Economic, Political and Institutional Determinants of Budget Deficits in the European Union PDF Download
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Author: Ali H. Bayar
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 40
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Author: Ali H. Bayar
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 40
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Ali H. Bayar
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 40
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Book Description
Author: Mr.Alberto Alesina
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1451850689
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 48
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Book Description
This paper provides a critical survey of the literature on politico-institutional determinants of the government budget. We organize our discussion around two questions: Why did certain OECD countries, but not others, accumulate large public debts? Why did these fiscal imbalances appear in the last 20 years rather than before? We begin by discussing the “tax smoothing” model and conclude that this approach alone cannot provide complete answers to these questions. We will then proceed to a discussion of political economy models, which we organize in six groups: (i) models based upon opportunistic policymakers and naive voters with “fiscal illusion;” (ii) models of intergenerational redistributions; (iii) models of debt as a strategic variable, linking the current government with the next one; (iv) models of coalition governments; (v) models of geographically dispersed interests; and (vi) models emphasizing the effects of budgetary institutions. We conclude by briefly discussing policy implications.
Author: Alberto Alesina
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Budget
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
This paper provides a critical survey of the literature on politico-institutional determinants of the government budget. We organize our discussion around two questions: Why did certain OECD countries, but not others, accumulate large public debts? Why did these fiscal imbalances appear in the last twenty years rather than before? We begin by discussing the 'tax smoothing' model and conclude that this approach alone cannot provide complete answers to these questions. We will then proceed to a discussion of political economy models, which we organize in six groups: i) Models based upon opportunistic policy makers and naive voters with 'fiscal illusion'; ii) Models of intergenerational redistributions; iii) Models of debt as a strategic variable, linking the current government with the next one; iv) Models of coalition governments; v) Models of geographically dispersed interests; vi) Models emphasizing the effects of budgetary institutions.
Author: Rolf R. Strauch
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 1461545552
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 273
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Book Description
Rolf R. Strauch and Jiirgen von Hagen Center for European Integration Studies (ZEI), University of Bonn; ZEI, University of Bonn, Indiana University, and CEPR The large and persistent deficits, rising levels of debt and growing levels of public spending observed in many DECO economies during the past 25 years have stimulated much theoretical and empirical research on the political economy of public finance. Although a number of issues have been studied extensively, certain areas are still at an exploratory stage and need further theorizing and thorough empirical research. During the last two decades, the theoretical debate on budgeting has been dominated by the controversy between partisan and institutionalist approaches. Within the more political-science oriented, institutionalist literature, a controversy exists between the distributive and the informational perspectives, each setting forth a distinctive organizational rationale of parliaments with different fiscal implications. The papers in this volume cover these different perspectives, extend previous models, and test their empirical validity. The papers were originally written for a conference on "Institutions, Politics, and Fiscal Policy" organized by the Center for European Integration Studies at the University of Bonn, Germany, in July 1998. The book is organized in three parts each focusing on a distinctive aspect. The first part is dedicated to the partisan perspective. The second part focuses on budget institutions. The third part consists of three case studies of institutional reform of the budget process. This book is directed to academics and practitioners alike.
Author: Istvan Benczes
Publisher: Central European University Press
ISBN: 963386058X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 245
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Book Description
The adjustment problems of public finance in countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) are often misunderstood and misinterpreted by western scholars. This book contributes to the bridging of the gap between what is being thought by external observers and what the actual public finance reality is, as described by competent local scholars. Popular political economy research has remained biased towards advanced countries and has neglected developing and transition economies. Publications on CEE countries? public finances seem to be reluctant to apply the conceptual framework of standard political economy to these countries because of the assumption that CEE economies are different from their Western peers. But is this really the case? Are CEE economies so much different that none of the well-known ?Western? political economy concepts or models can be applied to the analysis of fiscal performance in the region? Benczes demonstrates that they can be safely applied in the context of CEE economies as well. He sees no need to develop a separate or unique theory designed for the study and understanding of (one-time) transition economies. ÿ
Author: Mark Hallerberg
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Budget deficits
Languages : en
Pages : 52
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Book Description
A rough consensus has emerged that states with proportional representation systems are likely to run larger deficits than plurality states. We argue that electoral institutions matter because they restrict the type of budgetary institution at the governmental phase which a state has at its disposal. Cabinet members may willingly delegate authority to a finance minister who can monitor spending ministers and punish those who "defect" in a process we label "delegation, " and this procedure is feasible in states where one-party governments are the norm. Such states usually have plurality electoral systems. In multi-party governments, which are common in states with proportional representation, the coalition members are not willing to delegate to one actor the ability to monitor and punish the others. Negotiated targets in the form of fiscal contracts provide an alternative in multi-party governments. Pooled time series regression results for the current European Union states in the period 1981-94 support our contention that it is the presence or absence of one of these budgetary institutions, rather than the plurality/proportional representation dichotomy, which has the greatest impact on debt levels.
Author: Alberto F. Alesina
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 48
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Book Description
This paper provides a critical survey of the literature on politico-institutional determinants of the government budget. We organize our discussion around two questions: Why did certain OECD countries, but not others, accumulate large public debts? Why did these fiscal imbalances appear in the last 20 years rather than before? We begin by discussing the quot;tax smoothingquot; model and conclude that this approach alone cannot provide complete answers to these questions. We will then proceed to a discussion of political economy models, which we organize in six groups: (i) models based upon opportunistic policymakers and naive voters with quot;fiscal illusion;quot; (ii) models of intergenerational redistributions; (iii) models of debt as a strategic variable, linking the current government with the next one; (iv) models of coalition governments; (v) models of geographically dispersed interests; and (vi) models emphasizing the effects of budgetary institutions.We conclude by briefly discussing policy implications.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Driven by the desire to fulfill the Maastricht fiscal criteria and pressed by mounting debt burdens that have accumulated over the past 30 years, a majority of EU-15 countries attempted to reduce their budget deficits during the 1990s. Yet, these nations have exhibited remarkable differences in their ability to pursue such retrenchment policies. This paper endeavours to illuminate the political and institutional factors that can help explain those differing degrees of fiscal retrenchment in European Union countries for the time period 1990-2001. Several variants of the partisan approach and the veto players framework are elucidated and applied to the question of budgetary consolidation. These elaborations yield four working hypotheses which are empirically tested using a time-series cross-section data set of 14 EU countries. The results lend support to the notion that a low number of insitutional veto players increases likelihood and extent of a budgetary retrenchment. Given these findings it is possible to draw some conclusions concerning the effectiveness and deficiencies of the Stability and Growth Pact. -- deficits ; fiscal adjustment ; partisan theory ; veto players ; time-series cross-secton models
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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