Author: David Wendler
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0197675328
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 249
Book Description
"Most people believe there are degrees of moral status. Most prominently, they believe that animals matter morally, but human beings matter significantly more than animals. This belief explains why we put animals in cages, conduct pain-inducing experiments on them and eat them for dinner. Belief in degrees of moral status also raises the possibility that robots and genetically enhanced human beings could become significantly more important than the rest of us, in which case they might be justified in putting us in cages, experimenting on us, and eating us for dinner. The present work thus systematically assesses whether, in fact, some individuals are more important morally than others. It distinguishes between moral status conferring, moral action guiding, and moral status enhancing properties, and argues that degrees of moral status require moral status enhancing properties. It then considers whether some properties are moral status enhancing to in the sense that they increase the most status of those who possess them. This analysis reveals that there are no moral status enhancing properties, hence, no degrees of moral status. The book then considers the implications of this conclusion for seven issues: 1. The difference between a world that includes degrees of moral status and one that doesn't; 2. Our obligations to help animals; 3. Animal rights; 4. Raising animals and eating them; 5. Animal experimentation; 6. Humans who lack superior cognitive capacities; and 7. Human-animal chimeras, robots and genetically enhanced human beings"--
Life Without Degrees of Moral Status
Author: David Wendler
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0197675328
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 249
Book Description
"Most people believe there are degrees of moral status. Most prominently, they believe that animals matter morally, but human beings matter significantly more than animals. This belief explains why we put animals in cages, conduct pain-inducing experiments on them and eat them for dinner. Belief in degrees of moral status also raises the possibility that robots and genetically enhanced human beings could become significantly more important than the rest of us, in which case they might be justified in putting us in cages, experimenting on us, and eating us for dinner. The present work thus systematically assesses whether, in fact, some individuals are more important morally than others. It distinguishes between moral status conferring, moral action guiding, and moral status enhancing properties, and argues that degrees of moral status require moral status enhancing properties. It then considers whether some properties are moral status enhancing to in the sense that they increase the most status of those who possess them. This analysis reveals that there are no moral status enhancing properties, hence, no degrees of moral status. The book then considers the implications of this conclusion for seven issues: 1. The difference between a world that includes degrees of moral status and one that doesn't; 2. Our obligations to help animals; 3. Animal rights; 4. Raising animals and eating them; 5. Animal experimentation; 6. Humans who lack superior cognitive capacities; and 7. Human-animal chimeras, robots and genetically enhanced human beings"--
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0197675328
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 249
Book Description
"Most people believe there are degrees of moral status. Most prominently, they believe that animals matter morally, but human beings matter significantly more than animals. This belief explains why we put animals in cages, conduct pain-inducing experiments on them and eat them for dinner. Belief in degrees of moral status also raises the possibility that robots and genetically enhanced human beings could become significantly more important than the rest of us, in which case they might be justified in putting us in cages, experimenting on us, and eating us for dinner. The present work thus systematically assesses whether, in fact, some individuals are more important morally than others. It distinguishes between moral status conferring, moral action guiding, and moral status enhancing properties, and argues that degrees of moral status require moral status enhancing properties. It then considers whether some properties are moral status enhancing to in the sense that they increase the most status of those who possess them. This analysis reveals that there are no moral status enhancing properties, hence, no degrees of moral status. The book then considers the implications of this conclusion for seven issues: 1. The difference between a world that includes degrees of moral status and one that doesn't; 2. Our obligations to help animals; 3. Animal rights; 4. Raising animals and eating them; 5. Animal experimentation; 6. Humans who lack superior cognitive capacities; and 7. Human-animal chimeras, robots and genetically enhanced human beings"--
Moral Status
Author: Mary Anne Warren
Publisher: Clarendon Press
ISBN: 0191588156
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 278
Book Description
Mary Anne Warren explores a theoretical question which lies at the heart of practical ethics: what are the criteria for having moral status? In other words, what are the criteria for being an entity towards which people have moral obligations? Some philosophers maintain that there is one intrinsic property—for instance, life, sentience, humanity, or moral agency. Others believe that relational properties, such as belonging to a human community, are more important. In Part I of the book, Warren argues that no single property can serve as the sole criterion for moral status; instead, life, sentience, moral agency, and social and biotic relationships are all relevant, each in a different way. She presents seven basic principles, each focusing on a property that can, in combination with others, legitimately affect an agent's moral obligations towards entities of a given type. In Part II, these principles are applied in an examination of three controversial ethical issues: voluntary euthanasia, abortion
Publisher: Clarendon Press
ISBN: 0191588156
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 278
Book Description
Mary Anne Warren explores a theoretical question which lies at the heart of practical ethics: what are the criteria for having moral status? In other words, what are the criteria for being an entity towards which people have moral obligations? Some philosophers maintain that there is one intrinsic property—for instance, life, sentience, humanity, or moral agency. Others believe that relational properties, such as belonging to a human community, are more important. In Part I of the book, Warren argues that no single property can serve as the sole criterion for moral status; instead, life, sentience, moral agency, and social and biotic relationships are all relevant, each in a different way. She presents seven basic principles, each focusing on a property that can, in combination with others, legitimately affect an agent's moral obligations towards entities of a given type. In Part II, these principles are applied in an examination of three controversial ethical issues: voluntary euthanasia, abortion
A Theory of Bioethics
Author: David DeGrazia
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1316515834
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 329
Book Description
Offers a compelling theory of bioethics, covering medical assistance-in-dying, the right to health care, abortion, animal research, and the definition of death.
