Author: Bernard B. Fall
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Vietnam (Democratic Republic)
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
The Viet-Minh regime
Author: Bernard B. Fall
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Vietnam (Democratic Republic)
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Vietnam (Democratic Republic)
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Rice Wars in Colonial Vietnam
Author: Geoffrey C. Gunn
Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield
ISBN: 1442223030
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 345
Book Description
This book offers the first detailed English-language examination of the Great Vietnamese Famine of 1945, which left at least a million dead, and links it persuasively to the largely unexpected Viet Minh seizure of power only months later. Drawing on extensive research in French archives, Geoffrey C. Gunn offers an important new interpretation of Japanese–Vichy French wartime economic exploitation of Vietnam’s agricultural potential. He analyzes successes and failures of French colonial rice programs and policies from the early 1900s to 1945, drawing clear connections between colonialism and agrarian unrest in the 1930s and the rise of the Viet Minh in the 1940s. Gunn asks whether the famine signaled a loss of the French administration’s “mandate of heaven,” or whether the overall dire human condition was the determining factor in facilitating communist victory in August 1945. In the broader sweep of Vietnamese history, including the rise of the communist party, the picture that emerges is not only one of local victimhood at the hands of outsiders—French and, in turn, Japanese— but the enormous agency on the part of the Vietnamese themselves to achieve moral victory over injustice against all odds, no matter how controversial, tragic, and contested the outcome. As the author clearly demonstrates, colonial-era development strategies and contests also had their postwar sequels in the “American war,” just as land, land reform, and subsistence-sustainable development issues persist into the present.
Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield
ISBN: 1442223030
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 345
Book Description
This book offers the first detailed English-language examination of the Great Vietnamese Famine of 1945, which left at least a million dead, and links it persuasively to the largely unexpected Viet Minh seizure of power only months later. Drawing on extensive research in French archives, Geoffrey C. Gunn offers an important new interpretation of Japanese–Vichy French wartime economic exploitation of Vietnam’s agricultural potential. He analyzes successes and failures of French colonial rice programs and policies from the early 1900s to 1945, drawing clear connections between colonialism and agrarian unrest in the 1930s and the rise of the Viet Minh in the 1940s. Gunn asks whether the famine signaled a loss of the French administration’s “mandate of heaven,” or whether the overall dire human condition was the determining factor in facilitating communist victory in August 1945. In the broader sweep of Vietnamese history, including the rise of the communist party, the picture that emerges is not only one of local victimhood at the hands of outsiders—French and, in turn, Japanese— but the enormous agency on the part of the Vietnamese themselves to achieve moral victory over injustice against all odds, no matter how controversial, tragic, and contested the outcome. As the author clearly demonstrates, colonial-era development strategies and contests also had their postwar sequels in the “American war,” just as land, land reform, and subsistence-sustainable development issues persist into the present.
Number One Realist
Author: Nathaniel L. Moir
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0197654258
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 516
Book Description
In a 1965 letter to Newsweek, French writer and academic Bernard Fall (1926-67) staked a claim as the 'Number One Realist' on the Vietnam War. This is the first book to study the thought of this overlooked figure, one of the most important experts on counterinsurgency warfare in Indochina. Nathaniel L. Moir's intellectual history analyses Fall's formative experiences: his service in the French underground and army during the Second World War; his father's execution by the Germans and his mother's murder in Auschwitz; and his work as a research analyst at the Nuremberg Trials. Moir demonstrates how these critical events shaped Fall's trenchant analysis of Viet Minh-led revolutionary warfare during the French-Indochina War and the early Vietnam War. In the years before conventional American intervention in 1965, Fall argued that--far more than anything in the United States' military arsenal--resolving conflict in Vietnam would require political strength, willpower, integrity and skill. Number One Realist illuminates Fall's study of political reconciliation in Indochina, while showing how his profound, humanitarian critique of war continues to echo in the endless conflicts of the present. It will challenge and change the way we think about the Vietnam War.
