Author: Andrea Gallice
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 80

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Author: Kwok H. Cheung
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Collective bargaining
Languages : en
Pages : 232

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Author: Michael E. Conlin
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 286

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Author: Sunku Hahn
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 184

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Author: Nagore Iriberri
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Decision making
Languages : en
Pages : 414

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Author: Alessandro Innocenti
Publisher: Palgrave MacMillan
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 328

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Behavioural game theory is the most important recent development of standard game theory, and its applications regard several fields of research, ranging from economic theory to sociology and political science. Behavioural game theory aims to provide a behavioural and psychological approach to game theory modelling, in order to identify more robust equilibrium outcomes and more realistic behavioural assumptions. This book explores the key topics in detail, covering issues such as players' heterogeneity, social preferences, reciprocity, learning and information, and punishment in public good games. It provides a state-of-the-art analysis of the progress and methodology of behavioural game theory, as well as exploring the interdisciplinary aspects of the subject, and is an extremely valuable resource for academics and scholars with an interest in the area. Book jacket.

Author: David V. Budescu
Publisher: Psychology Press
ISBN: 1317778464
Category : Psychology
Languages : en
Pages : 448

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Human behavior often violates the predictions of rational choice theory. This realization has caused many social psychologists and experimental economists to attempt to develop an experimentally-based variant of game theory as an alternative descriptive model. The impetus for this book is the interest in the development of such a theory that combines elements from both disciplines and appeals to both. The editors have brought together leading researchers in the fields of experimental economics, behavioral game theory, and social dilemmas to engage in constructive dialogue across disciplinary boundaries. This book offers a comprehensive overview of the new insights into the motivation of human behavior under a variety of naturally or artificially induced incentive structures that are emerging from their work. Amnon Rapoport--a pioneer and leader in experimental study and quantitative modeling of human decisions in social and interactive contexts--is honored.

Author: Mr. Songzi Du
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

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This dissertation consists of three essays on the foundation and applications of game theory. In Chapter 1 we study a refinement of correlated equilibrium in which players' actions are driven by their beliefs and higher order beliefs about the play of the game (beliefs over what other players will do, over what other players believe others will do, etc.). For any finite, complete-information game, we characterize the behavioral implications of this refinement with and without a common prior, and up to any a priori fixed depth of reasoning. In every finite game "most" correlated equilibrium distributions are consistent with this refinement; as a consequence, this refinement gives a classification of "most" correlated equilibrium distributions based on the maximum order of beliefs used by players in the equilibrium. On the other hand, in a generic two-player game any non-degenerate mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is not consistent with this refinement. In the next two chapters we turn to the applications of game theory. In Chapter 2 we show that without flexible transfers, the timing of transactions is difficult to coordinate in large matching markets. In our model, some agents have the option of matching early before others arrive. We compare two regimes. In the first regime, transfers which divide surpluses created between the two sides of the market are exogenously fixed, perhaps due to some institutional constraints. Then even with a centralized mechanism that implements a stable matching after all agents arrive, some agents have incentives to match early. We prove that in this setting, as the market gets large, on average approximately one quarter of all agents have strict incentives to match early. Moreover, as the market gets large, with probability tending to 1 there is no early matching scheme that is dynamically stable. On the other hand, in the second regime in which agents can freely negotiate transfers, a stable matching after all agents arrive eliminates all incentives to match early and is dynamically stable. In Chapter 3 we study settlement auctions for credit default swaps (CDS). We find that the one-sided design of CDS auctions used in practice gives CDS buyers and sellers strong incentives to distort the final auction price, in order to maximize payoffs from existing CDS positions. Consequently, these auctions tend to overprice defaulted bonds conditional on an excess supply and underprice defaulted bonds conditional on an excess demand. In our model bidders have a commonly-known bond value but privately-known CDS positions. We prove that with a one-sided auction in every Bayesian-Nash equilibrium the final auction price is strictly greater than the common bond value given an excess supply of bonds, and strictly less than the common bond value given an excess demand of bonds. We propose a double auction to mitigate this price bias. Finally, we find the predictions of our model on bidding behavior to be consistent with data on CDS auctions.

Author: The late John F. Nash
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 9781781956298
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 116

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'This short volume is very welcome . . . Most importantly, on pages 32-33, the volume reprints as an appendix to the journal article based on Nash's Princeton doctoral dissertation on non-cooperative games a section of the thesis on "motivation and interpretation" that was omitted from the article. An editorial note remarks mildly that "The missing section is of considerable interest". This section, not available in any other published source, makes the present volume indispensable for research libraries . . . Nash's Essays on Game Theory, dating from his years as a Princeton graduate student . . . has a lasting impact on economics and related fields unmatched by any series of articles written in such a brief time . . . To economists, his name will always bring to mind his game theory papers of the early 1950s. It is good to have these conveniently reprinted in this volume.' - Robert W. Dimand, The Economic Journal 'The news that John Nash was to share the 1994 Nobel Prize for Economics with John Harsanyi and Reinhard Selten was doubly welcome. It signalled not only that the brilliant achievements of his youth were to be recognized in a manner consistent with their significance, but that the long illness that clouded his later years had fallen into remission. I hope that this collection of his economic papers will serve as another reminder that John Nash has rejoined the intellectual community to which he has contributed so much.' - From the introduction by Ken Binmore Essays on Game Theory is a unique collection of seven of John Nash's essays which highlight his pioneering contribution to game theory in economics. Featuring a comprehensive introduction by Ken Binmore which explains and summarizes John Nash's achievements in the field of non-cooperative and cooperative game theory, this book will be an indispensable reference for scholars and will be welcomed by those with an interest in game theory and its applications to the social sciences.

Author: Jeroen M. Swinkels
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 256

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