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1316515834
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 329
Book Description
Offers a compelling theory of bioethics, covering medical assistance-in-dying, the right to health care, abortion, animal research, and the definition of death.
Rethinking Moral Status
Author: Steve Clarke
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0192894072
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 352
Book Description
Common-sense morality implicitly assumes that reasonably clear distinctions can be drawn between the full moral status that is usually attributed to ordinary adult humans, the partial moral status attributed to non-human animals, and the absence of moral status, which is usually ascribed to machines and other artifacts. These implicit assumptions have long been challenged, and are now coming under further scrutiny as there are beings we have recently become able to create, as well as beings that we may soon be able to create, which blur the distinctions between human, non-human animal, and non-biological beings. These beings include non-human chimeras, cyborgs, human brain organoids, post-humans, and human minds that have been uploaded into computers and onto the internet and artificial intelligence. It is far from clear what moral status we should attribute to any of these beings. There are a number of ways we could respond to the new challenges these technological developments raise: we might revise our ordinary assumptions about what is needed for a being to possess full moral status, or reject the assumption that there is a sharp distinction between full and partial moral status. This volume explores such responses, and provides a forum for philosophical reflection about ordinary presuppositions and intuitions about moral status.
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0192894072
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 352
Book Description
Common-sense morality implicitly assumes that reasonably clear distinctions can be drawn between the full moral status that is usually attributed to ordinary adult humans, the partial moral status attributed to non-human animals, and the absence of moral status, which is usually ascribed to machines and other artifacts. These implicit assumptions have long been challenged, and are now coming under further scrutiny as there are beings we have recently become able to create, as well as beings that we may soon be able to create, which blur the distinctions between human, non-human animal, and non-biological beings. These beings include non-human chimeras, cyborgs, human brain organoids, post-humans, and human minds that have been uploaded into computers and onto the internet and artificial intelligence. It is far from clear what moral status we should attribute to any of these beings. There are a number of ways we could respond to the new challenges these technological developments raise: we might revise our ordinary assumptions about what is needed for a being to possess full moral status, or reject the assumption that there is a sharp distinction between full and partial moral status. This volume explores such responses, and provides a forum for philosophical reflection about ordinary presuppositions and intuitions about moral status.
How to Count Animals, more or less
Author: Shelly Kagan
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0192565176
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 320
Book Description
Most people agree that animals count morally, but how exactly should we take animals into account? A prominent stance in contemporary ethical discussions is that animals have the same moral status that people do, and so in moral deliberation the similar interests of animals and people should be given the very same consideration. In How to Count Animals, more or less, Shelly Kagan sets out and defends a hierarchical approach in which people count more than animals do and some animals count more than others. For the most part, moral theories have not been developed in such a way as to take account of differences in status. By arguing for a hierarchical account of morality - and exploring what status sensitive principles might look like - Kagan reveals just how much work needs to be done to arrive at an adequate view of our duties toward animals, and of morality more generally.
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0192565176
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 320
Book Description
Most people agree that animals count morally, but how exactly should we take animals into account? A prominent stance in contemporary ethical discussions is that animals have the same moral status that people do, and so in moral deliberation the similar interests of animals and people should be given the very same consideration. In How to Count Animals, more or less, Shelly Kagan sets out and defends a hierarchical approach in which people count more than animals do and some animals count more than others. For the most part, moral theories have not been developed in such a way as to take account of differences in status. By arguing for a hierarchical account of morality - and exploring what status sensitive principles might look like - Kagan reveals just how much work needs to be done to arrive at an adequate view of our duties toward animals, and of morality more generally.
