Three Essays in Market Microstructure PDF Download
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Author: Amitabh Arora
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 116
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Author: Amitabh Arora
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 116
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Author: Timothy Falcon Crack
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 274
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Author: Tatayana V. Zabotina
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ISBN:
Category : Futures market
Languages : en
Pages : 186
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Author: Giovanni Cespa
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ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 262
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Author: Sukwon Kim
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ISBN:
Category : Corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 148
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Author:
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Zeitungsausschnitte (1992-2000).
Author: Yi Xue
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Econometrics
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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This thesis consists of three essays that study three interdependent topics: microstructure foundation of volatility clustering, inefficiency of information diffusion and jump detection in high frequency financial time series data. Volatility clustering, with autocorrelations of the hyperbolic decay rate, is unquestionably one of the most important stylized facts of financial time series. The first essay forms Chapter 1 which presents a market microstructure model that is able to generate volatility clustering with hyperbolic autocorrelations through traders with multiple trading frequencies using Bayesian information updating in an incomplete market. The model illustrates that signal extraction, which is induced by multiple trading frequency, can increase the persistence of the volatility of returns. Furthermore, it is shown that the local temporal memory of the underlying time series of returns and their volatility varies greatly with the number of traders in the market. The second essay, Chapter 2, presents a market microstructure model showing that an increasing number of information hierarchies among informed competitive traders leads to a slower information diffusion rate and informational inefficiency. The model illustrates that informed traders may prefer trading with each other rather than with noise traders in the presence of the information hierarchies. Furthermore, it is shown that momentum can be generated from the trend following behavior pattern of noise traders. I propose a new nonparametric test based on wavelets to detect jump arrivals in high frequency financial time series data, in the third essay, Chapter 3. It is demonstrated that the test is robust for different specifications of price processes and the presence of market microstructure noise and it has good size and power. Further, I examine the multi-scale jump dynamics in U.S. equity markets and the findings are as follows. First, the jump dynamics of equities are entirely different across different time scales. Second, although arrival densities of positive jumps and negative jumps are symmetric across different time scales, the magnitude of jumps is distributed asymmetrically at high frequencies. Third, only twenty percent of jumps occur in the trading session from 9:30AM to 4:00PM, suggesting that jumps are largely determined by news rather than liquidity shocks.
Author: Rahul Ravi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 314
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Author: Daejin Kim
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Category : Arbitrage
Languages : en
Pages : 135
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Author: Sean Lew
Publisher:
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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This thesis contains three essays on market microstructure. Chapter 1 studies how endogenous information acquisition affects financial markets by modelling potentially informed traders who optimally acquire variable information at increasing cost. Prices affect the informed trading by providing incentives for acquiring information. Endogenous information acquisition explains the stylised facts that informed trading and transaction volume spike after informational events and fall over time. My model also tells a cautionary tale for interpreting measures of informed trading. Three common empirical proxies derived under the exogenous assumption (spreads, Easley O'Hara's PIN and blockholder interest) do not agree with each other in my setup. Chapter 2 develops a more general framework with endogenous information acquisition which I use to examine the behaviour of an optimal monopolistic market maker. Unlike a competitive market maker, he sets prices to increase information revelation which is valuable to him. I characterise market information structure by whether narrower or wider spreads increase the information revealed by trades. An optimal monopolistic market maker may behave differently from the standard exogenous information benchmark. He may set narrower spreads in early periods. On average, spreads may widen over time. The different results arise from the interaction of a monopolistic market maker with endogenous information acquisition. Chapter 3 studies the impact of confidential treatment requests made by institutional investors to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to delay disclosure of their holdings. The SEC requires the manager to present a coherent on-going trading program in his request for confidential treatment. If granted, he is restricted to trade in a manner consistent with his reported forecast in the subsequent period. Under the restriction, the manager earns higher expected profits by applying for confidential treatment only if his probability of success exceeds a threshold. The model predicts that the price impact of a disclosed trade due to a confidential treatment request denial is greater than that of a disclosed trade where there is no request.
