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Author: Igor Davidzon
Publisher: Springer Nature
ISBN: 3030455947
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 175
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Book Description
This book explores how nuclear weapons influence conventional warfighting, through three case studies of countries not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Pakistan, India, and Israel. The author examines how decision makers choose a preferred pattern of war management, as well as how these choices affect conflicts, suggesting that nuclear weaponization constitutes a clear change in the relative power of countries. This distribution of power within the international system expands or reduces the selection of strategies or war management patterns available to members of the international community. However, historic traumatic events like military defeats, countries’ self-images, and images of enemies form the perceptions of decision makers regarding material power and change thereof, suggesting that choices of decision makers are not affected directly by changes in relative power relations, but rather through an intermediate level of strategic culture parameter.
Author: Igor Davidzon
Publisher: Springer Nature
ISBN: 3030455947
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 175
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Book Description
This book explores how nuclear weapons influence conventional warfighting, through three case studies of countries not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Pakistan, India, and Israel. The author examines how decision makers choose a preferred pattern of war management, as well as how these choices affect conflicts, suggesting that nuclear weaponization constitutes a clear change in the relative power of countries. This distribution of power within the international system expands or reduces the selection of strategies or war management patterns available to members of the international community. However, historic traumatic events like military defeats, countries’ self-images, and images of enemies form the perceptions of decision makers regarding material power and change thereof, suggesting that choices of decision makers are not affected directly by changes in relative power relations, but rather through an intermediate level of strategic culture parameter.
Author: Igor Davidzon
Publisher: Palgrave Pivot
ISBN: 9783030455934
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 169
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Book Description
This book explores how nuclear weapons influence conventional warfighting, through three case studies of countries not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Pakistan, India, and Israel. The author examines how decision makers choose a preferred pattern of war management, as well as how these choices affect conflicts, suggesting that nuclear weaponization constitutes a clear change in the relative power of countries. This distribution of power within the international system expands or reduces the selection of strategies or war management patterns available to members of the international community. However, historic traumatic events like military defeats, countries’ self-images, and images of enemies form the perceptions of decision makers regarding material power and change thereof, suggesting that choices of decision makers are not affected directly by changes in relative power relations, but rather through an intermediate level of strategic culture parameter.
Author: Naval Studies Board
Publisher: National Academies Press
ISBN: 0309553237
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 244
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Book Description
Deterrence as a strategic concept evolved during the Cold War. During that period, deterrence strategy was aimed mainly at preventing aggression against the United States and its close allies by the hostile Communist power centers--the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and its allies, Communist China and North Korea. In particular, the strategy was devised to prevent aggression involving nuclear attack by the USSR or China. Since the end of the Cold War, the risk of war among the major powers has subsided to the lowest point in modern history. Still, the changing nature of the threats to American and allied security interests has stimulated a considerable broadening of the deterrence concept. Post-Cold War Conflict Deterrence examines the meaning of deterrence in this new environment and identifies key elements of a post-Cold War deterrence strategy and the critical issues in devising such a strategy. It further examines the significance of these findings for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps. Quantitative and qualitative measures to support judgments about the potential success or failure of deterrence are identified. Such measures will bear on the suitability of the naval forces to meet the deterrence objectives. The capabilities of U.S. naval forces that especially bear on the deterrence objectives also are examined. Finally, the book examines the utility of models, games, and simulations as decision aids in improving the naval forces' understanding of situations in which deterrence must be used and in improving the potential success of deterrence actions.
Author: Barry R. Posen
Publisher: Cornell University Press
ISBN: 080146837X
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 295
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Book Description
In this sobering book, Barry R. Posen demonstrates how the interplay between conventional military operations and nuclear forces could, in conflicts among states armed with both conventional and nuclear weaponry, inadvertently produce pressures for nuclear escalation. Knowledge of these hidden pressures, he believes, may help some future decision maker avoid catastrophe.Building a formidable argument that moves with cumulative force, he details the way in which escalation could occur not by mindless accident, or by deliberate preference for nuclear escalation, but rather as a natural accompaniment of land, naval, or air warfare at the conventional level. Posen bases his analysis on an empirical study of the east-west military competition in Europe during the 1980s, using a conceptual framework drawn from international relations theory, organization theory, and strategic theory.The lessons of his book, however, go well beyond the east-west competition. Since his observations are relevant to all military competitions between states armed with both conventional and nuclear weaponry, his book speaks to some of the problems that attend the proliferation of nuclear weapons in longstanding regional conflicts. Optimism that small and medium nuclear powers can easily achieve "stable" nuclear balances is, he believes, unwarranted.
Author: John J. Mearsheimer
Publisher: Cornell University Press
ISBN: 1501713256
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 298
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Book Description
Conventional Deterrence is a book about the origins of war. Why do nations faced with the prospect of large-scale conventional war opt for or against an offensive strategy? John J. Mearsheimer examines a number of crises that led to major conventional wars to explain why deterrence failed. He focuses first on Allied and German decision making in the years 1939–1940, analyzing why the Allies did not strike first against Germany after declaring war and, conversely, why the Germans did attack the West. Turning to the Middle East, he examines the differences in Israeli and Egyptian strategic doctrines prior to the start of the major conventional conflicts in that region. Mearsheimer then critically assays the relative strengths and weaknesses of NATO and the Warsaw Pact to determine the prospects for conventional deterrence in any future crisis. He is also concerned with examining such relatively technical issues as the impact of precision-guided munitions (PGM) on conventional deterrence and the debate over maneuver versus attrition warfare.Mearsheimer pays considerable attention to questions of military strategy and tactics. Challenging the claim that conventional detrrence is largely a function of the numerical balance of forces, he also takes issue with the school of thought that ascribes deterrence failures to the dominance of "offensive" weaponry. In addition to examining the military consideration underlying deterrence, he also analyzes the interaction between those military factors and the broader political considerations that move a nation to war.
