The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension

The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension PDF Author: László Á Kóczy
Publisher:
ISBN: 9789639588226
Category : Environmental economics
Languages : en
Pages : 21

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The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension

The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension PDF Author: László Á Kóczy
Publisher:
ISBN: 9789639588226
Category : Environmental economics
Languages : en
Pages : 21

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The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension

The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension PDF Author: László Á Kóczy
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 15

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A set of outcomes for a TU-game in characteristic function form is dominant if it is, with respect to an outsider-independent dominance relation, accessible (or admissible) and closed. This outsider-independent dominance relation is restrictive in the sense that a deviating coalition cannot determine the payoffs of those coalitions that are not involved in the deviation. The minimal (for inclusion) dominant set is non-empty and for a game with a non-empty coalition structure core, the minimal dominant set returns this core.

The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-empty Core-extension

The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-empty Core-extension PDF Author: Kóczy Á László
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

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Partition Function Form Games

Partition Function Form Games PDF Author: László Á. Kóczy
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 3319698419
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 320

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This book presents a systematic overview on partition function form games: a game form in cooperative game theory to integrate externalities for various applications. Cooperative game theory has been immensely useful to study a wide range of issues, but the standard approaches ignore the side effects of cooperation. Recently interest shifted to problems where externalities play the main roles such as models of cooperation in market competition or the shared use of public resources. Such problems require richer models that can explicitly evaluate the side-effects of cooperation. In partition function form games the value of cooperation depends on the outsiders' actions. A recent surge of interest driven by applications has made results very fragmented. This book offers an accessible, yet comprehensive and systematic study of properties, solutions and applications of partition function games surveying both theoretical results and their applications. It assembles a survey of existing research and smaller original results as well as original interpretations and comparisons. The book is self-contained and accessible for readers with little or no knowledge of cooperative game theory.

A Meta-analysis of the Willingness to Pay for Reductions in Pesticide Risk Exposure

A Meta-analysis of the Willingness to Pay for Reductions in Pesticide Risk Exposure PDF Author: Chiara M. Travisi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Meta-analysis
Languages : en
Pages : 44

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Valuation of Ecosystem Services Provided by Biodiversity Conservation

Valuation of Ecosystem Services Provided by Biodiversity Conservation PDF Author: Ingo Bräuer
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Biodiversity conservation
Languages : en
Pages : 24

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The Equivalence of the Minimal Dominant Set and the Myopic Stable Set for Coalition Function Form Games

The Equivalence of the Minimal Dominant Set and the Myopic Stable Set for Coalition Function Form Games PDF Author: Peter Jean-Jacques Herings
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

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Book Description
In cooperative games, the coalition structure core is, despite its potential emptiness, one of the most popular solutions. While it is a fundamentally static concept, the consideration of a sequential extension of the underlying dominance correspondence gave rise to a selection of non-empty generalizations. Among these, the payoff-equivalence minimal dominant set and the myopic stable set are defined by a similar set of conditions. We identify some problems with the payoff-equivalence minimal dominant set and propose an appropriate reformulation called the minimal dominant set. We show that replacing asymptotic external stability by sequential weak dominance leaves the myopic stable set unaffected. The myopic stable set is therefore equivalent to the minimal dominant set.

Taxing Land Rent in an Open Economy

Taxing Land Rent in an Open Economy PDF Author: Alberto Petrucci
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Investments, Foreign
Languages : en
Pages : 40

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Integrated Environmental Study for Beach Management

Integrated Environmental Study for Beach Management PDF Author: Mauro Fabiano
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Beaches
Languages : en
Pages : 28

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Natural Resources Dynamics

Natural Resources Dynamics PDF Author: Giuseppe Di Vita
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Natural resources
Languages : en
Pages : 36

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