An Oligopoly Model with Implicit Collusion on Price and Competition by Advertising PDF Download
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Author: Morton Schnabel
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Advertising
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Morton Schnabel
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Advertising
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Fouad Sabry
Publisher: One Billion Knowledgeable
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 358
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What is Collusion The term "collusion" refers to a dishonest agreement or covert collaboration between two or more parties with the intention of restricting open competition by deceiving, misleading, or committing fraud against certain individuals or organizations. Not all instances of collusion are regarded to be criminal. By way of example, by engaging in fraudulent activity or acquiring an unfair edge in the market, it is possible to accomplish goals that are prohibited by law. An agreement between companies or individuals to split a market, establish prices, restrict production, or restrict opportunities is referred to as a market division.It may involve activities such as "unions, wage fixing, kickbacks, or misrepresenting the independence of the relationship between the colluding parties" . In the eyes of the law, any and all actions caused by cooperation are regarded as invalid. How you will benefit (I) Insights, and validations about the following topics: Chapter 1: Collusion Chapter 2: Duopoly Chapter 3: Monopoly Chapter 4: Oligopoly Chapter 5: Perfect competition Chapter 6: Cartel Chapter 7: Price fixing Chapter 8: Cross elasticity of demand Chapter 9: Anti-competitive practices Chapter 10: Barriers to entry Chapter 11: Decartelization Chapter 12: Market power Chapter 13: Non-price competition Chapter 14: Bertrand competition Chapter 15: Cournot competition Chapter 16: Market structure Chapter 17: Market concentration Chapter 18: Competition (economics) Chapter 19: Tacit collusion Chapter 20: Economic law Chapter 21: Profit (economics) (II) Answering the public top questions about collusion. (III) Real world examples for the usage of collusion in many fields. Who this book is for Professionals, undergraduate and graduate students, enthusiasts, hobbyists, and those who want to go beyond basic knowledge or information for any kind of Collusion.
Author: Robert E. Kuenne
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 0230503713
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 442
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Book Description
The theory of price and quality decision-making in industries with a few firms which recognize their mutual interdependence is of increasing interest to economists and policy makers. This book introduces a novel theory of that decision-making, based upon the notion of the industry as a community of agents who are involved in both competitive and cooperative relationships. It develops theories and illustrates methodological approaches to the analysis of price and quality decision-making in such instances of a 'rivalrous consonance of interests' among firms.
Author: Joanna Ziolkowska
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 96
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Author: Gary Erickson
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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An oligopoly model is presented that allows the determination of feedback Nash equilibrium advertising strategies for an oligopoly. Analyses of symmetric and asymmetric oligopolies with the model show that unit contribution and advertising effectiveness have positive effects on a competitor's own advertising and steady-state sales, while discount rate and decay rate have negative effects. The asymmetric analysis further shows that unit contribution and advertising effectiveness affect positively, and discount rate and decay rate negatively, a competitor's rivals' advertising, but have effects in opposite directions regarding rivals' steady-state sales. The symmetric and asymmetric analyses also show that steady-state sales per competitor decline with the number of competitors in the oligopoly, while total oligopoly steady-state sales increase.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 1106
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Includes annual List of doctoral dissertations in political economy in progress in American universities and colleges; and the Hand book of the American Economic Association.
Author: Ashutosh Prasad
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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We examine an oligopoly model of advertising competition where each firm's market share depends on its own and its competitors' advertising decisions. A differential game model is developed and used to derive the closed-loop Nash equilibrium under symmetric as well as asymmetric competition. We obtain explicit solutions under certain plausible conditions, and discuss the effects of an increase in the number of competing firms on advertising expenditure, market share and profitability.
Author: Ashutosh Prasad
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
We examine an oligopoly model of advertising competition where each firm's market share depends on its own and its competitors' advertising decisions. A differential game model is developed and used to derive the closed-loop Nash equilibrium under symmetric as well as asymmetric competition. We obtain explicit solutions under certain plausible conditions, and discuss the effects of an increase in the number of competing firms on advertising expenditure, market share and profitability.
Author: Gerald L. Thompson
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 43
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Book Description
In this paper our previous work on monopoly and oligopoly new product models is extended by the addition of pricing as well as advertising control variables. These models contain Bass's demand growth model, and the Vidale-Wolfe and Ozga advertising models, as well as the production learning curve model and an exponential demand function. The problem of characterizing an optimal pricing and advertising policy over time is an important question in the field of marketing as well as in the areas of business policy and competitive economics. These questions are particularly important during the introductory period of a new product, when the effects of the learning curve phenomenon and market saturation are most pronounced.
Author: Jean-Jacques Lambin
Publisher: North-Holland
ISBN:
Category : Advertising
Languages : en
Pages : 334
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