A Theory of Games with General Complementarities PDF Download
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Author: Filippo L. Calciano
Publisher: Presses univ. de Louvain
ISBN: 2874632430
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 81
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Book Description
In the current theory of games, the formal notion of complementarity that is employed is unsatisfactory because it bears too few connections with our intuitive idea of complementarity. This is the starting point of the present work.
Author: Filippo L. Calciano
Publisher: Presses univ. de Louvain
ISBN: 2874632430
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 81
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Book Description
In the current theory of games, the formal notion of complementarity that is employed is unsatisfactory because it bears too few connections with our intuitive idea of complementarity. This is the starting point of the present work.
Author: Dr Jimmy Teng
Publisher: Chartridge Books Oxford
ISBN: 1909287768
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 108
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Book Description
Summary A Bayesian Theory of Games introduces a new game theoretic equilibrium concept: Bayesian equilibrium by iterative conjectures (BEIC). The new equilibrium concept achieves consistencies in results among different types of games that current games theory at times fails to. BEIC requires players to make predictions on the strategies of other players starting from first order uninformative predictive distribution functions (or conjectures) and keep updating with Bayesian statistical decision theoretic and game theoretic reasoning until a convergence of conjectures is achieved. In a BEIC, conjectures are consistent with the equilibrium or equilibriums they supported and so rationality is achieved for actions, strategies and beliefs and (statistical) decision rule. Given its ability to typically select only a unique equilibrium in games, the BEIC approach is capable of analyzing a larger set of games than current games theory, including games with noisy inaccurate observations and games with multiple sided incomplete information games. Key Features Provides a unified and consistent analysis of many categories of games. Its solution algorithm is iterative and has good computation properties. Can analyze more types of games than current existing games theory. The equilibrium concept and solution algorithm are based on Bayesian statistical decision theory. In the new equilibrium, rationality is achieved for action, strategy, belief (both prior and posterior) and decision rule. Beliefs are the results of optimization exercises of players. Uses first order uninformative conjectures and reaction functions to derive higher and higher orders of conjectures until a convergence of conjectures is achieved. Has great application value for it could solve many types of games and could model beliefs. The Author Dr Jimmy Teng currently teaches at the School of Economics of the University of Nottingham (Malaysia Campus). He is the author of many articles and two books. He received his economics PhD from the University of Toronto. He also earned a PhD in political Science and a MS in statistics from Duke University. He previously held research and teaching positions in Academia Sinica, National Taiwan University and Nanyang Technological University Readership Games theorists, decision theorists, economists, mathematicians, statisticians, operational researchers, social scientists, management researchers, public policy researchers, computer scientists Contents Preface Acknowledgments About the author Introduction Sequential games with incomplete information and noisy inaccurate observation; introduction; an inflationary game; Bayesian iterative conjectures algorithm as a Bayes decision rule; conclusions Sequential games with perfect and imperfect information; introduction; the Bayesian iterative conjecture algorithm, sub-game perfect equilibrium and perfect Bayesian equilibrium; solving sequential games of incomplete and perfect information; multiple-sided incomplete information sequential games with perfect information; conclusions Simultaneous games; introduction; complete information simultaneous games; BEIC and refinements of Nash equilibrium; simultaneous games with incomplete information; conclusions Conclusions References Index
Author: Drew Fudenberg
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 9812818472
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 417
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Book Description
This book brings together the joint work of Drew Fudenberg and David Levine (through 2008) on the closely connected topics of repeated games and reputation effects, along with related papers on more general issues in game theory and dynamic games. The unified presentation highlights the recurring themes of their work.
Author: John Von Neumann
Publisher: Diana
ISBN: 9785608789779
Category : Games & Activities
Languages : en
Pages : 660
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Book Description
This is the classic work upon which modern-day game theory is based. What began as a modest proposal that a mathematician and an economist write a short paper together blossomed, when Princeton University Press published Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. In it, John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern conceived a groundbreaking mathematical theory of economic and social organization, based on a theory of games of strategy. Not only would this revolutionize economics, but the entirely new field of scientific inquiry it yielded--game theory--has since been widely used to analyze a host of real-world phenomena from arms races to optimal policy choices of presidential candidates, from vaccination policy to major league baseball salary negotiations. And it is today established throughout both the social sciences and a wide range of other sciences.
