Supply Chain Coordination by Contracts Under Binomial Production Yield PDF Download
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Author: Karl Inderfurth
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 40
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Author: Karl Inderfurth
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 40
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Author: Josephine Clemens
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Karl Inderfurth
Publisher:
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 31
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Author: Ruxandra Maria Bejinariu
Publisher: Springer Nature
ISBN: 3658293896
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 320
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In this book Ruxandra Maria Bejinariu introduces an innovative approach related to improving the risk assessment process by using unexploited methods that have been mainly used in limited areas of business and identifying both threats and opportunities that can be generated as a result of risk materialization. The study can offer possibilities of improving the risk assessment process with a direct impact on increasing the organizations’ risk appetite and sustainable performance.​
Author: Marcus Dettenbach
Publisher: Logos Verlag Berlin GmbH
ISBN: 3832539905
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 148
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This book focuses on supply chains with uncertainty due to random yields. A common assumption in such systems is that the yields are observable only after all transportation or production steps are completed. The actual yield realization however happens earlier during the process. Technological advances and stronger supply chain collaboration make it possible to observe yield realization in real time and therefore close the time gap between the event and the observation. Within this thesis optimal and heuristic policies are developed that make use of this new type of information in various supply chain settings. These policies are used to identify conditions under which real time yield information is particularly beneficial. This book is relevant to both scholars and practitioners interested in managing supply chains with random yields.
Author: Guido Vogt
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642201326
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 208
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Information sharing is frequently promoted as a mean to improve the supply chain performance. This work shows the results of behavioral experiments, in which the participants share private information in order to influence the contract terms in a Just-in-Time environment. It is shown that the impact of information sharing is ambiguous, and dependent on several factors, such as contract flexibility and complexity or the interacting behavioral types. The experimental results form the basis for a behavioral principal-agent model that gives valuable insights on how the interaction of trust, trustworthiness and the information sharing strategy impacts the supply chain performance.
Author: Hongjun Peng
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Capital deficit due to capital constraints is a very common issue in supply chains and suppliers (such as farmers) often face yield uncertainty. A coordination problem for a supply chain with capital constraints and yield uncertainty is considered in this paper. In order to improve the supply chain, a buyback and risk sharing (BBRS) mechanism is proposed, in which the distributor shares the yield uncertainty risk with the supplier by purchasing the overproduced products at the end of the production season, and the supplier buys back the unsold products from the distributor at the end of the sales season. The results indicate that under the BBRS, the profits and the strategies of the supply chain are the same with those under the centralized case. In addition, the proposed BBRS mechanism has a built-in mechanism to allocate the spillover profit between the supplier and the distributor, and the actual allocation may depend on their negotiation skills. The managerial insight is that, for the capital constrained supply chain with yield uncertainty, it can be coordinated if the yield uncertainty risk and the market demand uncertainty risk are shared between the supplier and the distributor.
Author: Guang Xiao
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Electronic dissertations
Languages : en
Pages : 178
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The main purpose of this dissertation is to focus on designing and evaluating operational strategies to effectively mitigate both the production yield and the commodity price risks, which are among the primary challenges firms need to battle against in today's global economy.In the first chapter, we investigate the fundamental question about how to allocate supply risk within a bilateral supply chain. More specifically, we consider a supplier-retailer supply chain with supply random yield and deterministic demand. We study the impact of three commonly used implementations of single wholesale price contracts on allocating supply yield risk between supply chain parties and on channel performance. In a push contract, the retailer controls the production decision and bears all the risk; in a pull contract, the supplier controls the production decision and bears all the risk; and in a hybrid contract, the retailer decides the order quantity whereas the supplier decides the production quantity. We completely characterize the firms' optimal decisions and contract preferences under both exogenous and endogenous wholesale prices. Our analysis shows that all the hybrid contracts are Pareto efficient within its own type, survive the challenges from both push and pull contracts, and maintain high channel efficiency, i.e., around 96% ~ 97% on average based on our numerical and worst case analysis. We then argue that the good performance of the hybrid contracts is not primarily due to the common wisdom of risk sharing, but lies in its unique structure property. More specifically, the hybrid contract implementation utilizes production inflation as an instrument to effectively combine all the Pareto efficient push and pull segments within their joint Pareto set into a single contract type. Consequently, when negotiating among wholesale price contracts, firms only need to restrict their negotiation within the hybrid contract type alone, which is simple, easy to implement, and efficient.In the second chapter, we examine the interplay between supply diversification and price postponement as risk mitigation tools for a price-setting monopoly firm to deal with supply yield risk. We compare