Author: Guillermo Moloche
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781303423253
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 118

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This thesis contains two independent chapters, the first on financial econometrics and the second on financial economics.

Author: Yang Yu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Author: Tuckchung Lee
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 152

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Author: Harvey Birtill Westbrook (Jr.)
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 252

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Author: Bo Liu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Mutual funds
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Author: Evan Jo
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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"This thesis focuses on the economics of risk: it studies how to measure, price, and trade risk in financial markets. The first paper "Sharper Alpha" aims to provide a better econometric tool for measuring and studying risk premia. Traditional alpha-based tests face substantial estimation noise when applied to individual stocks. The standard approach of forming diversified portfolios reduces this noise, but also incurs the costs of aggregation errors and information loss. I propose a more efficient statistic, a sharper alpha, that directly reduces estimation noise for single stocks. I find that sharper alphas reveal stock-level patterns that were not visible before. In the second paper "A Supply and Demand Approach to Equity Pricing", joint with Sebastien Betermier and Laurent Calvet, we provide a new theoretical framework to analyze how the general equilibrium relation between risk and return is driven by both supply and demand for risky financial capital. The mantra of "high risk high return" in finance takes the point of view of investors, who require higher expected returns to supply more risky capital. Firms, on the other hand, require lower discount rates to demand more risky capital. We explain how the heterogeneity of supply and demand factors determine whether the risk-return relation is positive or negative, consistent with the empirical evidence and a wide range of asset pricing anomalies. We empirically estimate the supply and demand schedules of individual firms using three-stage-least-squares, and show that the risk-return relation is mainly driven by firm demand factors"--

Author: Suhas Saha
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 288

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Author: Judy Lynn Shelton
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Capital
Languages : en
Pages : 88

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Author: Eric John Osmer
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Author: Olexandr Gorbenko
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

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This thesis consists of three essays that apply game theory, theory and structural econometrics of auctions, and dynamic programming to study problems in two areas of corporate finance and market design: Dynamic theory of the firm and financial auctions. In the first essay (co-authored with Ilya A. Strebulaev), we investigate corporate financial policies in the presence of both temporary and permanent shocks to firms' cash flows. In our framework cash flows can be negative and are imperfectly correlated with firm value, and earnings volatility differs from asset volatility. These results are consistent with empirical stylized facts. They are also contrary to the implications of existing dynamic capital structure models that allow only for permanent shocks to cash flows. Temporary shocks increase the importance of financial flexibility and may provide an intuitively simple and realistic explanation of empirically observed financial conservatism and low leverage phenomena. The theoretical framework developed in this paper is general enough to be used in various corporate finance applications. In the second essay (co-authored with Andrey MalenkoSPAN class=skype_name_highlight_online title=amalenko height="12px" width="15px" SPAN class=skype_name_mark begin_of_the_skype_highlighting SPAN class=skype_name_mark end_of_the_skype_highlighting ), we study simultaneous security-bid second-price auctions with competition among sellers for potential bidders. The sellers compete by designing ordered sets of securities that the bidders can offer as payment for the assets. Upon observing auction designs, potential bidders decide which auctions to enter. We characterize all symmetric equilibria and show that there always exist equilibria in standard securities or their combinations. In large markets the unique equilibrium is auctions in pure cash. We extend the model for competition in reserve prices and show that binding reserve prices never constitute equilibrium as long as equilibrium security designs are not call options. To study how the market for takeovers operates, it is critical to understand how different potential acquirers shape their valuations, or maximum willingness to pay, for targets. In the third essay (co-authored with Andrey Malenko), we propose a structural model of a takeover auction that allows for asymmetries between strategic and financial bidders. Using a hand-collected data on the number of competing bidders, their types and bids, we estimate the model to recover valuations of participating strategic and financial bidders. Our approach helps overcome the sample selection problem that arises if takeover premia are simply interpreted as average bidder valuations. The results suggest that there are substantial differences between strategic and financial bidders along many dimensions. In particular, strategic and financial bidders value targets with different observable characteristics, and strategic bidders are considerably more heterogeneous than financial bidders. While average valuations of strategic bidders are higher than those of financial bidders, the higher takeover premiums that they pay are mainly driven by their greater heterogeneity. We extend the model to incorporate endogenous participation decisions, and show that strategic bidders appear to have considerably higher average participation costs than financial bidders, especially so if the target is highly valued by them or operates in a hi-tech industry.