Author: Frederick D. Parker
Publisher: CreateSpace
ISBN: 9781478344292
Category : Pearl Harbor (Hawaii), Attack on, 1941
Languages : en
Pages : 104
Book Description
This is the story of the U.S. Navy's communications intelligence (COMINT) effort between 1924 and 1941. It races the building of a program, under the Director of Naval Communications (OP-20), which extracted both radio and traffic intelligence from foreign military, commercial, and diplomatic communications. It shows the development of a small but remarkable organization (OP-20-G) which, by 1937, could clearly see the military, political, and even the international implications of effective cryptography and successful cryptanalysis at a time when radio communications were passing from infancy to childhood and Navy war planning was restricted to tactical situations. It also illustrates an organization plagues from its inception by shortages in money, manpower, and equipment, total absence of a secure, dedicated communications system, little real support or tasking from higher command authorities, and major imbalances between collection and processing capabilities. It explains how, in 1941, as a result of these problems, compounded by the stresses and exigencies of the time, the effort misplaced its focus from Japanese Navy traffic to Japanese diplomatic messages. Had Navy cryptanalysts been ordered to concentrate on the Japanese naval messages rather than Japanese diplomatic traffic, the United States would have had a much clearer picture of the Japanese military buildup and, with the warning provided by these messages, might have avoided the disaster of Pearl Harbor.
Pearl Harbor Revisited
Author: Frederick D. Parker
Publisher: CreateSpace
ISBN: 9781478344292
Category : Pearl Harbor (Hawaii), Attack on, 1941
Languages : en
Pages : 104
Book Description
This is the story of the U.S. Navy's communications intelligence (COMINT) effort between 1924 and 1941. It races the building of a program, under the Director of Naval Communications (OP-20), which extracted both radio and traffic intelligence from foreign military, commercial, and diplomatic communications. It shows the development of a small but remarkable organization (OP-20-G) which, by 1937, could clearly see the military, political, and even the international implications of effective cryptography and successful cryptanalysis at a time when radio communications were passing from infancy to childhood and Navy war planning was restricted to tactical situations. It also illustrates an organization plagues from its inception by shortages in money, manpower, and equipment, total absence of a secure, dedicated communications system, little real support or tasking from higher command authorities, and major imbalances between collection and processing capabilities. It explains how, in 1941, as a result of these problems, compounded by the stresses and exigencies of the time, the effort misplaced its focus from Japanese Navy traffic to Japanese diplomatic messages. Had Navy cryptanalysts been ordered to concentrate on the Japanese naval messages rather than Japanese diplomatic traffic, the United States would have had a much clearer picture of the Japanese military buildup and, with the warning provided by these messages, might have avoided the disaster of Pearl Harbor.
Publisher: CreateSpace
ISBN: 9781478344292
Category : Pearl Harbor (Hawaii), Attack on, 1941
Languages : en
Pages : 104
Book Description
This is the story of the U.S. Navy's communications intelligence (COMINT) effort between 1924 and 1941. It races the building of a program, under the Director of Naval Communications (OP-20), which extracted both radio and traffic intelligence from foreign military, commercial, and diplomatic communications. It shows the development of a small but remarkable organization (OP-20-G) which, by 1937, could clearly see the military, political, and even the international implications of effective cryptography and successful cryptanalysis at a time when radio communications were passing from infancy to childhood and Navy war planning was restricted to tactical situations. It also illustrates an organization plagues from its inception by shortages in money, manpower, and equipment, total absence of a secure, dedicated communications system, little real support or tasking from higher command authorities, and major imbalances between collection and processing capabilities. It explains how, in 1941, as a result of these problems, compounded by the stresses and exigencies of the time, the effort misplaced its focus from Japanese Navy traffic to Japanese diplomatic messages. Had Navy cryptanalysts been ordered to concentrate on the Japanese naval messages rather than Japanese diplomatic traffic, the United States would have had a much clearer picture of the Japanese military buildup and, with the warning provided by these messages, might have avoided the disaster of Pearl Harbor.