the optimal sourcing decisions under both ex ante pricing and responsive pricing (ex post) schemes and investigate the impact of pricing timing on the firm's optimal sourcing and diversification decisions. For the case of one unreliable supplier, we show that responsive pricing mitigates the overage and underage risks imposed by yield uncertainty, and results in a lower [higher] optimal order quantity than that under ex ante pricing when the procurement cost is low [high]. For the case of one unreliable and one reliable suppliers, we find that an ex ante pricing firm finds no value in supply diversification, but responsive pricing gives rise to the need for supply diversification. For the case of two unreliable suppliers, we prove that responsive pricing promotes [discourages] supply diversification when supply reliability is low [high]. When supply reliability is moderate, responsive pricing promotes [discourages] supply diversification when the unit procurement cost is low [high]. Finally, we demonstrate that when facing strongly positively correlated yields, the firm ranks reliability higher than cost in supplier selection, and it may skip the cheaper supplier to select the expensive supplier if the latter is more reliable.In the third chapter, we propose two technical assumptions to ensure the unimodality of the objective function in two classes of price and quantity decision problems with one procurement opportunity under supply random yield and deterministic demand in a price-setting environment. We provide appealing economic interpretations and easy-to-verify sufficient conditions for our proposed technical assumptions. We show that most commonly used continuous yield distributions satisfy both of our technical assumptions. Finally, we provide several examples to show that our technical Assumption 1 applies to a large class of random yield problems involving a single firm's price and quantity decisions under different contracts, payment schemes and supplier portfolios, and that our technical Assumption 2 applies to a large class of random yield problems involving a decentralized supply chain/assembly system under different configurations.In the fourth chapter, we study two symmetric firms' production lead time (long vs. short) and selling timing (forward vs. spot) choices in a competitive market with uncertain input commodity cost. We consider Cournot competition and model the cost uncertainty via a two-point distribution. Our results are summarized as follow: First, regarding to the production lead time choice, as the cost volatility or the ex ante cost increases, both firms simultaneously switch from long lead time to short lead time to enjoy the benefit of being responsive in reacting to the procurement cost risk. Second, regarding to the selling timing choice, when the ex ante cost is low, both firms choose sell forward with appropriated hedging strategy adopted to avoid default. When the ex ante cost is high, both firms choose sell forward but strategically default on the high cost realization. In contrast, when the ex ante cost is in an intermediate range, both firms choose to sell spot when the high cost state is more likely to occur. Interesting, when the low cost state is more likely to occur, both firms choose to sell forward with one hedges and the other strategically defaults on high cost state. Finally, when both production lead time and selling timing choices are available, choosing long lead time and carrying inventory without selling forward is always a weakly dominated strategy. Consequently, the market equilibrium structure remains the same as that under the case when only the selling timing choice is available.
Author: Yahya Pezeshki
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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In decentralized Supply Chains, each member decides based on his own interests. Conflict of interests results in suboptimal decisions and poor performance for entire supply chains, as well seriously harms credibly information sharing across them. In this thesis, coordination of decisions in supply chains in the context of Capacity Procurement problem are studied in different situations in form of three models. In first model, a dyadic supply chain with stochastic demand and exogenous price is investigated by taking various costs into account. PARD and RCRS contracts are designed and proposed in order for coordination of decisions respectively in full and partial information updating situations. It is mathematically shown that coordination is achieved by using each contract in its corresponding situation. In second model, endogenous price is assumed. That is, demand is modeled as sum of a decreasing linear function of price and a stochastic parameter. The model is first examined in a dyadic structure, and RSRP contract is proposed for coordinating of price, production time and production rate decisions. It is proved that coordination is achieved by RSRP contract in the dyadic structure. The application of RSRP contract is then extended to be employed in a divergent supply chain with multiple retailers, and shown that the supply chain performs considerably better than the same supply chain with a wholesale contract. In third model, a divergent supply chain comprising a supplier and multiple retailers is studied where retailers face stochastic and price-dependent demand. Since main decision makers in supply chain interactions are human, paying attention to human decision making process and their biases from theoretical predictions are important in designing coordination mechanisms. One of the non-pecuniary factors which cause deviations in human-decisions is Trust. In this model, the retailers have more accurate demand forecast information due to their proximity to market. In order to secure availability of products during the selling season, the retailers have incentives to inflate their private forecast information. A coordination mechanism is proposed, which consists of an optimization model, a scoring system and a rewarding-punishing system, in order to coordinate the supply chain. Using simulation approach, performance of the mechanism is then compared to those of two other mechanisms, namely Without Trust an Asymmetric mechanism. According to the results, employing the mechanism in situations with any demand variability is advised. More accurately, in situations with high demand variability, the mechanism achieves a proper profit improvement and moderate capability for identifying deceptive agents, while in situations with low demand variability, the mechanism shows insignificant profit improvement and considerable ability in identifying deceptive agents.
Author: Shiming Deng
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 238
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