Victories Are Not Enough: Limitations Of The German Way Of War PDF Download
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Author: Dr. Samuel J. Newland
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 1786256363
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 160
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Book Description
Since the early stages of World War II, militaries in general, and the U.S. Army in particular, have studied the German way of war, specifically as practiced in the 20th century. While acknowledging that Germany—and before that nation came into existence, Prussia—produced some excellent armies, major problems with the German way of war must not be ignored. Even the casual observers should have noted that, despite the military prowess of Germany, it lost both of the major wars of the 20th century. This Letort Paper, authored by Dr. Samuel J. Newland, explores the reasons why a nation with such a strong military reputation was unable to win its wars and achieve its goals. He emphasizes that military power, tactical and operational brilliance, and victories in the field can easily be squandered if a nation has failed to set achievable goals and develop strategies to reach them. This failure, which led to Germany’s defeat in these wars, should not be lost on modern nations as they proceed into the 21st century.—Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., Director, Strategic Studies Institute
Author: Dr. Samuel J. Newland
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 1786256363
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 160
Get Book Here
Book Description
Since the early stages of World War II, militaries in general, and the U.S. Army in particular, have studied the German way of war, specifically as practiced in the 20th century. While acknowledging that Germany—and before that nation came into existence, Prussia—produced some excellent armies, major problems with the German way of war must not be ignored. Even the casual observers should have noted that, despite the military prowess of Germany, it lost both of the major wars of the 20th century. This Letort Paper, authored by Dr. Samuel J. Newland, explores the reasons why a nation with such a strong military reputation was unable to win its wars and achieve its goals. He emphasizes that military power, tactical and operational brilliance, and victories in the field can easily be squandered if a nation has failed to set achievable goals and develop strategies to reach them. This failure, which led to Germany’s defeat in these wars, should not be lost on modern nations as they proceed into the 21st century.—Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., Director, Strategic Studies Institute
Author:
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1428916482
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 103
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Book Description
Author: Samuel J. Newland
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Germany
Languages : en
Pages : 108
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Book Description
Since the early stages of World War II, militaries in general, and the U.S. Army in particular, have studied the German way of war, specifically as practiced in the 20th century. While acknowledging that Germany--and before that nation came into existence, Prussia--produced some excellent armies, major problems with the German way of war must not be ignored. Despite the military prowess of Germany, it lost both of the major wars of the 20th century. The author explores the reasons why a nation with such a strong military reputation was unable to win its wars and achieve its goals. He emphasizes that military power, tactical and operational brilliance, and victories in the field can easily be squandered if a nation has failed to set achievable goals and develop strategies to reach them. This failure should not be lost on modern nations as they proceed into the 21st century.
Author: Samuel J. Newland
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Germany
Languages : en
Pages : 104
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Book Description
Since the early stages of World War II, militaries in general, and the U.S. Army in particular, have studied the German way of war, specifically as practiced in the 20th century. While acknowledging that Germany--and before that nation came into existence, Prussia--produced some excellent armies, major problems with the German way of war must not be ignored. Despite the military prowess of Germany, it lost both of the major wars of the 20th century. The author explores the reasons why a nation with such a strong military reputation was unable to win its wars and achieve its goals. He emphasizes that military power, tactical and operational brilliance, and victories in the field can easily be squandered if a nation has failed to set achievable goals and develop strategies to reach them. This failure should not be lost on modern nations as they proceed into the 21st century.
Author: Samuel J. Newland
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781461193616
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 104
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Book Description
Since the early 1940s, the students of military operations in general, and from the United States in particular, have studied German military operations. While some of these studies have dealt with the wars of the imperial era, particularly the Wars of German Unification (1864- 71), much more study has centered on the wars waged by the Third Reich from 1939-45. From these studies, lessons have been extracted, and military doctrine has been influenced. Regrettably, however, as the German way of war has been studied, too often those studies have focused on the tactical or the operational levels of war. The exploits, the victories of German operational leaders such as Erwin Rommel, Heinz Guderian, and Eric von Manstein have been traditional favorites. And while the Germans have clearly influenced warfare on this level, even the casual observer should have noticed that the Germans fought two major wars in the 20th century and lost both of them, the second with disastrous consequences. Thus the question emerges, What was wrong with the oft-studied German way of war? A significant factor in their military failure can be laid at the top with both their civilian and military leadership. For while the Germans have excelled tactically and operationally, they have exhibited significant weaknesses in developing achievable goals for their nation and appropriate strategies for achieving these goals. In the time that stretched from the beginning of the 1860s until the end of World War II, Germany only had one brief period when it could bask in the glory of the European leadership it so desired. That brief period was from 1871 until 1889 when Otto von Bismarck was Chancellor. Following Bismarck (and Chief of the German General Staff Helmuth von Moltke), the German record of setting achievable goals and developing and following logical strategies is poor. This Letort Paper is designed to explore these issues and provide an overview of the development of Germany as a nation and German military thought in the 19th century. It examines the origins of modern German military thinking and the concepts promoted by some of Germany's key military and political leadership. It emphasizes that, if a nation is unwilling or incapable of designing logical strategies, tactical and operational victories in the field will come to naught.
