Author: David Russell Hansen
Publisher: Stanford University
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 147
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This dissertation is composed of three chapters. All three deal with topics in development economics. The first chapter examines the effects on village institutions of introducing formal financial institution options into the village. The second addresses the effects of government policy on educational investment and crime. The third tests the explanatory power of various explanations of the gender gap in math test scores. The first chapter examines the effects of a transition from a ``traditional'' economy based on an uncertain source of income, with risk fully insured away by one's neighbors in a social network through costly network ties, to a ``modern'' economy in which some agents have access to partial insurance at a lower cost. A theoretical model is used to show that village social networks can break down as some members of the village no longer need the insurance the social network provides, producing a reduction in welfare (if the costs of reducing moral hazard are not too high) for at least some individuals and possibly the village as a whole. This loss of welfare can occur even when networks provide other benefits to those belonging to them and is likely to be heterogeneous, depending on the opportunities and networks available to individuals. This paper tests these predictions using Indonesian data to examine the effect of a change in the banking institutions available to a community on the strength of social networks (measured by community participation) and welfare (measured by household expenditure and by child health). The analysis finds that changing financial institution availability in general does not influence community participation or welfare, but that financial institutions that primarily serve certain groups do relatively reduce the welfare of households not in those groups, which is consistent with the hypotheses generated by the model. Crime is an important feature of economic life in many countries, especially in the developing world. Crime distorts many economic decisions because it acts like an unpredictable tax on earnings. In particular, the threat of crime may influence people's willingness to invest in schooling or physical capital. The second chapter explores the questions "What influence do crime rates and levels of investment have on one another?" and "How do government policies affect the relationship between investment and crime?" by creating a simple structural model of crime and educational investment and attempting to fit this model to Mexican data. A method of simulated moments procedure is used to estimate parameters of the model and the estimated parameters are then used to carry out policy simulations. The simulations show that increasing spending on police or increasing the severity of punishment reduces crime but has little effect on educational investment. Increased educational subsidies increase educational investment but reduce crime only slightly. Thus, one type of policy is insufficient to accomplish the goals of both reducing crime and increasing education. The third chapter is joint work with Prashant Bharadwaj, Giacomo De Giorgi, and Christopher Neilson. Boys tend to have better performances than girls in mathematical testing; in particular, there are significantly more boys than girls among high achievers and the score distribution appears to have a longer right tail for boys. We confirm such results on several low- and middle-income countries. In particular we find that the gender gap is already present by age 10 and substantially increases by age 14 and 15. We propose and try to test a series of explanations for such a gap: (i) parental investment, (ii) ability, (iii) school resources, (iv) individual investment and effort (not tested directly), (v) competitive environment, and (vi) cultural norms. We conclude that none of our proposed explanations can account for a substantial portion of the gap.
Author: Artur Minkin
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 114
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Author: Christian Rafael Jaramillo Herrera
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 344
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Author: Roger White
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 768
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Author: Lori Lynn Parcel
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 362
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Author: S. Irudaya Rajan
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1136196935
Category : Social Science
Languages : en
Pages : 360
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Book Description
This book examines identities, violence and conflict in the context of internal migration within India. As India prepares to count its citizens for Census 2011 with a proposal for a National Population Register and a unique identity card for every Indian citizen, the debate on internal and cross-border migration is significant. The second volume in this annual series, India Migration Report 2011 focuses on the implications of internal migration, livelihood strategies, recruitment processes, and development and policy concerns in critically reviewing the existing institutional framework. The essays provide a district-level analysis of the various facets of migration with a focus on employment networks, gender dimensions and migration–development linkages, with concrete policy suggestions to improve living and working conditions of vulnerable migrant workers who are a lifeline to the growth of Indian economy. This will be an invaluable resource for those in the fields of demography, economics, sociology, public policy and administration.
