Author: Tao-yi Joseph Wang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 308
Book Description
Three Essays in Auction and Information
Author: Tao-yi Joseph Wang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 308
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 308
Book Description
Three Essays on Auctions and Innovation
Author: Thomas Giebe
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Three Essays on Auctions and Innovations
Author: Thomas Giebe
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 89
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 89
Book Description
Three Essays on Auctions and Bargaining
Author: Yumiko Baba
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 214
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 214
Book Description
Three Essays in the Theory of Auctions
Author: Jörg Nikutta
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 99
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 99
Book Description
Three Essays in Empirical Auctions
Author: Sudip Gupta
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 148
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 148
Book Description
Three Essays in Auctions and Information Acquisition
Author: Gabor Virag
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 250
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 250
Book Description
Three Essays on Auctions
Author: Itzhak Rasooly
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Three Essays in Auctions and Contests
Author: Jun Zhang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 122
Book Description
This thesis studies issues in auctions and contests. The seller of an object and the organizer of a contest have many instruments to improve the revenue of the auction or the efficiency of the contest. The three essays in this dissertation shed light on these issues. Chapter 2 investigates how a refund policy affects a buyer's strategic behavior by characterizing the equilibria of a second-price auction with a linear refund policy. I find that a generous refund policy induces buyers to bid aggressively. I also examine the optimal mechanism design problem when buyers only have private initial estimates of their valuations and may privately learn of shocks that affect their valuations later. When all buyers are \emph{ex-ante} symmetric, this optimal selling mechanism can be implemented by a first-price or second-price auction with a refund policy. Chapter 3 investigates how information revelation rules affect the existence and the efficiency of equilibria in two-round elimination contests. I establish that there exists no symmetric separating equilibrium under the full revelation rule and find that the non-existence result is very robust. I then characterize a partially efficient separating equilibrium under the partial revelation rule when players' valuations are uniformly distributed. I finally investigate the no revelation rule and find that it is both most efficient and optimal in maximizing the total efforts from the contestants. Within my framework, more information revelation leads to less efficient outcomes. Chapter 4 analyzes the signaling effect of bidding in a two-round elimination contest. Before the final round, bids in the preliminary round are revealed and act as signals of the contestants' private valuations. Compared to the benchmark model, in which private valuations are revealed automatically before the final round and thus no signaling of bids takes place, I find that strong contestants bluff and weak contestants sandbag. In a separating equilibrium, bids in the preliminary round fully reveal the contestants' private valuations. However, this signaling effect makes the equilibrium bidding strategy in the preliminary round steeper for high valuations and flatter for low valuations compared to the benchmark model.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 122
Book Description
This thesis studies issues in auctions and contests. The seller of an object and the organizer of a contest have many instruments to improve the revenue of the auction or the efficiency of the contest. The three essays in this dissertation shed light on these issues. Chapter 2 investigates how a refund policy affects a buyer's strategic behavior by characterizing the equilibria of a second-price auction with a linear refund policy. I find that a generous refund policy induces buyers to bid aggressively. I also examine the optimal mechanism design problem when buyers only have private initial estimates of their valuations and may privately learn of shocks that affect their valuations later. When all buyers are \emph{ex-ante} symmetric, this optimal selling mechanism can be implemented by a first-price or second-price auction with a refund policy. Chapter 3 investigates how information revelation rules affect the existence and the efficiency of equilibria in two-round elimination contests. I establish that there exists no symmetric separating equilibrium under the full revelation rule and find that the non-existence result is very robust. I then characterize a partially efficient separating equilibrium under the partial revelation rule when players' valuations are uniformly distributed. I finally investigate the no revelation rule and find that it is both most efficient and optimal in maximizing the total efforts from the contestants. Within my framework, more information revelation leads to less efficient outcomes. Chapter 4 analyzes the signaling effect of bidding in a two-round elimination contest. Before the final round, bids in the preliminary round are revealed and act as signals of the contestants' private valuations. Compared to the benchmark model, in which private valuations are revealed automatically before the final round and thus no signaling of bids takes place, I find that strong contestants bluff and weak contestants sandbag. In a separating equilibrium, bids in the preliminary round fully reveal the contestants' private valuations. However, this signaling effect makes the equilibrium bidding strategy in the preliminary round steeper for high valuations and flatter for low valuations compared to the benchmark model.
Three Essays on Auctions and Mechanism Design
Author: Luke Hu
Publisher:
ISBN: 9783844025132
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 89
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN: 9783844025132
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 89
Book Description