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0197654258
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 516
Book Description
In a 1965 letter to Newsweek, French writer and academic Bernard Fall (1926-67) staked a claim as the 'Number One Realist' on the Vietnam War. This is the first book to study the thought of this overlooked figure, one of the most important experts on counterinsurgency warfare in Indochina. Nathaniel L. Moir's intellectual history analyses Fall's formative experiences: his service in the French underground and army during the Second World War; his father's execution by the Germans and his mother's murder in Auschwitz; and his work as a research analyst at the Nuremberg Trials. Moir demonstrates how these critical events shaped Fall's trenchant analysis of Viet Minh-led revolutionary warfare during the French-Indochina War and the early Vietnam War. In the years before conventional American intervention in 1965, Fall argued that--far more than anything in the United States' military arsenal--resolving conflict in Vietnam would require political strength, willpower, integrity and skill. Number One Realist illuminates Fall's study of political reconciliation in Indochina, while showing how his profound, humanitarian critique of war continues to echo in the endless conflicts of the present. It will challenge and change the way we think about the Vietnam War.
The Viet-Minh Regime
Author: Bernard B. Fall
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 234
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 234
Book Description
The Psychological War for Vietnam, 1960–1968
Author: Mervyn Edwin Roberts III
Publisher: University Press of Kansas
ISBN: 0700625836
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 428
Book Description
The Psychological War for Vietnam, 1960–1968, for the first time fully explores the most sustained, intensive use of psychological operations (PSYOP) in American history. In PSYOP, US military personnel use a variety of tactics—mostly audio and visual messages—to influence individuals and groups to behave in ways that favor US objectives. Informed by the author’s firsthand experience of such operations elsewhere, this account of the battle for “hearts and minds” in Vietnam offers rare insight into the art and science of propaganda as a military tool in the twentieth century. The Psychological War for Vietnam, 1960–1968, focuses on the creation, capabilities, and performance of the forces that conducted PSYOP in Vietnam, including the Joint US Public Affairs Office and the 4th PSYOP Group. In his comprehensive account, Mervyn Edwin Roberts III covers psychological operations across the entire theater, by all involved US agencies. His book reveals the complex interplay of these activities within the wider context of Vietnam and the Cold War propaganda battle being fought by the United States at the same time. Because PSYOP never occurs in a vacuum, Roberts considers the shifting influence of alternative sources of information—especially from the governments of North and South Vietnam, but also from Australia, Korea, and the Philippines. The Psychological War for Vietnam, 1960–1968, also addresses the development of PSYOP doctrine and training in the period prior to the introduction of ground combat forces in 1965 and, finally, shows how the course of the war itself forced changes to this doctrine. The scope of the book allows for a unique measurement of the effectiveness of psychological operations over time.
Publisher: University Press of Kansas
ISBN: 0700625836
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 428
Book Description
The Psychological War for Vietnam, 1960–1968, for the first time fully explores the most sustained, intensive use of psychological operations (PSYOP) in American history. In PSYOP, US military personnel use a variety of tactics—mostly audio and visual messages—to influence individuals and groups to behave in ways that favor US objectives. Informed by the author’s firsthand experience of such operations elsewhere, this account of the battle for “hearts and minds” in Vietnam offers rare insight into the art and science of propaganda as a military tool in the twentieth century. The Psychological War for Vietnam, 1960–1968, focuses on the creation, capabilities, and performance of the forces that conducted PSYOP in Vietnam, including the Joint US Public Affairs Office and the 4th PSYOP Group. In his comprehensive account, Mervyn Edwin Roberts III covers psychological operations across the entire theater, by all involved US agencies. His book reveals the complex interplay of these activities within the wider context of Vietnam and the Cold War propaganda battle being fought by the United States at the same time. Because PSYOP never occurs in a vacuum, Roberts considers the shifting influence of alternative sources of information—especially from the governments of North and South Vietnam, but also from Australia, Korea, and the Philippines. The Psychological War for Vietnam, 1960–1968, also addresses the development of PSYOP doctrine and training in the period prior to the introduction of ground combat forces in 1965 and, finally, shows how the course of the war itself forced changes to this doctrine. The scope of the book allows for a unique measurement of the effectiveness of psychological operations over time.
