Testing a Purportedly More Learnable Auction Mechanism

Testing a Purportedly More Learnable Auction Mechanism PDF Author: Katherine L. Milkman
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
We describe an auction mechanism in the class of Groves mechanisms that has received attention in the computer science literature because of its theoretical property of being more "learnable" than the standard second price auction mechanism. We bring this mechanism, which we refer to as the "clamped second price auction mechanism," into the laboratory to determine whether it helps human subjects learn to play their optimal strategy faster than the standard second price auction mechanism. Contrary to earlier results within computer science using simulated reinforcement learning agents, we find that both in settings where subjects are given complete information about auction payoff rules and in settings where they are given no information about auction payoff rules, subjects converge on playing their optimal strategy significantly faster in sequential auctions conducted with a standard second price auction mechanism than with a clamped second price auction mechanism. We conclude that while it is important for mechanism designers to think more about creating learnable mechanisms, the clamped second price auction mechanism in fact produces slower learning in human subjects than the standard second price auction mechanism. Our results also serve to highlight differences in behavior between simulated agents and human bidders that mechanism designers should take into account before placing too much faith in simulations to test the performance of mechanisms intended for human use.

Testing a Purportedly More Learnable Auction Mechanism

Testing a Purportedly More Learnable Auction Mechanism PDF Author: Katherine L. Milkman
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
We describe an auction mechanism in the class of Groves mechanisms that has received attention in the computer science literature because of its theoretical property of being more "learnable" than the standard second price auction mechanism. We bring this mechanism, which we refer to as the "clamped second price auction mechanism," into the laboratory to determine whether it helps human subjects learn to play their optimal strategy faster than the standard second price auction mechanism. Contrary to earlier results within computer science using simulated reinforcement learning agents, we find that both in settings where subjects are given complete information about auction payoff rules and in settings where they are given no information about auction payoff rules, subjects converge on playing their optimal strategy significantly faster in sequential auctions conducted with a standard second price auction mechanism than with a clamped second price auction mechanism. We conclude that while it is important for mechanism designers to think more about creating learnable mechanisms, the clamped second price auction mechanism in fact produces slower learning in human subjects than the standard second price auction mechanism. Our results also serve to highlight differences in behavior between simulated agents and human bidders that mechanism designers should take into account before placing too much faith in simulations to test the performance of mechanisms intended for human use.

Testing a Purportedly More Learnable Auction Mechanism

Testing a Purportedly More Learnable Auction Mechanism PDF Author: Katherine L. Milkman
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 37

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Book Description
We describe an auction mechanism in the class of Groves mechanisms that has received attention in the computer science literature because of its theoretical property of being more "learnable" than the standard second price auction mechanism. We bring this mechanism, which we refer to as the "clamped second price auction mechanism," into the laboratory to determine whether it helps human subjects learn to play their optimal strategy faster than the standard second price auction mechanism.

Learning in Repeated Auctions

Learning in Repeated Auctions PDF Author: Thomas Nedelec
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781680839388
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 170

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Book Description
Online auctions are one of the most fundamental facets of the modern economy and power an industry generating hundreds of billions of dollars a year in revenue. Online auction theory has historically focused on the question of designing the best way to sell a single item to potential buyers relying on some prior knowledge agents were assumed to have on each other. In new markets, such as online advertising, however, similar items are sold repeatedly, and agents are unaware of each other or might try to manipulate each other, making the assumption invalid. Statistical learning theory now provides tools to supplement those missing pieces of information given enough data, as agents can learn from their environment to improve their strategies. This book is a comprehensive introduction to the learning techniques in repeated auctions. It covers everything from the traditional economic study of optimal one-shot auctions, through learning optimal mechanisms from a dataset of bidders' past values, to showing how strategic agents can actually manipulate repeated auctions to their own advantage. The authors explore the effects of different scenarios and assumptions throughout while remaining grounded in real-world applications. Many of the ideas and algorithms described are used every day to power the Internet economy. This book provides students, researchers and practitioners with a deep understanding of the theory of online auctions and gives practical examples of how to implement in modern-day internet systems.

Learning in Repeated Auctions

Learning in Repeated Auctions PDF Author: THOMAS NEDELEC; CLEMENT CALAUZENES; NOUREDDINE EL.
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781680839395
Category : Internet auctions
Languages : en
Pages :

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Book Description
Online auctions are one of the most fundamental facets of the modern economy and power an industry generating hundreds of billions of dollars a year in revenue. Online auction theory has historically focused on the question of designing the best way to sell a single item to potential buyers relying on some prior knowledge agents were assumed to have on each other. In new markets, such as online advertising, however, similar items are sold repeatedly, and agents are unaware of each other or might try to manipulate each other, making the assumption invalid. Statistical learning theory now provides tools to supplement those missing pieces of information given enough data, as agents can learn from their environment to improve their strategies. This book is a comprehensive introduction to the learning techniques in repeated auctions. It covers everything from the traditional economic study of optimal one-shot auctions, through learning optimal mechanisms from a dataset of bidders0́9 past values, to showing how strategic agents can actually manipulate repeated auctions to their own advantage. The authors explore the effects of different scenarios and assumptions throughout while remaining grounded in real-world applications. Many of the ideas and algorithms described are used every day to power the Internet economy. This book provides students, researchers and practitioners with a deep understanding of the theory of online auctions and gives practical examples of how to implement in modern-day internet systems.

Social Science Research

Social Science Research PDF Author: Anol Bhattacherjee
Publisher: CreateSpace
ISBN: 9781475146127
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 156

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Book Description
This book is designed to introduce doctoral and graduate students to the process of conducting scientific research in the social sciences, business, education, public health, and related disciplines. It is a one-stop, comprehensive, and compact source for foundational concepts in behavioral research, and can serve as a stand-alone text or as a supplement to research readings in any doctoral seminar or research methods class. This book is currently used as a research text at universities on six continents and will shortly be available in nine different languages.

