags comes The Blind Strategist: John Boyd and the American Art of War. Colonel John Boyd, a maverick fighter pilot, revolutionized the American art of war through his ideas on conflict and the human mind. Boyd claimed that victory is won by the side which transitions through 'decision cycles' faster than the enemy and his ideas gained influential converts in the Pentagon who were seeking a new way of waging war after defeat in Vietnam. Although Boyd’s theories became the basis of American military doctrine, he relied upon the fraudulent testimony of former Nazi generals who fabricated historical evidence to disassociate their reputations from their defeat and cover up their willing participation in war crimes. Boyd certainly changed the American art of war, but did he corrupt it in the process? The Blind Strategist separates fact from fantasy and exposes the myths of maneuver warfare through a detailed evidence-based investigation. Discover how maneuver warfare has resulted in catastrophic decisions in this must-read for anybody interested in American military history.
Author: Simon Serfaty
Publisher: University of Pennsylvania Press
ISBN: 0812203429
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 182
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Book Description
The commencement of war in Iraq in 2003 was met with a variety of reactions around the globe. In Architects of Delusion, Simon Serfaty presents a historical analysis of how and why the decision to wage war was endorsed by some of America's main European allies, especially Britain, and opposed by others, especially France and Germany. Tony Blair, George W. Bush, Jacques Chirac, and Gerhard Schroeder were, Serfaty argues, the architects of one of the most serious crises in postwar transatlantic relations. These four heads of state were the victims not only of their personal delusions but also of those of the nations they led. They all played the hand that their countries had dealt them—the forceful hand of a righteous America, the principled acquiescence of a faithful Britain, the determined intransigence of a quarrelsome France, and the ambiguous "new way" of a recast Germany. Serfaty's deft interweaving of the political histories and cultures of the four countries and the personalities of their leaders transcends the Europe-bashing debate sparked by the Iraq invasion. He contends that not one of these four leaders was entirely right or entirely wrong in his approach to the others or to the issues, before and during the war. For the resulting wounds to heal, though, and for the continuity of transatlantic relations, he reminds us that the United States and France must end their estrangement, France and Britain must resolve their differences, Germany must carry its weight relative to both France and Britain, and the United States must exert the same visionary leadership for the twenty-first century that it showed during its rise to preeminence in the twentieth century.
Author: Colin S. Gray
Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing USA
ISBN: 0313082243
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 209
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Book Description
Gray presents an inventive treatise on the nature of strategy, war, and peace, organized around forty maxims. This collection of mini-essays will forearm politicians, soldiers, and the attentive general public against many—probably most—fallacies that abound in contemporary debates about war, peace, and security. While one can never guarantee strategic success, which depends on policy, military prowess, and the quality of the dialogue between the two, a strategic education led by the judgments in these maxims increases the chances that one's errors will be small rather than catastrophic. The maxims are grouped according to five clusters. War and Peace tackles the larger issues of strategic history that drive the demand for the services of strategic thought and practice. Strategy presses further, into the realm of strategic behavior, and serves as a bridge between the political focus of part one and the military concerns that follow. In Military Power and Warfare turns to the pragmatic business of military performance: operations, tactics, and logistics. Part four, Security and Insecurity examines why strategy is important, including a discussion of the nature, dynamic character, and functioning of world politics. Finally, History and the Future is meant to help strategists better understand the processes of historical change.