Author: Robert Michael Citino
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 456
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Book Description
For Frederick the Great, the prescription for warfare was simple: kurz und vives (short and lively) - wars that relied upon swift, powerful, and decisive military operations. Robert Citino takes us on a dramatic march through Prussian and German military history to show how that primal theme played out time and time again. Citino focuses on operational warfare to demonstrate continuity in German military campaigns from the time of Elector Frederick Wilhelm and his great sleigh-drive against the Swedes to the age of Adolf Hitler and the blitzkrieg to the gates of Moscow. Along the way, he underscores the role played by the Prussian army in elevating a small, vulnerable state to the ranks of the European powers, describes how nineteenth-century victories over Austria and France made the German army the most respected in Europe, and reviews the lessons learned from the trenches of World War I.
Author: Carl von Clausewitz
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Military art and science
Languages : en
Pages : 388
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Book Description
Author: Daniel Hughes
Publisher: Presidio Press
ISBN: 0307538516
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 290
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Book Description
Field Marshal Helmuth Graf von Moltke is best known for his direction of the German/Prussian campaigns against Austria in 1866 and France in 1870-71, yet it was during his service as chief of the General Staff that he laid the foundation for the German way of war which would continue through 1945. Professor Daniel Hughes of the Air War College, in addition to editing and assisting with the translation of this selection of Moltke’s thoughts and theories on the art of war, has written an insightful commentary on “Moltke the Elder” that places him in the broader context of Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz’s sometimes abstract philosophical ideas. The book also contains an extensive bibliographic and historiographic commentary that includes references to Moltke and his theories in the current literature in Germany, England, and the United States—a valuable aid to anyone doing research on the subject. This volume, in addition to its appeal to scholars, serves as an introduction to the theory of the German army, as well as a summary of Moltke’s enduring theoretical legacy. Praise for Moltke on the Art of War “Moltke molded the Prussian and ultimately the German army at a time of technological and economic change. For that reason . . . this book deserves a much wider audience than those interested in nineteenth-century military history. Readers will be particularly grateful for the editor’s careful explanation of terms that are easily mistranslated in English, and for concise and useful footnotes and bibliography. A model of fine editing.”—Foreign Affairs Magazine “This valuable work ably compiles the selected writings on the art of war of one of military history’s greatest geniuses. [Moltke’s] impact on American military thinking persists, especially in various military staff college curricula. Strongly recommended.”—Armed Forces Journal “A thoughtfully edited, well-translated anthology that merits a place in any serious collection on the craft of war in the modern Western world."—Journal of Military History
Author: Timothy A. Wray
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781780394244
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 232
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Book Description
Author: Mark T. Calhoun
Publisher: University Press of Kansas
ISBN: 0700620699
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 432
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Book Description
George C. Marshall once called him "the brains of the army." And yet General Lesley J. McNair (1883-1944), a man so instrumental to America's military preparedness and Army modernization, remains little known today, his papers purportedly lost, destroyed by his wife in her grief at his death in Normandy. This book, the product of an abiding interest and painstaking research, restores the general Army Magazine calls one of "Marshall's forgotten men" to his rightful place in American military history. Because McNair contributed so substantially to America's war preparedness, this first complete account of his extensive and varied career also leads to a reevaluation of U.S. Army effectiveness during WWII. Born halfway between the Civil War and the dawn of the 20th century, Lesley McNair–"Whitey" by his classmates for his blond hair–graduated 11th of 124 in West Point's class of 1904 and rose slowly through the ranks like all officers in the early twentieth century. He was 31 when World War I erupted, 34 and a junior officer when American troops prepared to join the fight. It was during this time, and in the interwar period that followed the end of the First World War, that McNair's considerable influence on Army doctrine and training, equipment development, unit organization, and combined arms fighting methods developed. By looking at the whole of McNair's career–not just his service in WWII as chief of staff, General Headquarters, 1940-1942, and then as commander, Army Ground Forces, 1942-1944–Calhoun reassesses the evolution and extent of that influence during the war, as well as McNair's, and the Army's, wartime performance. This in-depth study tracks the significantly positive impact of McNair's efforts in several critical areas: advanced officer education; modernization, military innovation, and technological development; the field-testing of doctrine; streamlining and pooling of assets for necessary efficiency; arduous and realistic combat training; combined arms tactics; and an increasingly mechanized and mobile force. Because McNair served primarily in staff roles throughout his career and did not command combat formations during WWII, his contribution has never received the attention given to more public–and publicized–military exploits. In its detail and scope, this first full military biography reveals the unique and valuable perspective McNair's generalship offers for the serious student of military history and leadership.