Author: Tomas Rodriguez Barraquer
Publisher: Stanford University
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 210
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Book Description
Over the last few decades some analytic tools intensely used by economics have produced useful insights in topics formerly in the exclusive reach of other social sciences. In particular game theory, justifiable from either a multi-person decision theoretic perspective or from an evolutionary one, often serves as a generous yet sufficiently tight framework for interdisciplinary dialogue. The three essays in this collection apply game theory to answer questions with some aspects of economic interest. The three of them have in common that they are related to topics to which other social sciences, specially sociology, have made significant contributions. While working within economics I have attempted to use constructively and faithfully some of these ideas. Chapter 1, coauthored with Xu Tan, studies situations in which a set of agents take actions in order to convey private information to an observing third party which then assigns a set of prizes based on its beliefs about the ranking of the agents in terms of the unobservable characteristic. These situations were first studied using game theoretic frameworks by Spence and Akerlof in the early seventies, but some of the key insights date back to the foundational work of Veblen. In our analysis we focus on the competitive aspect of some of these situations and cast signals as random variables whose distributions are determined by the underlying unobservable characteristics. Under this formulation different signals have inherent meanings, preceding any stable conventions that may be established. We use these prior meanings to propose an equilibrium selection criterion, which significantly refines the very large set of sequential equilibria in this class of games. In Chapter 2, coauthored with Matthew O. Jackson and Xu Tan, we study the structure of social networks that allow individuals to cooperate with one another in settings in which behavior is non-contractible, by supporting schemes of credible ostracism of deviators. There is a significant literature on the subject of cooperation in social networks focusing on the role of the network in transmitting the information necessary for the timely punishment of deviators, and deriving properties of network structures able to sustain cooperation from that perspective. Ours is one of the first efforts to understand the network restrictions that emerge purely from the credibility of ostracism, carefully considering the implications that the dissolution of any given relationship may have over the sustainability of other relations in the community. In Chapter 3 I study the sets of Pure Strategy Nash equilibria of a variety of binary games of social influence under complete information. In a game of social influence agents simultaneously choose one of two possible strategies (to be inactive or be active), and the optimal choice depends on the strategies of the agents in their social environment. Different social environments and assumptions on the way in which they influence the behavior of the agents lead to different classes of games of varying degrees of tractability. In any such game an equilibrium can be described by the set of agents that are active, and the full set of equilibria can be thus represented as a collection of subsets of the set of agents. I build the analysis of each of the classes of games that I consider around the question: What collections of sets are expressible as the set of equilibria of some game in the class? I am able to provide precise answers to these questions in some of the classes studied, and in other cases just some pointers.
Author: Sherman Lewis
Publisher: Hayward Area Planning Association
ISBN:
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 191
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Book Description
These essays are for Americans concerned about the future of our country and for policy wonks. By and large, the political process is controlled by those who take an intertest in politics, large in number but small as a percent of population. Are you a member of the political class? Membership is voluntary. Our first 800 years of thinking: science culture and empathy from the Enlightenment ~1600 to ~ 2400 The Crisis of the Anthropocene: The most comprehensive description of all issues of the crisis in less than 100 pages. For the purpose of going through your mind to influence your brain. Musings on our Present Discontent: America, not advanced, not a democracy. Right to life for baby; right to choose for mom. Taxation. The security of a free state. Issues not discussed. The threat from within, Trumpism. The threat from without: Putinism. How to participate. Renewal.
Author: Paul Conal Winters
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Agriculture
Languages : en
Pages : 328
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Author: John Scott
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
ISBN: 9780415251099
Category : Social Science
Languages : en
Pages : 438
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This collection brings together the principal sources in the development of the techniques of social network analysis, from early metaphorical statements in Simmel and Radcliffe-Brown through the more systematic explorations in sociology and social anthropology, to contemporary formalizations. A new introduction explores the history of Social Networks and highlights the arguments of those who treat social network analysis as a loose, qualitative approach as well as those who see its potential in technical, mathematical uses. The thematically organized coverage includes: * Part I: Conceptualizing Social Networks * Part II: Topics and Developments in Graph Theory * Part III: Further Mathematical Models for Networks * Part IV: Applications: Family and Community * Part V: Applications: Corporate Power and Economic Structures * Part VI: Applications: Political, Protest, and Policy Networks * Part VII: Applications: Knowledge, Reputation, and Diffusion