Consciousness and Moral Status
Author: Joshua Shepherd
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1315396327
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 150
Book Description
It seems obvious that phenomenally conscious experience is something of great value, and that this value maps onto a range of important ethical issues. For example, claims about the value of life for those in Permanent Vegetative State (PVS); debates about treatment and study of disorders of consciousness; controversies about end-of-life care for those with advanced dementia; and arguments about the moral status of embryos, fetuses, and non-human animals arguably turn on the moral significance of various facts about consciousness. However, though work has been done on the moral significance of elements of consciousness, such as pain and pleasure, little explicit attention has been devoted to the ethical significance of consciousness. In this book Joshua Shepherd presents a systematic account of the value present within conscious experience. This account emphasizes not only the nature of consciousness, but also the importance of items within experience such as affect, valence, and the complex overall shape of particular valuable experiences. Shepherd also relates this account to difficult cases involving non-humans and humans with disorders of consciousness, arguing that the value of consciousness influences and partially explains the degree of moral status a being possesses, without fully determining it. The upshot is a deeper understanding of both the moral importance of phenomenal consciousness and its relations to moral status. This book will be of great interest to philosophers and students of ethics, bioethics, philosophy of psychology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science.
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1315396327
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 150
Book Description
It seems obvious that phenomenally conscious experience is something of great value, and that this value maps onto a range of important ethical issues. For example, claims about the value of life for those in Permanent Vegetative State (PVS); debates about treatment and study of disorders of consciousness; controversies about end-of-life care for those with advanced dementia; and arguments about the moral status of embryos, fetuses, and non-human animals arguably turn on the moral significance of various facts about consciousness. However, though work has been done on the moral significance of elements of consciousness, such as pain and pleasure, little explicit attention has been devoted to the ethical significance of consciousness. In this book Joshua Shepherd presents a systematic account of the value present within conscious experience. This account emphasizes not only the nature of consciousness, but also the importance of items within experience such as affect, valence, and the complex overall shape of particular valuable experiences. Shepherd also relates this account to difficult cases involving non-humans and humans with disorders of consciousness, arguing that the value of consciousness influences and partially explains the degree of moral status a being possesses, without fully determining it. The upshot is a deeper understanding of both the moral importance of phenomenal consciousness and its relations to moral status. This book will be of great interest to philosophers and students of ethics, bioethics, philosophy of psychology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science.
Life Without Degrees of Moral Status
Author: David Wendler
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780197675342
Category : Animal welfare
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
"Most people believe there are degrees of moral status. Most prominently, they believe that animals matter morally, but human beings matter significantly more than animals. This belief explains why we put animals in cages, conduct pain-inducing experiments on them and eat them for dinner. Belief in degrees of moral status also raises the possibility that robots and genetically enhanced human beings could become significantly more important than the rest of us, in which case they might be justified in putting us in cages, experimenting on us, and eating us for dinner. The present work thus systematically assesses whether, in fact, some individuals are more important morally than others. It distinguishes between moral status conferring, moral action guiding, and moral status enhancing properties, and argues that degrees of moral status require moral status enhancing properties. It then considers whether some properties are moral status enhancing to in the sense that they increase the most status of those who possess them. This analysis reveals that there are no moral status enhancing properties, hence, no degrees of moral status. The book then considers the implications of this conclusion for seven issues: 1. The difference between a world that includes degrees of moral status and one that doesn't; 2. Our obligations to help animals; 3. Animal rights; 4. Raising animals and eating them; 5. Animal experimentation; 6. Humans who lack superior cognitive capacities; and 7. Human-animal chimeras, robots and genetically enhanced human beings"--
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780197675342
Category : Animal welfare
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
"Most people believe there are degrees of moral status. Most prominently, they believe that animals matter morally, but human beings matter significantly more than animals. This belief explains why we put animals in cages, conduct pain-inducing experiments on them and eat them for dinner. Belief in degrees of moral status also raises the possibility that robots and genetically enhanced human beings could become significantly more important than the rest of us, in which case they might be justified in putting us in cages, experimenting on us, and eating us for dinner. The present work thus systematically assesses whether, in fact, some individuals are more important morally than others. It distinguishes between moral status conferring, moral action guiding, and moral status enhancing properties, and argues that degrees of moral status require moral status enhancing properties. It then considers whether some properties are moral status enhancing to in the sense that they increase the most status of those who possess them. This analysis reveals that there are no moral status enhancing properties, hence, no degrees of moral status. The book then considers the implications of this conclusion for seven issues: 1. The difference between a world that includes degrees of moral status and one that doesn't; 2. Our obligations to help animals; 3. Animal rights; 4. Raising animals and eating them; 5. Animal experimentation; 6. Humans who lack superior cognitive capacities; and 7. Human-animal chimeras, robots and genetically enhanced human beings"--
Animals in Our Midst: The Challenges of Co-existing with Animals in the Anthropocene
Author: Bernice Bovenkerk
Publisher: Springer Nature
ISBN: 3030635236
Category : Medical
Languages : en
Pages : 574
Book Description
This Open Access book brings together authoritative voices in animal and environmental ethics, who address the many different facets of changing human-animal relationships in the Anthropocene. As we are living in complex times, the issue of how to establish meaningful relationships with other animals under Anthropocene conditions needs to be approached from a multitude of angles. This book offers the reader insight into the different discussions that exist around the topics of how we should understand animal agency, how we could take animal agency seriously in farms, urban areas and the wild, and what technologies are appropriate and morally desirable to use regarding animals. This book is of interest to both animal studies scholars and environmental ethics scholars, as well as to practitioners working with animals, such as wildlife managers, zookeepers, and conservation biologists.
