Author: Thomas Patrick Lyons
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Quot;Buyer-optionquot; contracts, in which the buyer selects the product variant to be traded and chooses whether to accept delivery, are often used to solve holdup problems. We present a simple game that focuses sharply on subgames in which the buyer proposes inefficient actions in order to improve his bargaining position. We argue for one of several alternative ways to model this situation. We then apply that modeling choice to recent models of the foundations of incomplete contracts and show that a buyer-option contract is sufficient to induce first-best outcomes.
Buyer-Option Contracts Restored
Author: Thomas Patrick Lyons
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Quot;Buyer-optionquot; contracts, in which the buyer selects the product variant to be traded and chooses whether to accept delivery, are often used to solve holdup problems. We present a simple game that focuses sharply on subgames in which the buyer proposes inefficient actions in order to improve his bargaining position. We argue for one of several alternative ways to model this situation. We then apply that modeling choice to recent models of the foundations of incomplete contracts and show that a buyer-option contract is sufficient to induce first-best outcomes.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Quot;Buyer-optionquot; contracts, in which the buyer selects the product variant to be traded and chooses whether to accept delivery, are often used to solve holdup problems. We present a simple game that focuses sharply on subgames in which the buyer proposes inefficient actions in order to improve his bargaining position. We argue for one of several alternative ways to model this situation. We then apply that modeling choice to recent models of the foundations of incomplete contracts and show that a buyer-option contract is sufficient to induce first-best outcomes.
Buyer-option Contracts Restored
Author: Thomas P. Lyons
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Contracts
Languages : en
Pages : 25
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Contracts
Languages : en
Pages : 25
Book Description
Comment on Top-of-the-market Contract-pricing Clauses
Author: Sheldon Kimmel
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 30
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 30
Book Description
Contract Law and Economics
Author: Gerrit de Geest
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 1849806640
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 497
Book Description
This unique and timely book offers an up-to-date, clear and comprehensive review of the economic literature on contract law. The topical chapters written by leading international scholars include: precontractual liability, misrepresentation, duress, gratuitous promises, gifts, standard form contracts, interpretation, contract remedies, penalty clauses, impracticability and foreseeability. Option contracts, warranties, long-term contracts, marriage contracts, franchise contracts, quasi-contracts, behavioral approaches, and civil contract law are also discussed. This excellent resource on contract law and economics will be particularly suited to contract law scholars, law teachers, policy makers, and judges. For experts in and practitioners of contract law this will be a key book to buy.
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 1849806640
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 497
Book Description
This unique and timely book offers an up-to-date, clear and comprehensive review of the economic literature on contract law. The topical chapters written by leading international scholars include: precontractual liability, misrepresentation, duress, gratuitous promises, gifts, standard form contracts, interpretation, contract remedies, penalty clauses, impracticability and foreseeability. Option contracts, warranties, long-term contracts, marriage contracts, franchise contracts, quasi-contracts, behavioral approaches, and civil contract law are also discussed. This excellent resource on contract law and economics will be particularly suited to contract law scholars, law teachers, policy makers, and judges. For experts in and practitioners of contract law this will be a key book to buy.
Controlling for Temporary Promotions in a Differentiated Products Model of Consumer Demand
Author: Charles J. Romeo
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consumers' preferences
Languages : en
Pages : 68
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consumers' preferences
Languages : en
Pages : 68
Book Description
Essays on Contract Design and Incentive Provision
Author: Eva I. Hoppe-Fischer
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 3658241330
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 211
Book Description
Contract theory, which emphasizes the importance of unverifiable actions and private information, has been a highly active field of research in microeconomics in the last decades. This thesis is divided into two parts. Part I consists of three chapters that study contract-theoretic models which are motivated by the classic procurement problem of a principal who wants an agent to deliver a certain good or service. In such models it is typically assumed that decision makers are interested in their own monetary payoffs only. Moreover, they have unlimited cognitive abilities and behave in a perfectly rational way. Yet, in practice people often do not behave this way. While empirical research is very difficult in contract theory, laboratory experiments have recently turned out to be an important source of data. In Part II, three experimental studies are presented that investigate contract-theoretic problems brought up in Part I.
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 3658241330
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 211
Book Description
Contract theory, which emphasizes the importance of unverifiable actions and private information, has been a highly active field of research in microeconomics in the last decades. This thesis is divided into two parts. Part I consists of three chapters that study contract-theoretic models which are motivated by the classic procurement problem of a principal who wants an agent to deliver a certain good or service. In such models it is typically assumed that decision makers are interested in their own monetary payoffs only. Moreover, they have unlimited cognitive abilities and behave in a perfectly rational way. Yet, in practice people often do not behave this way. While empirical research is very difficult in contract theory, laboratory experiments have recently turned out to be an important source of data. In Part II, three experimental studies are presented that investigate contract-theoretic problems brought up in Part I.
Solving Holdup Through Intermediation
Author: Alexander Raskovich
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Breach of contract
Languages : en
Pages : 50
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Breach of contract
Languages : en
Pages : 50
Book Description
Federal Antitrust Developments in the United States: Annual Reports to the Competition Committee of the Directorate For Financial and Enterprise Affairs of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2005
Author:
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1428953205
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 26
Book Description
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1428953205
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 26
Book Description
A World of Uncertainty
Author: Kenneth Heyer
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Antitrust law
Languages : en
Pages : 62
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Antitrust law
Languages : en
Pages : 62
Book Description
An Antitrust Analysis of Bundled Loyalty Discounts
Author: Patrick Greenlee
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Antitrust law
Languages : en
Pages : 50
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Antitrust law
Languages : en
Pages : 50
Book Description