Multiple referrals and multidimensional cheap talk

Multiple referrals and multidimensional cheap talk PDF Author: Marco Battaglini
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 36

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Book Description

Multiple referrals and multidimensional cheap talk

Multiple referrals and multidimensional cheap talk PDF Author: Marco Battaglini
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 36

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Book Description


Multidimensional Cheap Talk

Multidimensional Cheap Talk PDF Author: Gilat Levy
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business communication
Languages : en
Pages : 46

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Econophysics & Economics of Games, Social Choices and Quantitative Techniques

Econophysics & Economics of Games, Social Choices and Quantitative Techniques PDF Author: Banasri Basu
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 8847015014
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 394

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Book Description
The combined efforts of the Physicists and the Economists in recent years in analyzing and modelling various dynamic phenomena in monetary and social systems have led to encouraging developments, generally classified under the title of Econophysics. These developments share a common ambition with the already established field of Quantitative Economics. This volume intends to offer the reader a glimpse of these two parallel initiatives by collecting review papers written by well-known experts in the respective research frontiers in one cover. This massive book presents a unique combination of research papers contributed almost equally by Physicists and Economists. Additional contributions from Computer Scientists and Mathematicians are also included in this volume. The book consists of two parts: the first part concentrates on Econophysics problems and the second part stresses on various quantitative issues in Economics. Both parts specialize on frontier problems in Games and Social Choices.

Handbook of Experimental Game Theory

Handbook of Experimental Game Theory PDF Author: C. M. Capra
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 1785363336
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 448

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Book Description
The aim of this Handbook is twofold: to educate and to inspire. It is meant for researchers and graduate students who are interested in taking a data-based and behavioral approach to the study of game theory. Educators and students of economics will find the Handbook useful as a companion book to conventional upper-level game theory textbooks, enabling them to compare and contrast actual behavior with theoretical predictions. Researchers and non-specialists will find valuable examples of laboratory and field experiments that test game theoretic propositions and suggest new ways of modeling strategic behavior. Chapters are organized into several sections; each section concludes with an inspirational chapter, offering suggestions on new directions and cutting-edge topics of research in experimental game theory.

Ignorance and Uncertainty

Ignorance and Uncertainty PDF Author: Olivier Compte
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1108422020
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 303

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Book Description
Proposes novel methods to incorporate ignorance and uncertainty into economic modeling without complex mathematics.

The Elgar Companion to Information Economics

The Elgar Companion to Information Economics PDF Author: Daphne R. Raban
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 1802203966
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 579

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Book Description
The Elgar Companion to Information Economics dexterously navigates this interdisciplinary field of research which celebrates the crucial contribution of information to decision making, market dynamics, and economic well-being. Offering a wealth of conceptual analysis, this erudite Companion embarks on an intellectual journey exploring the fundamentals of information economics. This title contains one or more Open Access chapters.

A model of reporting and controlling outbreaks by public health agencies

A model of reporting and controlling outbreaks by public health agencies PDF Author: Saak, Alexander E.
Publisher: Intl Food Policy Res Inst
ISBN:
Category : Social Science
Languages : en
Pages : 48

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Book Description
When an outbreak of an infectious disease is suspected, a local health agency may notify a state or federal agency and request additional resources to investigate and, if necessary, contain it. However, due to capacity constraints, state and federal health agencies may not be able to grant all such requests, which may give an incentive to local agencies to request help strategically. We study a model of detection and control of an infectious disease by local health agencies in the presence of imperfect information about the likelihood of an outbreak and limited diagnostic capacity. When diagnostic capacity is rationed based on reports of symptoms, the decision to report symptoms or not creates a trade-off. On the one hand, rigorous testing allows one to make an informed disease control decision. On the other hand, it also increases the probability that the disease will spread from an untested area where fewer precautionary measures are taken. Symptoms are overreported (respectively, reported truthfully, or underreported) when the cost of disease control is sufficiently small (respectively, in some intermediate range, or sufficiently large). If the disease incidence decreases or infectiousness increases, symptoms are reported less frequently. If the precision of private signals increases, the extent of overreporting of symptoms may increase. For different values of the parameters it can be socially optimal to subsidize or tax requests for additional investigations and confirmatory testing.

Storable Votes

Storable Votes PDF Author: Alessandra Casella
Publisher: Oxford University Press on Demand
ISBN: 019530909X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 381

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Book Description
Storable votes allow the minority to win occasionally while treating every voter equally and increasing the efficiency of decision-making, without the need for external knowledge of voters' preferences. This book complements the theoretical discussion with several experiments, showing that the promise of the idea is borne out by the data: the outcomes of the experiments and the payoffs realized match very closely the predictions of the theory.

Readings in Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy

Readings in Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy PDF Author: Charles Rowley
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 0387758704
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 617

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Book Description
Public choice is the study of behavior at the intersection of economics and political science. Since the pioneering work of Duncan Black in the 1940s, public choice has developed a rich literature, drawing from such related perspectives as history, philosophy, law, and sociology, to analyze political decision making (by citizen-voters, elected officials, bureaucratic administrators, lobbyists, and other "rational" actors) in social and economic context, with an emphasis on identifying differences between individual goals and collective outcomes. Constitutional political economy provides important insights into the relationship between effective constitutions and the behavior of ordinary political markets. In Readings in Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy, Charles Rowley and Friedrich Schneider have assembled an international array of leading authors to present a comprehensive and accessible overview of the field and its applications. Covering a wide array of topics, including regulation and antitrust, taxation, trade liberalization, political corruption, interest group behavior, dictatorship, and environmental issues, and featuring biographies of the founding fathers of the field, this volume will be essential reading for scholars and students, policymakers, economists, sociologists, and non-specialist readers interested in the dynamics of political economy.

Stochastic Teams, Games, and Control under Information Constraints

Stochastic Teams, Games, and Control under Information Constraints PDF Author: Serdar YĆ¼ksel
Publisher: Springer Nature
ISBN: 3031540719
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 935

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Book Description