Author: Hans Ehlert
Publisher: University Press of Kentucky
ISBN: 0813147476
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 597
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Book Description
With the creation of the Franco-Russian Alliance and the failure of the Reinsurance Treaty in the late nineteenth century, Germany needed a strategy for fighting a two-front war. In response, Field Marshal Count Alfred von Schlieffen produced a study that represented the apex of modern military planning. His Memorandum for a War against France, which incorporated a mechanized cavalry as well as new technologies in weaponry, advocated that Germany concentrate its field army to the west and annihilate the French army within a few weeks. For generations, historians have considered Schlieffen's writings to be the foundation of Germany's military strategy in World War I and have hotly debated the reasons why the plan, as executed, failed. In this important volume, international scholars reassess Schlieffen's work for the first time in decades, offering new insights into the renowned general's impact not only on World War I but also on nearly a century of military historiography. The contributors draw on newly available source materials from European and Russian archives to demonstrate both the significance of the Schlieffen Plan and its deficiencies. They examine the operational planning of relevant European states and provide a broad, comparative historical context that other studies lack. Featuring fold-out maps and abstracts of the original German deployment plans as they evolved from 1893 to 1914, this rigorous reassessment vividly illustrates how failures in statecraft as well as military planning led to the tragedy of the First World War.
Author: Terence Zuber
Publisher: OUP Oxford
ISBN: 0191647713
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 871
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Book Description
The existence of the Schlieffen plan has been one of the basic assumptions of twentieth-century military history. It was the perfect example of the evils of German militarism: aggressive, mechanical, disdainful of politics and of public morality. The Great War began in August 1914 allegedly because the Schlieffen plan forced the German government to transform a Balkan quarrel into a World War by attacking France. And, in the end, the Schlieffen plan failed at the battle of the Marne. Yet it has always been recognized that the Schlieffen plan included inconsistencies which have never been satisfactorily explained. On the basis of newly discovered documents from German archives, Terence Zuber presents a radically different picture of German war planning between 1871 and 1914, and concludes that, in fact, there never really was a `Schlieffen plan'.
Author: William D. O'Neil
Publisher: William D. O'Neil
ISBN: 1481955853
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 205
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Book Description
As July turned to August in 1914, all the Great Powers of Europe mobilized their armies and then went to war with one another. It would take more than 50 months for peace to return, and the better part of a century to heal many of the wounds. Germany acted only near the end of a chain of actions by other nations, but German troops moved first and set the pattern for the war. They smashed through neutral Belgium before thrusting deeply into France, coming close to knocking France out of the war, and soon were making huge inroads in Russia as well. It was a remarkable performance for an army outnumbered by its foes. Yet four years later the German Empire was swept away, its army a shell, its people starving, its government in chaos. How did the leaders of Imperial Germany come to make the decisions that committed their nation to an all-or-nothing war based on a highly risky strategy? This book explores the background of the decisions, what those who made them knew and thought, what they failed to look at and why. It explains the Prussian Great General Staff (Großer Generalstab) and the part it played in planning and preparing for war. It follows the action of August and the first part of September 1914 to show where they went wrong and how other options could have achieved Germany’s aims with far lower risk and cost. These options were realistically available and the book probes why the nation’s leaders failed to consider or rejected them. The German leaders in 1914 weren’t Hitler. They valued security over conquest and didn’t go to war to expand their empire. They weren't the first to light the fuze that led to war. They thought and acted as leaders very often do. We can understand them in terms of patterns we see all around us, patterns we even see in ourselves. Their decisions had results that were uniquely catastrophic, but the way they were reached was quite ordinary. The Plan That Broke the World explains it all briefly and crisply, in non-technical terms, drawing on the latest research. There are 35 images, many unique to this book, to illustrate specific aspects of the story. Four charts and thirteen high-quality maps, all but one drawn especially for this book, present complex information in forms that are immediately understandable. There’s no other book like it. The book Web site is whatweretheythinking.williamdoneil.com/theplanthatbroketheworld The Plan That Broke the World is a case study in the What Were They Thinking? series. The series Web site is whatweretheythinking.williamdoneil.com/
Author: Gerhard Ritter
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 178912283X
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 339
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Book Description
The Schlieffen Plan was the name given after World War I to the theory behind the German invasion of France and Belgium on 4 August 1914. In 1905-1906 Field Marshal Alfred von Schlieffen, the Chief of the Imperial Army German General Staff from 1891-1906, had devised a deployment plan for a war-winning offensive, in a one-front war against the French Third Republic. After the war, the German official historians of the Reichsarchiv and other writers, described the plan as a blueprint for victory. Post-war writing by senior German officers and the Reichsarchiv historians managed to establish a commonly accepted narrative that it was Schlieffen’s successor Helmuth von Moltke the Younger’s failure to follow the blueprint, rather than German strategic miscalculation, that resulted in four years of attrition warfare. In 1953, renowned historian Prof. Gerhard Ritter Schlieffen’s unearthed Schlieffen’s papers during a visit to the United States, and he published his findings in the book Der Schlieffenplan: Kritik eines Mythos, presented here in its 1958 English translation, The Schlieffen Plan: Critique of a Myth. It proved to be an important historical publication, as it set in motion a period of revision, when the details of the supposed Schlieffen Plan were subjected to scrutiny and contextualisation. In Der Schlieffen Plan, Prof. Ritter presents the full text of Schlieffen’s military testament, and the relevant parts of other memoranda which shed light on the evolution of the Plan. They are preceded by Professor Ritter’s masterly exposition of their content and significance, while his accompanying notes add to the illuminating effect. “FOR two generations the Schlieffen Plan has been a magic phrase, embodying one of the chief mysteries and ‘might have beens’ of modern times. The mystery is cleared up and the great ‘If’ analysed in Gerhard Ritter’s book—a striking contribution to twentieth-century history.”—B. H. Liddell Hart
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Authorized translation from the German. Contains 100 maps. Includes various battles which the author analyzes along with military theories. Convinced that Germany, surrounded by powerful enemies, would have to fight outnumbered and win, Schlieffen believed the key to victory could be discovered in an account of the Battle of Cannae, written by the German military historian Hans Delbruck. Therefore, Schlieffen ordered the historical section of the General Staff to produce a set of "Cannae Studies" that would demonstrate that the principle of double envelopment practiced by Hannibal at Cannae was the master key to victory in battle.