Author: Brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal
Publisher: KW Publishers Pvt Ltd
ISBN: 9385714678
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 150
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Book Description
Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs), often referred to as “battlefield”, “sub-strategic”, or “non-strategic” nuclear weapons, usually have a plutonium core and are typically distinct from strategic nuclear weapons. Therefore, they warrant a separate consideration in the realm of nuclear security. The yield of such weapons is generally lower than that of strategic nuclear weapons and may range from the relatively low 0.1 kiloton to a few kilotons. Pakistan’s quest to acquire tactical nuclear weapons has added a dangerous dimension to the already precarious strategic equation in South Asia. The security discourse in the subcontinent revolves around the perennial apprehension of a conventional or sub-conventional conflict triggering a chain reaction, eventually paving the way for a potential nuclear crisis haunting peace and stability in the region. Pakistan believes that the successful testing of the 60-km nuclear-capable short-range m issile Hatf-9 (Nasr) “adds deterrence value to Pakistan’s strategic weapons development programme at shorter ranges.” In paradox, the fact remains that this step has further lowered Pakistan’s nuclear threshold through the likely use of TNWs. The introduction of TNWs into the tactical battle area further exacerbates credibility of their control. Pakistan has not formally declared a nuclear doctrine, but it is well known that nuclear weapons are its first line of defence. The use of TNWs in the India-Pakistan case will alter the strategic scenario completely as Pakistan would threaten India with the use of TNWs in the event of New Delhi responding against Islamabad with a conventional strike in reaction to a 26/11-style terrorist attack. Pakistan forgets that given its offensive strategic posture and continuing involvement in terror strikes in India, it is New Delhi which is confronted with the problem of developing a strategy to counter Pakistan’s “first-strike” and proxy war in the light of its declared “no-first-use” policy. This edited volume attempts to address and decipher complex issues, including aspects such as China’s WMD collaboration with Pakistan, nuclear command and control dynamics within Pakistan, overall rationale and implications of TNWs, safety and security of nuclear weapons, scenarios for nuclear usage, India’s potential response options and, more specifically, the technical aspects of the Nasr delivery system.
Author: Jonathan Mallory House
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1428915834
Category : Armies
Languages : en
Pages : 235
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Book Description
Author: Gro Nystuen
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1139992740
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 804
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Book Description
Nuclear Weapons under International Law is a comprehensive treatment of nuclear weapons under key international law regimes. It critically reviews international law governing nuclear weapons with regard to the inter-state use of force, international humanitarian law, human rights law, disarmament law, and environmental law, and discusses where relevant the International Court of Justice's 1996 Advisory Opinion. Unique in its approach, it draws upon contributions from expert legal scholars and international law practitioners who have worked with conventional and non-conventional arms control and disarmament issues. As a result, this book embraces academic consideration of legal questions within the context of broader political debates about the status of nuclear weapons under international law.
Author: Nina Tannenwald
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9780521524285
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 472
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Book Description
Why have nuclear weapons not been used since Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945? Nina Tannenwald disputes the conventional answer of 'deterrence' in favour of what she calls a nuclear taboo - a widespread inhibition on using nuclear weapons - which has arisen in global politics. Drawing on newly released archival sources, Tannenwald traces the rise of the nuclear taboo, the forces that produced it, and its influence, particularly on US leaders. She analyzes four critical instances where US leaders considered using nuclear weapons (Japan 1945, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Gulf War 1991) and examines how the nuclear taboo has repeatedly dissuaded US and other world leaders from resorting to these 'ultimate weapons'. Through a systematic analysis, Tannenwald challenges conventional conceptions of deterrence and offers a compelling argument on the moral bases of nuclear restraint as well as an important insight into how nuclear war can be avoided in the future.
Author: David C. Gompert
Publisher: Government Printing Office
ISBN: 9780160915734
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 236
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Book Description
The second half of the 20th century featured a strategic competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. That competition avoided World War III in part because during the 1950s, scholars like Henry Kissinger, Thomas Schelling, Herman Kahn, and Albert Wohlstetter analyzed the fundamental nature of nuclear deterrence. Decades of arms control negotiations reinforced these early notions of stability and created a mutual understanding that allowed U.S.-Soviet competition to proceed without armed conflict. The first half of the 21st century will be dominated by the relationship between the United States and China. That relationship is likely to contain elements of both cooperation and competition. Territorial disputes such as those over Taiwan and the South China Sea will be an important feature of this competition, but both are traditional disputes, and traditional solutions suggest themselves. A more difficult set of issues relates to U.S.-Chinese competition and cooperation in three domains in which real strategic harm can be inflicted in the current era: nuclear, space, and cyber. Just as a clearer understanding of the fundamental principles of nuclear deterrence maintained adequate stability during the Cold War, a clearer understanding of the characteristics of these three domains can provide the underpinnings of strategic stability between the United States and China in the decades ahead. That is what this book is about.