Publisher: Springer Nature
ISBN: 3030635236
Category : Medical
Languages : en
Pages : 574
Book Description
This Open Access book brings together authoritative voices in animal and environmental ethics, who address the many different facets of changing human-animal relationships in the Anthropocene. As we are living in complex times, the issue of how to establish meaningful relationships with other animals under Anthropocene conditions needs to be approached from a multitude of angles. This book offers the reader insight into the different discussions that exist around the topics of how we should understand animal agency, how we could take animal agency seriously in farms, urban areas and the wild, and what technologies are appropriate and morally desirable to use regarding animals. This book is of interest to both animal studies scholars and environmental ethics scholars, as well as to practitioners working with animals, such as wildlife managers, zookeepers, and conservation biologists.
The Animal Question : Why Nonhuman Animals Deserve Human Rights
Author: Paola Cavalieri
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 9780199721313
Category : Nature
Languages : en
Pages : 198
Book Description
How much do animals matter--morally? Can we keep considering them as second class beings, to be used merely for our benefit? Or, should we offer them some form of moral egalitarianism? Inserting itself into the passionate debate over animal rights, this fascinating, provocative work by renowned scholar Paola Cavalieri advances a radical proposal: that we extend basic human rights to the nonhuman animals we currently treat as "things." Cavalieri first goes back in time, tracing the roots of the debate from the 1970s, then explores not only the ethical but also the scientific viewpoints, examining the debate's precedents in mainstream Western philosophy. She considers the main proposals of reform that recently have been advanced within the framework of today's prevailing ethical perspectives. Are these proposals satisfying? Cavalieri says no, claiming that it is necessary to go beyond the traditional opposition between utilitarianism and Kantianism and focus on the question of fundamental moral protection. In the case of human beings, such protection is granted within the widely shared moral doctrine of universal human rights' theory. Cavalieri argues that if we examine closely this theory, we will discover that its very logic extends to nonhuman animals as beings who are owed basic moral and legal rights and that, as a result, human rights are not human after all.
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 9780199721313
Category : Nature
Languages : en
Pages : 198
Book Description
How much do animals matter--morally? Can we keep considering them as second class beings, to be used merely for our benefit? Or, should we offer them some form of moral egalitarianism? Inserting itself into the passionate debate over animal rights, this fascinating, provocative work by renowned scholar Paola Cavalieri advances a radical proposal: that we extend basic human rights to the nonhuman animals we currently treat as "things." Cavalieri first goes back in time, tracing the roots of the debate from the 1970s, then explores not only the ethical but also the scientific viewpoints, examining the debate's precedents in mainstream Western philosophy. She considers the main proposals of reform that recently have been advanced within the framework of today's prevailing ethical perspectives. Are these proposals satisfying? Cavalieri says no, claiming that it is necessary to go beyond the traditional opposition between utilitarianism and Kantianism and focus on the question of fundamental moral protection. In the case of human beings, such protection is granted within the widely shared moral doctrine of universal human rights' theory. Cavalieri argues that if we examine closely this theory, we will discover that its very logic extends to nonhuman animals as beings who are owed basic moral and legal rights and that, as a result, human rights are not human after all.
Ethics at the Beginning of Life
Author: James Mumford
Publisher: Oxford Studies in Theological
ISBN: 0199673969
Category : Medical
Languages : en
Pages : 229
Book Description
Many declare the debate about abortion to be hopelessly polarised, between conservatives and liberals, between forces religious and secular. In this book Mumford upends this received wisdom and challenges consensus, arguing that many dominant attitudes and argument fail to take into account the particular way human beings 'emerge' in the world.
Publisher: Oxford Studies in Theological
ISBN: 0199673969
Category : Medical
Languages : en
Pages : 229
Book Description
Many declare the debate about abortion to be hopelessly polarised, between conservatives and liberals, between forces religious and secular. In this book Mumford upends this received wisdom and challenges consensus, arguing that many dominant attitudes and argument fail to take into account the particular way human beings 'emerge' in the world.