Markets in Profile

Markets in Profile PDF Author: James F. Dalton
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
ISBN: 9781118044643
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 224

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Book Description
Markets in Profile explores the confluence of three disparate philosophical frameworks: the Market Profile, behavioral finance, and neuroeconomics in order to present a unified theory of how markets work. The Market Profile is an ever-evolving, multidimensional graphic that gives visual form to the market's continuing auction process, revealing the myriad underlying dynamics that influence market activity. Behavioral finance posits that investors are driven more by emotional factors and the subjective interpretation of minutia than by "rationality" when making investment decisions. And neuroeconomics is the study of how investor psychology permeates and affects the financial markets. Mr. Dalton explicates the ways in which irrational human behavior influences the market's natural auction process, creating frequently predictable market structure, which results in opportunities for investors to ameliorate risk. The book will improve investors ability to interpret change in markets, enabling better, more confident investment decisions.

Robust Mechanism Design

Robust Mechanism Design PDF Author: Dirk Bergemann
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 981437458X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 471

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Book Description
Foreword by Eric Maskin (Nobel Laureate in Economics, 2007)This volume brings together the collected contributions on the theme of robust mechanism design and robust implementation that Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris have been working on for the past decade. The collection is preceded by a comprehensive introductory essay, specifically written for this volume with the aim of providing the readers with an overview of the research agenda pursued in the collected papers.The introduction selectively presents the main results of the papers, and attempts to illustrate many of them in terms of a common and canonical example, namely a single unit auction with interdependent values. It is our hope that the use of this example facilitates the presentation of the results and that it brings the main insights within the context of an important economic mechanism, namely the generalized second price auction.

The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report

The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report PDF Author: Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
Publisher: Cosimo, Inc.
ISBN: 1616405414
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 692

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Book Description
The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, published by the U.S. Government and the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in early 2011, is the official government report on the United States financial collapse and the review of major financial institutions that bankrupted and failed, or would have without help from the government. The commission and the report were implemented after Congress passed an act in 2009 to review and prevent fraudulent activity. The report details, among other things, the periods before, during, and after the crisis, what led up to it, and analyses of subprime mortgage lending, credit expansion and banking policies, the collapse of companies like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and the federal bailouts of Lehman and AIG. It also discusses the aftermath of the fallout and our current state. This report should be of interest to anyone concerned about the financial situation in the U.S. and around the world.THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION is an independent, bi-partisan, government-appointed panel of 10 people that was created to "examine the causes, domestic and global, of the current financial and economic crisis in the United States." It was established as part of the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009. The commission consisted of private citizens with expertise in economics and finance, banking, housing, market regulation, and consumer protection. They examined and reported on "the collapse of major financial institutions that failed or would have failed if not for exceptional assistance from the government."News Dissector DANNY SCHECHTER is a journalist, blogger and filmmaker. He has been reporting on economic crises since the 1980's when he was with ABC News. His film In Debt We Trust warned of the economic meltdown in 2006. He has since written three books on the subject including Plunder: Investigating Our Economic Calamity (Cosimo Books, 2008), and The Crime Of Our Time: Why Wall Street Is Not Too Big to Jail (Disinfo Books, 2011), a companion to his latest film Plunder The Crime Of Our Time. He can be reached online at www.newsdissector.com.

The Manchurian Candidate

The Manchurian Candidate PDF Author: Richard Condon
Publisher: RosettaBooks
ISBN: 0795335067
Category : Fiction
Languages : en
Pages : 312

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Book Description
The classic thriller about a hostile foreign power infiltrating American politics: “Brilliant . . . wild and exhilarating.” —The New Yorker A war hero and the recipient of the Congressional Medal of Honor, Sgt. Raymond Shaw is keeping a deadly secret—even from himself. During his time as a prisoner of war in North Korea, he was brainwashed by his Communist captors and transformed into a deadly weapon—a sleeper assassin, programmed to kill without question or mercy at his captors’ signal. Now he’s been returned to the United States with a covert mission: to kill a candidate running for US president . . . This “shocking, tense” and sharply satirical novel has become a modern classic, and was the basis for two film adaptations (San Francisco Chronicle). “Crammed with suspense.” —Chicago Tribune “Condon is wickedly skillful.” —Time

Handbook of Test Development

Handbook of Test Development PDF Author: Suzanne Lane
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1136242570
Category : Education
Languages : en
Pages : 676

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Book Description
The second edition of the Handbook of Test Development provides graduate students and professionals with an up-to-date, research-oriented guide to the latest developments in the field. Including thirty-two chapters by well-known scholars and practitioners, it is divided into five sections, covering the foundations of test development, content definition, item development, test design and form assembly, and the processes of test administration, documentation, and evaluation. Keenly aware of developments in the field since the publication of the first edition, including changes in technology, the evolution of psychometric theory, and the increased demands for effective tests via educational policy, the editors of this edition include new chapters on assessing noncognitive skills, measuring growth and learning progressions, automated item generation and test assembly, and computerized scoring of constructed responses. The volume also includes expanded coverage of performance testing, validity, fairness, and numerous other topics. Edited by Suzanne Lane, Mark R. Raymond, and Thomas M. Haladyna, The Handbook of Test Development, 2nd edition, is based on the revised Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing, and is appropriate for graduate courses and seminars that deal with test development and usage, professional testing services and credentialing agencies, state and local boards of education, and academic libraries serving these groups.