The Political Economy of Fiscal Transparency and Independent Fiscal Councils PDF Download
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Author: Mr.Roel M. W. J. Beetsma
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1484318390
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 48
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Book Description
The global surge in independent fiscal councils (IFCs) raises three related questions: How can IFCs improve the conduct of fiscal policy? Are they simultaneously desirable for voters and elected policymakers? And are they resilient to changes in political conditions? We build a model in which voters cannot observe the true competence of elected policymakers. IFCs’ role is to mitigate this imperfection. Equilibrium public debt is excessive because policymakers are “partisan” and “opportunistic.” If voters only care about policymakers’ competence, both the incumbent and the voters would be better off with an IFC as the debt bias would shrink. However, when other considerations eclipse competence and give the incumbent a strong electoral advantage or disadvantage, setting up an IFC may be counterproductive as the debt bias would increase. If the incumbent holds a moderate electoral advantage or disadvantage, voters would prefer an IFC, but an incumbent with a large advantage may prefer not to have an IFC. The main policy implications are that (i) establishing an IFC can only lower the debt bias if voters care sufficiently about policymakers’ competence; (ii) not all political environments are conducive to the emergence of IFCs; and (iii) IFCs are consequently vulnerable to shifts in political conditions.
Author: Mr.Roel M. W. J. Beetsma
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1484318390
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 48
Get Book Here
Book Description
The global surge in independent fiscal councils (IFCs) raises three related questions: How can IFCs improve the conduct of fiscal policy? Are they simultaneously desirable for voters and elected policymakers? And are they resilient to changes in political conditions? We build a model in which voters cannot observe the true competence of elected policymakers. IFCs’ role is to mitigate this imperfection. Equilibrium public debt is excessive because policymakers are “partisan” and “opportunistic.” If voters only care about policymakers’ competence, both the incumbent and the voters would be better off with an IFC as the debt bias would shrink. However, when other considerations eclipse competence and give the incumbent a strong electoral advantage or disadvantage, setting up an IFC may be counterproductive as the debt bias would increase. If the incumbent holds a moderate electoral advantage or disadvantage, voters would prefer an IFC, but an incumbent with a large advantage may prefer not to have an IFC. The main policy implications are that (i) establishing an IFC can only lower the debt bias if voters care sufficiently about policymakers’ competence; (ii) not all political environments are conducive to the emergence of IFCs; and (iii) IFCs are consequently vulnerable to shifts in political conditions.
Author: Mr.Roel M. W. J. Beetsma
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1484348281
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 28
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Book Description
Countries increasingly rely on independent fiscal councils to constrain policymakers’ discretion and curb the bias towards excessive deficits and pro-cyclical policies. Since fiscal councils are often recent and heterogeneous across countries, assessing their impact is challenging. Using the latest (2016) vintage of the IMF Fiscal Council Dataset, we focus on two tasks expected to strengthen fiscal performance: the preparation or assessment of forecasts, and the monitoring of compliance with fiscal rules. Tentative econometric evidence suggests that the presence of a fiscal council is associated with more accurate and less optimistic fiscal forecasts, as well as greater compliance with fiscal rules.
Author: Mr.J. D. Craig
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 155775697X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 50
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Book Description
Transparency in government operations is widely regarded as an important precondition for macroeconomic fiscal sustainability, good governance, and overall fiscal rectitude. Notably, the Interim Committee, at its April and September 1996 meetings, stressed the need for greater fiscal transparency. Prompted by these concerns, this paper represents a first attempt to address many of the aspects of transparency in government operations. It provides an overview of major issues in fiscal transparency and examines the IMF's role in promoting transparency in government operations.
Author: Sanjeev Khagram
Publisher: Brookings Institution Press
ISBN: 0815723377
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 272
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Book Description
Explicates political economy factors that have brought about greater transparency and participation in budget settings across Asia, Africa, and Latin America. This title presents the strategies, policies, and institutions through which improvements can occur and produce change in policy and institutional outcomes.