Author: Professor Michael S Neiberg
Publisher: Amber Books Ltd
ISBN: 190662612X
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 226
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Book Description
The History of World War I series recounts the battles and campaigns of the 'Great War'. From the Falkland Islands to the lakes of Africa, across the Eastern and Western Fronts, to the former German colonies in the Pacific, the World War I series provides a six-volume history of the battles and campaigns that raged on land, at sea and in the air.
Author: Terence Zuber
Publisher: Boydell Press
ISBN: 9781843831082
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 338
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Book Description
Germany's Schlieffen Plan of the First World War is much talked of but little understood. Translations of primary sources recently available clarify the issues involved. The great deficiency in the discussion of German war planning prior to the Great War has been the dearth of reliable primary sources. Practically nothing was made public before the German Reichsarchiv was destroyed in April 1945, and this problem is compounded for Anglophone historians by the fact that the most interesting secondary literature was printed in German periodicals in the early 1920s. This book makes available in English translationmany of the documents concerning German war planning before 1914 that survived the war, but were kept closely guarded by the East German army archives, and only became available with the fall of the wall. Included are the only archival history of German war planning, Wilhelm Dieckmann's Der Schlieffenplan, Hellmuth Greiner's secret history of the German west front intelligence estimate from 1885 to 1914, and two of the younger Moltke's General Staff exercises. The book also presents other little-known documents found in other German archives as well as the most important parts of the 1920s literature concerning the debate on the German war plan. The picture ofGerman war planning which now emerges is both more complex and more credible than the previous single-minded emphasis on the 'Schlieffenplan'. TERENCE ZUBER has also written Inventing the Schlieffen Plan and The Moltke Myth; born in Cleveland, Ohio, he is currently living in Wurzburg, Germany.
Author: Abigail Green
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9780521791014
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 346
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Book Description
An exploration of the nature of identity in nineteenth-century Germany.
Author: Isabel V. Hull
Publisher: Cornell University Press
ISBN: 0801470641
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 425
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Book Description
In A Scrap of Paper, Isabel V. Hull compares wartime decision making in Germany, Great Britain, and France, weighing the impact of legal considerations in each. She demonstrates how differences in state structures and legal traditions shaped the way the three belligerents fought the war. Hull focuses on seven cases: Belgian neutrality, the land war in the west, the occupation of enemy territory, the blockade, unrestricted submarine warfare, the introduction of new weaponry, and reprisals. A Scrap of Paper reconstructs the debates over military decision-making and clarifies the role law played—where it constrained action, where it was manipulated, where it was ignored, and how it developed in combat—in each case. A Scrap of Paper is a passionate defense of the role that the law must play to govern interstate relations in both peace and war.
Author: Alan Axelrod
Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield
ISBN: 1493031937
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 345
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Book Description
Immediately after the armistice was signed in November, 1918, an American journalist asked Paul von Hindenburg who won the war against Germany. He was the chief of the German General Staff, co-architect with Erich Ludendorff of Germany’s Eastern Front victories and its nearly war-winning Western Front offensives, and he did not hesitate in his answer. “The American infantry,” he said. He made it even more specific, telling the reporter that the final death blow for Germany was delivered by “the American infantry in the Argonne.” The British and the French often denigrated the American contribution to the war, but they had begged for US entry into the conflict, and their stake in America’s victory was, if anything, even greater than that of the United States itself. But How America Won WWI will not litigate the points of view of Britain and France. The book will accepts as gospel the assessment of the top German leader whose job it had been to oppose the Americans directly - that the American infantry won the war - and this book will tell how the American infantry did it.
