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Author: Guido Vogt
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642201326
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 208
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Book Description
Information sharing is frequently promoted as a mean to improve the supply chain performance. This work shows the results of behavioral experiments, in which the participants share private information in order to influence the contract terms in a Just-in-Time environment. It is shown that the impact of information sharing is ambiguous, and dependent on several factors, such as contract flexibility and complexity or the interacting behavioral types. The experimental results form the basis for a behavioral principal-agent model that gives valuable insights on how the interaction of trust, trustworthiness and the information sharing strategy impacts the supply chain performance.
Author: Guido Vogt
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642201326
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 208
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Book Description
Information sharing is frequently promoted as a mean to improve the supply chain performance. This work shows the results of behavioral experiments, in which the participants share private information in order to influence the contract terms in a Just-in-Time environment. It is shown that the impact of information sharing is ambiguous, and dependent on several factors, such as contract flexibility and complexity or the interacting behavioral types. The experimental results form the basis for a behavioral principal-agent model that gives valuable insights on how the interaction of trust, trustworthiness and the information sharing strategy impacts the supply chain performance.
Author: Karl Inderfurth
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 41
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Book Description
Author: Guido Vogt
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 9783642201318
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 181
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Book Description
Information sharing is frequently promoted as a mean to improve the supply chain performance. This work shows the results of behavioral experiments, in which the participants share private information in order to influence the contract terms in a Just-in-Time environment. It is shown that the impact of information sharing is ambiguous, and dependent on several factors, such as contract flexibility and complexity or the interacting behavioral types. The experimental results form the basis for a behavioral principal-agent model that gives valuable insights on how the interaction of trust, trustworthiness and the information sharing strategy impacts the supply chain performance.
Author: Guido Voigt
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 216
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Book Description
Author: Stefan Helber
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3319007955
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 577
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Book Description
This book contains selected papers presented at the "International Annual Conference of the German Operations Research Society (OR2012)" which was held September 4 -7, 2012 at the Leibniz Universität Hannover, Germany. The international conference, which also serves as the annual meeting of the German Operations Research Society (GOR), attracted more than 500 participants from more than 39 countries. Special attention at the conference was given to the three topics "Energy, Markets and Mobility". The OR2012 conference has addressed these topics from an OR perspective, treating them not only in isolation, but also with respect to their numerous and exciting interconnections, such as new energy for new mobility concepts and new market mechanisms for sustainable energy production to name but a few. The proceedings show that this conference topic is an important and promising area to apply Operations Research. The book also contains numerous papers addressing the full scope of fields in Operations Research.
Author: Bernhard Fleischmann
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642001424
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 586
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Book Description
The international conference \Operations Research 2008", the annual meeting of the German Operations Research Society (GOR), was held at the University of Augsburg on September 3-5, 2008. About 580 p- ticipants from more than 30 countries presented and listened to nearly 400 talks on a broad range of Operations Research. The general subject \Operations Research and Global Business" str- ses the important role of Operations Research in improving decisions in the increasingly complex business processes in a global environment. The plenary speakers Morris A. Cohen (Wharton School) and Bernd Liepert (Executive Board of KUKA Robotics) addressed this subject. Moreover, one of the founders of Operations Research, Saul Gass (U- versity of Maryland), gave the opening speech on the early history of Operations Research. This volume contains 93 papers presented at the conference, selected by the program committee and the section chairs, forming a representative sample of the various subjects dealt with at Operations Research 2008. The volume follows the structure of the conference, with 12 sections, grouped into six \Fields of Applications" and six \Fields of Methods and Theory". This structure in no way means a separation of theory and application, which would be detrimental in Operations Research, but displays the large spectrum of aspects in the focus of the papers. Of course, most papers present theory, methods and applications together.
Author: M. Çakanyıldırım
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 36
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Book Description
We analyze a supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer. The supplier's unit production cost, which characterizes his type, is only privately known to him. When trading with the retailer, the supplier demands a reservation profit that depends on his unit production cost. We model this problem as a game of adverse selection. In this model, the retailer offers a menu of contracts, each of which consists of two parameters: the ordering quantity and the supplier's share of the channel profit. We show that the optimal contract depends critically on a surrogate measure. This measure represents the size of the outside market that the supplier may serve if not trading with the retailer. An important implication from our analysis is that information asymmetry alone does not necessarily induce loss in channel efficiency. The optimal contract can coordinate the supply chain as long as the size of the outside market is comparable to the quantities required by the retailer. We further discuss the retailer's preference of the supplier's type under different market conditions, as well as evaluate the effects of the supplier's reservation profit, the retail price, and the demand uncertainty on the optimal contract.
Author:
Publisher: University of Bamberg Press
ISBN: 386309025X
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 304
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Book Description
Author: Cuihong Li
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 32
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Book Description
We consider a buyer sourcing from multiple competing suppliers who exert cost reduction efforts before procurement contracts are awarded. The supply chain is subject to the classic hold-up problem--as the lack of a contract commitment hinders suppliers' incentives to make investment upfront--complicated with supplier competition. With deterministic cost-reduction outcomes, suppliers will not exert any effort if this effort is observable, and a pure strategy equilibrium does not exist if the effort is unobservable. We analyze the mixed strategy equilibrium with unobservable supplier effort, in which suppliers randomize their efforts and the buyer designs an optimal procurement mechanism. We show that the optimal procurement mechanism can be implemented by a conventional single-price reverse auction with a random reserve price. The mixed strategy of supplier effort generates endogenous information asymmetry on supplier costs that provides suppliers with information rent, which sustains their efforts. The endogenous information asymmetry improves effort efficiency (by inducing positive supplier effort) yet introduces trade inefficiency (by causing the possible failure of trade between the parties). While increasing supplier competition (measured by the number of suppliers) hurts the effort efficiency, it improves the trade efficiency. As a result, the buyer is always better off introducing supplier competition by including more than one supplier in the supply base. However, the desired supply base size (number of suppliers) depends on the product revenue: for high-margin goods, the optimal size is achieved with two suppliers, whereas for low-margin goods, a larger supply base is better for the buyer. We show that the result based on deterministic cost reduction can be established as a limit of the case when uncertainty in cost reduction exists and shrinks to null. Our study helps to understand the impact of supplier competition when supply chain parties deliberately make their actions unpredictable to avoid being held up. The findings provide managerial guidance on procurement auction and supply base designs.
Author: Lennart Christian Johnsen
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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