Three Essays on Information, Contracting and Financial Intermediation

Three Essays on Information, Contracting and Financial Intermediation PDF Author: Andrew John Winton
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 124

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Three Essays on Information, Contracting and Financial Intermediation

Three Essays on Information, Contracting and Financial Intermediation PDF Author: Andrew John Winton
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 124

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Three essays on venture capital contracting

Three essays on venture capital contracting PDF Author: Ibolya Schindele
Publisher: Rozenberg Publishers
ISBN: 9051709471
Category : Contracts
Languages : en
Pages : 181

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Three Essays in Financial Intermediation

Three Essays in Financial Intermediation PDF Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 194

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Three Essays on Financial Intermediation in the Open Economy

Three Essays on Financial Intermediation in the Open Economy PDF Author: Johanna Krenz
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Three Essays on Empirical Financial Intermediation

Three Essays on Empirical Financial Intermediation PDF Author: Stefan Pohl
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Three Essays on Financial Intermediation

Three Essays on Financial Intermediation PDF Author: Roberto Liebscher
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

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Essays on Financial Intermediation

Essays on Financial Intermediation PDF Author: Igor Salitskiy
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

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This dissertation consists of three studies. In the first study I This paper extends the costly state verification model from Townsend (1979) to a dynamic and hierarchical setting with an investor, a financial intermediary, and an entrepreneur. Such a hierarchy is natural in a setting where the intermediary has special monitoring skills. This setting yields a theory of seniority and dynamic control: it explains why investors are usually given the highest priority on projects' assets, financial intermediaries have middle priority and entrepreneurs have the lowest priority; it also explains why more cash flow and control rights are allocated to financial intermediaries if a project's performance is bad and to entrepreneurs if it is good. I show that the optimal contracts can be replicated with debt and equity. If the project requires a series of investments until it can be sold to outsiders, the entrepreneur sells preferred stock (a combination of debt and equity) each time additional financing is needed. If the project generates a series of positive payoffs, the entrepreneur sells a combination of short-term and long-term debt. In the second study I I study optimal government interventions during asset fire sales by banks. Fire sales happen when a large portion of banks receive liquidity shocks. This depletes bank balance sheets directly and indirectly because these assets are used as collateral. The government can respond by buying distressed assets or buying stock from banks. Stock purchases do not deprive banks of collateral, but may have a lower effect on asset prices. The optimal policy depends on the elasticity of asset prices to asset supply and the amount of assets held by banks. Calibration to the recent financial crisis is provided. In the third study conducted with Attila Ambrus and Eric Chaney we use ransom prices and time to ransom for over 10,000 captives rescued from two Barbary strongholds to investigate the empirical relevance of dynamic bargaining models with one-sided asymmetric information in ransoming settings. We observe both multiple negotiations that were ex ante similar from the uninformed party's (seller's) point of view, and information that only the buyer knew. Through reduced-form analysis, we test some common qualitative predictions of dynamic bargaining models. We also structurally estimate the model in Cramton (1991) to compare negotiations in different Barbary strongholds. Our estimates suggest that the historical bargaining institutions were remarkably efficient, despite the presence of substantial asymmetric information.

Essays on Information and Financial Intermediation

Essays on Information and Financial Intermediation PDF Author: Douglas Warren Diamond
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 282

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Three Essays in Corporate Finance

Three Essays in Corporate Finance PDF Author: Bernardino Manuel Pereira Adão
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 292

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Three Essays on Financial Intermediation [cumulative Dissertation]

Three Essays on Financial Intermediation [cumulative Dissertation] PDF Author: Roberto Liebscher
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Intermediation (Finance)
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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