The Aggressors
Author: Martin Scott Catino
Publisher: Dog Ear Publishing
ISBN: 1608445305
Category : Communism
Languages : en
Pages : 310
Book Description
Publisher: Dog Ear Publishing
ISBN: 1608445305
Category : Communism
Languages : en
Pages : 310
Book Description
The Twenty-five Year Century
Author: Quang Thi Lâm
Publisher: University of North Texas Press
ISBN: 1574411438
Category : Biography & Autobiography
Languages : en
Pages : 449
Book Description
For Victor Hugo, the nineteenth century could be remembered by only its first two years, which established peace in Europe and France's supremacy on the continent. For General Lam Quang Thi, the twentieth century had only twenty-five years: from 1950 to 1975, during which the Republic of Vietnam and its Army grew up and collapsed with the fall of Saigon. This is the story of those twenty-five years. General Thi fought in the Indochina War as a battery commander on the side of the French. When Viet Minh aggression began after the Geneva Accords, he served in the nascent Vietnamese National Army, and his career covers this army's entire lifespan. He was deputy commander of the 7th Infantry Division, and in 1965 he assumed command of the 9th Infantry Division. In 1966, at the age of thirty-three, he became one of the youngest generals in the Vietnamese Army. He participated in the Tet Offensive before being removed from the front lines for political reasons. When North Vietnam launched the 1972 Great Offensive, he was brought back to the field and eventually promoted to commander of an Army Corps Task Force along the Demilitarized Zone. With the fall of Saigon, he left Vietnam and emigrated to the United States. Like his tactics during battle, General Thi pulls no punches in his denunciation of the various regimes of the Republic, and complacency and arrogance toward Vietnam in the policies of both France and the United States. Without lapsing into bitterness, this is finally a tribute to the soldiers who fell on behalf of a good cause.
Publisher: University of North Texas Press
ISBN: 1574411438
Category : Biography & Autobiography
Languages : en
Pages : 449
Book Description
For Victor Hugo, the nineteenth century could be remembered by only its first two years, which established peace in Europe and France's supremacy on the continent. For General Lam Quang Thi, the twentieth century had only twenty-five years: from 1950 to 1975, during which the Republic of Vietnam and its Army grew up and collapsed with the fall of Saigon. This is the story of those twenty-five years. General Thi fought in the Indochina War as a battery commander on the side of the French. When Viet Minh aggression began after the Geneva Accords, he served in the nascent Vietnamese National Army, and his career covers this army's entire lifespan. He was deputy commander of the 7th Infantry Division, and in 1965 he assumed command of the 9th Infantry Division. In 1966, at the age of thirty-three, he became one of the youngest generals in the Vietnamese Army. He participated in the Tet Offensive before being removed from the front lines for political reasons. When North Vietnam launched the 1972 Great Offensive, he was brought back to the field and eventually promoted to commander of an Army Corps Task Force along the Demilitarized Zone. With the fall of Saigon, he left Vietnam and emigrated to the United States. Like his tactics during battle, General Thi pulls no punches in his denunciation of the various regimes of the Republic, and complacency and arrogance toward Vietnam in the policies of both France and the United States. Without lapsing into bitterness, this is finally a tribute to the soldiers who fell on behalf of a good cause.
China and the First Vietnam War, 1947-54
Author: Laura M. Calkins
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1134078544
Category : Social Science
Languages : en
Pages : 248
Book Description
This book charts the development of the First Vietnam War – the war between the Vietnamese Communists (the Viet Minh) and the French colonial power – considering especially how relations between the Viet Minh and the Chinese Communists had a profound impact on the course of the war. It shows how the Chinese provided finance, training and weapons to the Viet Minh, but how differences about strategy emerged, particularly when China became involved in the Korean War and the subsequent peace negotiations, when the need to placate the United States and to prevent US military involvement in Southeast Asia became a key concern for the Chinese. The book shows how the Viet Minh strategy of all-out war in the north and limited guerrilla warfare in the south developed from this situation, and how the war then unfolded.
