Mechanism Design with Multidimensional, Continuous Types and Interdependent Valuations PDF Download
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Author: Nolan Miller
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 28
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Book Description
Author: Nolan Miller
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 28
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Book Description
Author: Nolan H. Miller
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 29
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Book Description
We consider the mechanism design problem when agents' types are multidimensional and continuous, and their valuations are interdependent. If there are at least three agents whose types satisfy a weak correlation condition, then for any decision rule there exist balanced transfers that render truthful revelation a Bayesian amp;ε-equilibrium. A slightly stronger correlation condition ensures balanced transfers exist that induce a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which agents' strategies are nearly truthful. This paper extends the analysis of KSG RWP03-020.
Author: Scott Johnson
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics, Mathematical
Languages : en
Pages : 29
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Book Description
Author: Mark Machina
Publisher: Newnes
ISBN: 0444536868
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 897
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Book Description
The need to understand the theories and applications of economic and finance risk has been clear to everyone since the financial crisis, and this collection of original essays proffers broad, high-level explanations of risk and uncertainty. The economics of risk and uncertainty is unlike most branches of economics in spanning from the individual decision-maker to the market (and indeed, social decisions), and ranging from purely theoretical analysis through individual experimentation, empirical analysis, and applied and policy decisions. It also has close and sometimes conflicting relationships with theoretical and applied statistics, and psychology. The aim of this volume is to provide an overview of diverse aspects of this field, ranging from classical and foundational work through current developments. Presents coherent summaries of risk and uncertainty that inform major areas in economics and finance Divides coverage between theoretical, empirical, and experimental findings Makes the economics of risk and uncertainty accessible to scholars in fields outside economics
Author: Panos M. Pardalos
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 0387772472
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 872
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Book Description
This comprehensive work examines important recent developments and modern applications in the fields of optimization, control, game theory and equilibrium programming. In particular, the concepts of equilibrium and optimality are of immense practical importance affecting decision-making problems regarding policy and strategies, and in understanding and predicting systems in different application domains, ranging from economics and engineering to military applications. The book consists of 29 survey chapters written by distinguished researchers in the above areas.
Author: Scott Johnson
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
We consider mechanism design in social choice problems in which agents' types are mutually payoff-relevant, multidimensional, and take on a continuum of possible values. If the center receives a signal that is stochastically related to the agents' types and direct returns are bounded, for any decision rule there is a balanced transfer scheme that ensures that any strategy that is not arbitrarily close to truthful is dominated by one that is. If direct returns are also continuous, truthful revelation becomes a nearly dominant strategy, all Bayes-Nash equilibrium strategies are nearly truthful, and at least one such strategy exists. If the center's information is not informative but agents' types are stochastically related, then there are balanced transfers under which truthful revelation is a Bayesian epsilon-equilibrium, again for any decision rule. Analogous results hold when agents also take mutually payoff-relevant actions in advance of any action by the center.
Author: Econometric Society. World Congress
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 0521871522
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 431
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Author: Rakesh V. Vohra
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1139499173
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 185
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Book Description
Mechanism design is an analytical framework for thinking clearly and carefully about what exactly a given institution can achieve when the information necessary to make decisions is dispersed and privately held. This analysis provides an account of the underlying mathematics of mechanism design based on linear programming. Three advantages characterize the approach. The first is simplicity: arguments based on linear programming are both elementary and transparent. The second is unity: the machinery of linear programming provides a way to unify results from disparate areas of mechanism design. The third is reach: the technique offers the ability to solve problems that appear to be beyond solutions offered by traditional methods. No claim is made that the approach advocated should supplant traditional mathematical machinery. Rather, the approach represents an addition to the tools of the economic theorist who proposes to understand economic phenomena through the lens of mechanism design.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Dirk Bergemann
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 981437458X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 471
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Book Description
Foreword by Eric Maskin (Nobel Laureate in Economics, 2007)This volume brings together the collected contributions on the theme of robust mechanism design and robust implementation that Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris have been working on for the past decade. The collection is preceded by a comprehensive introductory essay, specifically written for this volume with the aim of providing the readers with an overview of the research agenda pursued in the collected papers.The introduction selectively presents the main results of the papers, and attempts to illustrate many of them in terms of a common and canonical example, namely a single unit auction with interdependent values. It is our hope that the use of this example facilitates the presentation of the results and that it brings the main insights within the context of an important economic mechanism, namely the generalized second price auction.