Soviet Military Operational Art
Author: David M. Glantz
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
ISBN: 9780714640778
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 328
Book Description
David Glantz examines the Soviet study of war, the re-emergence of the operation level, the evolution of the Soviet theory of operations in depth before 1941, and its application in the European theatre and the Far East between 1941 and 1945.
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
ISBN: 9780714640778
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 328
Book Description
David Glantz examines the Soviet study of war, the re-emergence of the operation level, the evolution of the Soviet theory of operations in depth before 1941, and its application in the European theatre and the Far East between 1941 and 1945.
Japan’s Decision For War In 1941: Some Enduring Lessons
Author: Dr. Jeffrey Record
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 1786252961
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 105
Book Description
Japan’s decision to attack the United States in 1941 is widely regarded as irrational to the point of suicidal. How could Japan hope to survive a war with, much less defeat, an enemy possessing an invulnerable homeland and an industrial base 10 times that of Japan? The Pacific War was one that Japan was always going to lose, so how does one explain Tokyo’s decision? Did the Japanese recognize the odds against them? Did they have a concept of victory, or at least of avoiding defeat? Or did the Japanese prefer a lost war to an unacceptable peace? Dr. Jeffrey Record takes a fresh look at Japan’s decision for war, and concludes that it was dictated by Japanese pride and the threatened economic destruction of Japan by the United States. He believes that Japanese aggression in East Asia was the root cause of the Pacific War, but argues that the road to war in 1941 was built on American as well as Japanese miscalculations and that both sides suffered from cultural ignorance and racial arrogance. Record finds that the Americans underestimated the role of fear and honor in Japanese calculations and overestimated the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a deterrent to war, whereas the Japanese underestimated the cohesion and resolve of an aroused American society and overestimated their own martial prowess as a means of defeating U.S. material superiority. He believes that the failure of deterrence was mutual, and that the descent of the United States and Japan into war contains lessons of great and continuing relevance to American foreign policy and defense decision-makers.
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 1786252961
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 105
Book Description
Japan’s decision to attack the United States in 1941 is widely regarded as irrational to the point of suicidal. How could Japan hope to survive a war with, much less defeat, an enemy possessing an invulnerable homeland and an industrial base 10 times that of Japan? The Pacific War was one that Japan was always going to lose, so how does one explain Tokyo’s decision? Did the Japanese recognize the odds against them? Did they have a concept of victory, or at least of avoiding defeat? Or did the Japanese prefer a lost war to an unacceptable peace? Dr. Jeffrey Record takes a fresh look at Japan’s decision for war, and concludes that it was dictated by Japanese pride and the threatened economic destruction of Japan by the United States. He believes that Japanese aggression in East Asia was the root cause of the Pacific War, but argues that the road to war in 1941 was built on American as well as Japanese miscalculations and that both sides suffered from cultural ignorance and racial arrogance. Record finds that the Americans underestimated the role of fear and honor in Japanese calculations and overestimated the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a deterrent to war, whereas the Japanese underestimated the cohesion and resolve of an aroused American society and overestimated their own martial prowess as a means of defeating U.S. material superiority. He believes that the failure of deterrence was mutual, and that the descent of the United States and Japan into war contains lessons of great and continuing relevance to American foreign policy and defense decision-makers.
Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence
Author: Richard K. Betts
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1135759650
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 236
Book Description
Part of a three part collection in honour of the teachings of Michael I. Handel, one of the foremost strategists of the late 20th century, this collection explores the paradoxes of intelligence analysis, surprise and deception from both historical and theoretical perspectives.
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1135759650
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 236
Book Description
Part of a three part collection in honour of the teachings of Michael I. Handel, one of the foremost strategists of the late 20th century, this collection explores the paradoxes of intelligence analysis, surprise and deception from both historical and theoretical perspectives.