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1134078544
Category : Social Science
Languages : en
Pages : 248
Book Description
This book charts the development of the First Vietnam War – the war between the Vietnamese Communists (the Viet Minh) and the French colonial power – considering especially how relations between the Viet Minh and the Chinese Communists had a profound impact on the course of the war. It shows how the Chinese provided finance, training and weapons to the Viet Minh, but how differences about strategy emerged, particularly when China became involved in the Korean War and the subsequent peace negotiations, when the need to placate the United States and to prevent US military involvement in Southeast Asia became a key concern for the Chinese. The book shows how the Viet Minh strategy of all-out war in the north and limited guerrilla warfare in the south developed from this situation, and how the war then unfolded.
French Indochina War
Author: Huston, Simon
Publisher: Simon Huston
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 213
Book Description
Military mistakes impel strategic reflection. The French Indochina War (FIW) from 1946-1954 furnishes useful insights with some resonance for current challenges. A combination of pre-exiting conditions, catalysts and operational drivers caused the cathartic 1954 French defeat. Pre-conditions included the illegitimacy of the colonial regime, repression that polarised nationalist sentiment. Economically, pernicious terms of trade suppressed industrialisation but oiled speculation until suddenly reversed by devaluation in 1953 that reflected financial disengagement by France but increased American involvement. Vacillating metropolitan and the dubious colonial regime of the ‘night club’ Emperor, Bảo Đại, fuelled political instability. Militarily, after the disastrous evacuation of the RC4 in 1950, Việt Minh men and supplies poured across the Chinese frontier. In 1954, financial constraints and the looming international peace conference catalysed Navarre, the new French commander, to gamble on a battle of attrition. He bet that the Việt Minh would be unable drag artillery to the remote jungle outpost of Diên Biên Phú, but he underestimated their determination, strength, and adaptability. In early December partisans resented the bungled evacuation of Lai Châu. The entrenched camp’s defences were inadequate and neither infantry sorties nor napalm suppressed VM artillery in the surrounding hills. The French aero-logistical sub-system was overstretched, and significant parachute supplies fell into enemy hands. Navarre scattered his reserves on a futile and remote side show, Operation Atlante. The Americans prevaricated and refused to unleash their B29 fleet. ‘Iacta alea est’ - the die was cast.
Publisher: Simon Huston
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 213
Book Description
Military mistakes impel strategic reflection. The French Indochina War (FIW) from 1946-1954 furnishes useful insights with some resonance for current challenges. A combination of pre-exiting conditions, catalysts and operational drivers caused the cathartic 1954 French defeat. Pre-conditions included the illegitimacy of the colonial regime, repression that polarised nationalist sentiment. Economically, pernicious terms of trade suppressed industrialisation but oiled speculation until suddenly reversed by devaluation in 1953 that reflected financial disengagement by France but increased American involvement. Vacillating metropolitan and the dubious colonial regime of the ‘night club’ Emperor, Bảo Đại, fuelled political instability. Militarily, after the disastrous evacuation of the RC4 in 1950, Việt Minh men and supplies poured across the Chinese frontier. In 1954, financial constraints and the looming international peace conference catalysed Navarre, the new French commander, to gamble on a battle of attrition. He bet that the Việt Minh would be unable drag artillery to the remote jungle outpost of Diên Biên Phú, but he underestimated their determination, strength, and adaptability. In early December partisans resented the bungled evacuation of Lai Châu. The entrenched camp’s defences were inadequate and neither infantry sorties nor napalm suppressed VM artillery in the surrounding hills. The French aero-logistical sub-system was overstretched, and significant parachute supplies fell into enemy hands. Navarre scattered his reserves on a futile and remote side show, Operation Atlante. The Americans prevaricated and refused to unleash their B29 fleet. ‘Iacta alea est’ - the die was cast.