Author: Harold William Kuhn
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 9780691079349
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 224
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Book Description
The description for this book, Contributions to the Theory of Games (AM-24), Volume I, will be forthcoming.
Author: John Von Neumann
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 684
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Book Description
This is the classic work upon which modern-day game theory is based. What began more than sixty years ago as a modest proposal that a mathematician and an economist write a short paper together blossomed, in 1944, when Princeton University Press published Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. In it, John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern conceived a groundbreaking mathematical theory of economic and social organization, based on a theory of games of strategy. Not only would this revolutionize economics, but the entirely new field of scientific inquiry it yielded--game theory--has since been widely used to analyze a host of real-world phenomena from arms races to optimal policy choices of presidential candidates, from vaccination policy to major league baseball salary negotiations. And it is today established throughout both the social sciences and a wide range of other sciences.
Author: Iosif A. Krass
Publisher: Academic Press
ISBN: 1483258084
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 236
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Book Description
The Theory of Positional Games with Applications in Economics deals with information and probabilistic extension of games in extensive forms, in normal forms, and to the existence of solutions of infinite games. The text also explains the application of existence of a solution to a von Neumann model with conflict interaction, and the theory of differential games based on Isaac's equations. The text describes in detail the definitions of a difference game, control sets of players, general strategies, optimal behavioral strategies. Isaac's approach to differential games is based primarily on the assumption of the sufficient smoothness of a Bellman's function. Bellman's function becomes smooth if control functions satisfy certain regularity conditions and smoothness conditions. Other approaches to differential games include the geometric properties of games and those of Avner Friedman and Nokolai Krasovsky. The computation of behavioral strategies in the Friedman approach is primarily based on Isaac's approach. Krasovky's approach is somewhat a generalization of both the geometrical approach and Friedman's approximation approach. The book is suitable for economists, statistician, mathematicians, students or professors of economics, business, and games theory.
Author: Dr. Harjinthar Singh
Publisher: Marc & Zed | PUBLISHING
ISBN:
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 108
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Book Description
Game Theory is the study of mathematical models of strategic interaction among rational decision-makers. It has found application in the fields of economics, computer science, biology and international relations. This book serves to introduce the principles of non-cooperative game theory - including Nash Equilibrium, Zero-sum Games, Non-zero-sum games, Repeated and Stochastic games, and the Shapely Value in coalition game theory. Selected articles on game theory application in real-life are also included.
Author: Harold William Kuhn
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 1400881978
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 408
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Book Description
These two new collections, numbers 28 and 29 respectively in the Annals of Mathematics Studies, continue the high standard set by the earlier Annals Studies 20 and 24 by bringing together important contributions to the theories of games and of nonlinear differential equations.
Author: Nicolai N. Vorob'ev
Publisher: Birkhäuser
ISBN: 3034885148
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 501
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Book Description
The English edition differs only slightly from the Russian original. The main struc tural difference is that all the material on the theory of finite noncooperative games has been collected in Chapter 2, with renumbering of the material of the remain ing chapters. New sections have been added in this chapter: devoted to general questions of equilibrium theory in nondegenerate games, subsections 3.9-3.17, by N.N. Vorob'ev, Jr.; and § 4, by A.G. Chernyakov; and § 5, by N.N. Vorob'ev, Jr., on the computational complexity of the process of finding equilibrium points in finite games. It should also be mentioned that subsections 3.12-3.14 in Chapter 1 were written by E.B. Yanovskaya especially for the Russian edition. The author regrets that the present edition does not reflect the important game-theoretical achievements presented in the splendid monographs by E. van Damme (on the refinement of equilibrium principles for finite games), as well as those by J.e. Harsanyi and R. Selten, and by W. Giith and B. Kalkofen (on equilibrium selection). When the Russian edition was being written, these direc tions in game theory had not yet attained their final form, which appeared only in quite recent monographs; the present author has had to resist the temptation of attempting to produce an elementary exposition of the new theories for the English edition; readers of this edition will find only brief mention of the new material.