Author: Mr.Roel M. W. J. Beetsma
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1484322908
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 26
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Book Description
The paper discusses the effectiveness of independent fiscal institutions—or fiscal councils—in taming the deficit bias that emerged in the 1970s. After a review of the main theoretical arguments and recent trends about fiscal councils, we develop a stylized model showing how a fiscal council can effectively mitigate the deficit bias even though it has no direct lever on the conduct of fiscal policy. We show that the capacity of the fiscal council to improve the public’s understanding of the quality of fiscal policy contributes to better align voters and policymakers’ incentives and to tame the deficit bias affecting well-intended governments. After mapping the model’s key features into a broad set of criteria likely to contribute to the effectiveness of a fiscal council, we use the 2014 vintage of the IMF dataset on independent fiscal institutions to assess whether existing institutions have been built to work.
Author: Vitor Gaspar
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1475547900
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 548
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Book Description
Two main themes of the book are that (1) politics can distort optimal fiscal policy through elections and through political fragmentation, and (2) rules and institutions can attenuate the negative effects of this dynamic. The book has three parts: part 1 (9 chapters) outlines the problems; part 2 (6 chapters) outlines how institutions and fiscal rules can offer solutions; and part 3 (4 chapters) discusses how multilevel governance frameworks can help.
Author: Lorenzo Forni
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 147556998X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 20
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Book Description
The paper provides evidence that fiscal rules can limit the political budget cycle. It focuses on the application of the Italian fiscal rule at the sub-national level over the period 2004-2006 and shows that: 1) municipalities are subject to political budget cycles in capital spending; 2) the Italian subnational fiscal rule introduced in 1999 has been enforced by the central government; 3) municipalities subject to the fiscal rule show more limited political budget cycles than municipalities not subject to the rule. In order to identify the effect, we rely on the fact that the domestic fiscal rule does not apply to municipalities below 5,000 inhabitants. We find that the political budget cycle increases real capital spending by about 35 percent on average in the years prior to municipal elections and that the sub-national fiscal rule reduces these figures by about two thirds.
Author: Mr.Bernardin Akitoby
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1513532839
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 66
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Book Description
This departmental paper investigates how countries in Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe (CESEE) can improve fiscal transparency, thereby raising government efficiency and reducing corruption vulnerabilities.
Author: Luc Eyraud
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1484350685
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 132
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Book Description
Fiscal rule frameworks have evolved significantly in response to the global financial crisis. Many countries have reformed their fiscal rules or introduced new ones with a view to enhancing the credibility of fiscal policy and providing a medium-term anchor. Enforcement and monitoring mechanisms have also been upgraded. However, these innovations have made the systems of rules more complicated to operate, while compliance has not improved. The SDN takes stock of past experiences, reviews recent reforms, and presents new research on the effectiveness of rules. It also proposes guiding principles for future reforms to strike a better balance between simplicity, flexibility, and enforceability. Read the blog
Author: International Monetary Fund. Fiscal Affairs Dept.
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1498312748
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 76
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Book Description
This Fiscal Transparency Evaluation report highlights that Uzbekistan is embarking on a comprehensive reform program to strengthen public financial management and fiscal transparency. Wide-ranging reforms to improve the coverage, reliability, quality, and accessibility of fiscal reports are being developed and implemented, and some good progress already made. This assessment of fiscal transparency practices has been undertaken to support the government’s efforts to increase transparency by identifying priority areas for reform. An evaluation of practices against the IMF’s Fiscal Transparency Code (the Code) finds that tangible gains have been made over 2017 and 2018. In several areas where Uzbekistan’s practices do not currently meet the basic standard required under the Code, quick progress can be made. The report also provides a more detailed evaluation of Uzbekistan’s fiscal transparency practices and recommended reform priorities. Strengthening legislative oversight of the state budget with a view to reducing the extent to which in-year changes can be made to aggregate expenditures without prior parliamentary approval.