Mass Mobilization in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, 1945–1960
Author: Alec Holcombe
Publisher: University of Hawaii Press
ISBN: 0824884477
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 365
Book Description
Immediately after its founding by Hồ Chí Minh in September 1945, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) faced challenges from rival Vietnamese political organizations and from a France determined to rebuild her empire after the humiliations of WWII. Hồ, with strategic genius, courageous maneuver, and good fortune, was able to delay full-scale war with France for sixteen months in the northern half of the country. This was enough time for his Communist Party, under the cover of its Vietminh front organization, to neutralize domestic rivals and install the rough framework of an independent state. That fledgling state became a weapon of war when the DRV and France finally came to blows in Hanoi during December of 1946, marking the official beginning of the First Indochina War. With few economic resources at their disposal, Hồ and his comrades needed to mobilize an enormous and free contribution in manpower and rice from DRV-controlled regions. Extracting that contribution during the war’s early days was primarily a matter of patriotic exhortation. By the early 1950s, however, the infusion of weapons from the United States, the Soviet Union, and China had turned the Indochina conflict into a “total war.” Hunger, exhaustion, and violence, along with the conflict’s growing political complexity, challenged the DRV leaders’ mobilization efforts, forcing patriotic appeals to be supplemented with coercion and terror. This trend reached its revolutionary climax in late 1952 when Hồ, under strong pressure from Stalin and Mao, agreed to carry out radical land reform in DRV-controlled areas of northern Vietnam. The regime’s 1954 victory over the French at Điện Biên Phủ, the return of peace, and the division of the country into North and South did not slow this process of socialist transformation. Over the next six years (1954–1960), the DRV’s Communist leaders raced through land reform and agricultural collectivization with a relentless sense of urgency. Mass Mobilization in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, 1945–1960 explores the way the exigencies of war, the dreams of Marxist-Leninist ideology, and the pressures of the Cold War environment combined with pride and patriotism to drive totalitarian state formation in northern Vietnam.
Publisher: University of Hawaii Press
ISBN: 0824884477
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 365
Book Description
Immediately after its founding by Hồ Chí Minh in September 1945, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) faced challenges from rival Vietnamese political organizations and from a France determined to rebuild her empire after the humiliations of WWII. Hồ, with strategic genius, courageous maneuver, and good fortune, was able to delay full-scale war with France for sixteen months in the northern half of the country. This was enough time for his Communist Party, under the cover of its Vietminh front organization, to neutralize domestic rivals and install the rough framework of an independent state. That fledgling state became a weapon of war when the DRV and France finally came to blows in Hanoi during December of 1946, marking the official beginning of the First Indochina War. With few economic resources at their disposal, Hồ and his comrades needed to mobilize an enormous and free contribution in manpower and rice from DRV-controlled regions. Extracting that contribution during the war’s early days was primarily a matter of patriotic exhortation. By the early 1950s, however, the infusion of weapons from the United States, the Soviet Union, and China had turned the Indochina conflict into a “total war.” Hunger, exhaustion, and violence, along with the conflict’s growing political complexity, challenged the DRV leaders’ mobilization efforts, forcing patriotic appeals to be supplemented with coercion and terror. This trend reached its revolutionary climax in late 1952 when Hồ, under strong pressure from Stalin and Mao, agreed to carry out radical land reform in DRV-controlled areas of northern Vietnam. The regime’s 1954 victory over the French at Điện Biên Phủ, the return of peace, and the division of the country into North and South did not slow this process of socialist transformation. Over the next six years (1954–1960), the DRV’s Communist leaders raced through land reform and agricultural collectivization with a relentless sense of urgency. Mass Mobilization in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, 1945–1960 explores the way the exigencies of war, the dreams of Marxist-Leninist ideology, and the pressures of the Cold War environment combined with pride and patriotism to drive totalitarian state formation in northern Vietnam.