Strategic Intelligence
Author: Bloomsbury Publishing
Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing USA
ISBN: 0313065284
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 1808
Book Description
While several fine texts on intelligence have been published over the past decade, there is no complementary set of volumes that addresses the subject in a comprehensive manner for the general reader. This major set explains how the sixteen major U.S. intelligence agencies operate, how they collect information from around the world, the problems they face in providing further insight into this raw information through the techniques of analysis, and the difficulties that accompany the dissemination of intelligence to policymakers in a timely manner. Further, in a democracy it is important to have accountability over secret agencies and to consider some ethical benchmarks in carrying out clandestine operations. In addition to intelligence collection and analysis and the subject of intelligence accountability, this set addresses the challenges of counterintelligence and counterterrorism, as well covert action. Further, it provides comparisons regarding the various approaches to intelligence adopted by other nations around the world. Its five volumes underscore the history, the politics, and the policies needed for a solid comprehension of how the U.S. intelligence community functions in the modern age of globalization, characterized by a rapid flow of information across national boundaries.
Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing USA
ISBN: 0313065284
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 1808
Book Description
While several fine texts on intelligence have been published over the past decade, there is no complementary set of volumes that addresses the subject in a comprehensive manner for the general reader. This major set explains how the sixteen major U.S. intelligence agencies operate, how they collect information from around the world, the problems they face in providing further insight into this raw information through the techniques of analysis, and the difficulties that accompany the dissemination of intelligence to policymakers in a timely manner. Further, in a democracy it is important to have accountability over secret agencies and to consider some ethical benchmarks in carrying out clandestine operations. In addition to intelligence collection and analysis and the subject of intelligence accountability, this set addresses the challenges of counterintelligence and counterterrorism, as well covert action. Further, it provides comparisons regarding the various approaches to intelligence adopted by other nations around the world. Its five volumes underscore the history, the politics, and the policies needed for a solid comprehension of how the U.S. intelligence community functions in the modern age of globalization, characterized by a rapid flow of information across national boundaries.
The State of Strategic Intelligence, June 1941
Author: Robert C. Smith
Publisher: Merriam Press
ISBN: 1576380610
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 68
Book Description
Publisher: Merriam Press
ISBN: 1576380610
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 68
Book Description
Essentials of Strategic Intelligence
Author: Loch K. Johnson
Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing USA
ISBN:
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 399
Book Description
A highly valuable resource for students of intelligence studies, strategy and security, and foreign policy, this volume provides readers with an accessible and comprehensive exploration of U.S. espionage activities that addresses both the practical and ethical implications that attend the art and science of spying. Essentials of Strategic Intelligence investigates a subject unknown to or misunderstood by most American citizens: how U.S. foreign and security policy is derived from the information collection operations and data analysis by the sixteen major U.S. intelligence agencies. The essays in this work draw back the curtain on the hidden side of America's government, explaining the roles of various intelligence missions, justifying the existence of U.S. intelligence agencies, and addressing the complex moral questions that arise in the conduct of secret operations. After an introductory overview, the book presents accessibly written essays on the key topics: intelligence collection-and-analysis, counterintelligence, covert action, and intelligence accountability. Readers will understand how intelligence directly informs policymakers and why democracies need secret agencies; learn how the CIA has become deeply involved in the war-like assassination operations that target suspected foreign terrorists, even some individuals who are American citizens; and appreciate how the existence of—and our reliance on—these intelligence agencies poses challenges for democratic governance.
Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing USA
ISBN:
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 399
Book Description
A highly valuable resource for students of intelligence studies, strategy and security, and foreign policy, this volume provides readers with an accessible and comprehensive exploration of U.S. espionage activities that addresses both the practical and ethical implications that attend the art and science of spying. Essentials of Strategic Intelligence investigates a subject unknown to or misunderstood by most American citizens: how U.S. foreign and security policy is derived from the information collection operations and data analysis by the sixteen major U.S. intelligence agencies. The essays in this work draw back the curtain on the hidden side of America's government, explaining the roles of various intelligence missions, justifying the existence of U.S. intelligence agencies, and addressing the complex moral questions that arise in the conduct of secret operations. After an introductory overview, the book presents accessibly written essays on the key topics: intelligence collection-and-analysis, counterintelligence, covert action, and intelligence accountability. Readers will understand how intelligence directly informs policymakers and why democracies need secret agencies; learn how the CIA has become deeply involved in the war-like assassination operations that target suspected foreign terrorists, even some individuals who are American citizens; and appreciate how the existence of—and our reliance on—these intelligence agencies poses challenges for democratic governance.
Stalin's Secret War
Author: Robert W. Stephan
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 424
Book Description
An animated adaptation of the story of the same title by Maurice Sendak in which a small boy makes a visit to the land of the wild things. Tells how he tames the creatures and returns home. For primary grades.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 424
Book Description
An animated adaptation of the story of the same title by Maurice Sendak in which a small boy makes a visit to the land of the wild things. Tells how he tames the creatures and returns home. For primary grades.
Assessing the Tradecraft of Intelligence Analysis
Author: Gregory F. Treverton
Publisher: Rand Corporation
ISBN: 0833046012
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 75
Book Description
This report assesses intelligence analysis across the main U.S. intelligence agencies and makes a number of recommendations, some of which parallel initiatives that have begun in the wake of the December 2004 legislation, for instance, create a Deputy Director of National Intelligence as a focal point for analysis, establish a National Intelligence University, build a Long Term Analysis Unit at the National Intelligence Council, and form an Open Source Center for making more creative use of open-source materials.
Publisher: Rand Corporation
ISBN: 0833046012
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 75
Book Description
This report assesses intelligence analysis across the main U.S. intelligence agencies and makes a number of recommendations, some of which parallel initiatives that have begun in the wake of the December 2004 legislation, for instance, create a Deputy Director of National Intelligence as a focal point for analysis, establish a National Intelligence University, build a Long Term Analysis Unit at the National Intelligence Council, and form an Open Source Center for making more creative use of open-source materials.
Stalin's Other War
Author: Albert L. Weeks
Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers
ISBN: 146164349X
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 215
Book Description
On June 22, 1941, just less than two years after signing the Nazi-Soviet Agreements, Adolf Hitler's German army invaded the Soviet Union. The attack hardly came as a surprise to Josef Stalin; in fact, history has long held that Stalin spent the two intervening years building up his defenses against a Nazi attack. With the gradual declassifying of former Soviet documents, though, historians are learning more and more about Stalin's grand plan during the years 1939-1941. Longtime Soviet expert Albert L. Weeks has studied the newly-released information and come to a different conclusion about the Soviet Union's pre-war buildup_it was not precaution against German invasion at all. In fact, Weeks argues, the evidence now suggests Soviet mobilization was aimed at an eventual invasion of Nazi Germany. The Soviets were quietly biding their time between 1939 and 1941, allowing the capitalist powers to destroy one another, all the while preparing for their own Westward march. Stalin, Weeks shows, wasn't waiting for a Nazi attack_Hitler simply beat him to the punch.
Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers
ISBN: 146164349X
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 215
Book Description
On June 22, 1941, just less than two years after signing the Nazi-Soviet Agreements, Adolf Hitler's German army invaded the Soviet Union. The attack hardly came as a surprise to Josef Stalin; in fact, history has long held that Stalin spent the two intervening years building up his defenses against a Nazi attack. With the gradual declassifying of former Soviet documents, though, historians are learning more and more about Stalin's grand plan during the years 1939-1941. Longtime Soviet expert Albert L. Weeks has studied the newly-released information and come to a different conclusion about the Soviet Union's pre-war buildup_it was not precaution against German invasion at all. In fact, Weeks argues, the evidence now suggests Soviet mobilization was aimed at an eventual invasion of Nazi Germany. The Soviets were quietly biding their time between 1939 and 1941, allowing the capitalist powers to destroy one another, all the while preparing for their own Westward march. Stalin, Weeks shows, wasn't waiting for a Nazi attack_Hitler simply beat him to the punch.