Author: Marie D. Connolly
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Arbitration and award
Languages : en
Pages : 314
Book Description
The Impact of Final Offer Arbitration on the Bargaining Process and Wage Outcomes
Author: Connolly Marie D. (Marie Day)
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Collective bargaining
Languages : en
Pages : 142
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Collective bargaining
Languages : en
Pages : 142
Book Description
The Impact of Final Offer Arbitration on the Bargaining Process and Wage Outcomes
Author: Marie D. Connolly
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Arbitration and award
Languages : en
Pages : 314
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Arbitration and award
Languages : en
Pages : 314
Book Description
Final-offer Arbitration
Author: James L. Stern
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 248
Book Description
Monograph comprising three case studies of collective bargaining and arbitration involving essential public sector employees (fire fighters, police) in the USA - comments on labour legislation concerning compulsory arbitration and conciliation, etc. References and statistical tables.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 248
Book Description
Monograph comprising three case studies of collective bargaining and arbitration involving essential public sector employees (fire fighters, police) in the USA - comments on labour legislation concerning compulsory arbitration and conciliation, etc. References and statistical tables.
The Impact of Arbitration on Negotiation Process
Author: A. V. Subbarao
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 340
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 340
Book Description
Negotiation Under the Threat of Final Offer Arbitration
Author: Linda Christine Babcock
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 500
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 500
Book Description
The Behavioural, Economic and Institutional Effects of Compulsory Interest Arbitration
Author: Bryan M. Downie
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Arbitration, Industrial
Languages : en
Pages : 118
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Arbitration, Industrial
Languages : en
Pages : 118
Book Description
Final Offer Arbitration
Author: Peter Feuille
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 74
Book Description
Pamphlet on final offer compulsory arbitration procedures in the public sector of the USA - includes statistical tables on some dispute settlement experiences, etc. References.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 74
Book Description
Pamphlet on final offer compulsory arbitration procedures in the public sector of the USA - includes statistical tables on some dispute settlement experiences, etc. References.
Final Offer Arbitration in Major League Baseball
Author: Daniel Tobias Brown
Publisher: ProQuest
ISBN: 9780549811725
Category : Collective bargaining
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Final offer arbitration is a conflict resolution device that has been the subject of extensive theoretical and empirical research during the last 30 years. Data from 1985 to 2008 Major League Baseball salary negotiations are used to answer three questions concerning bargaining in the presence of final offer arbitration. First, what explains the player's decision to threaten his team with final offer arbitration? In particular, does previous salary inequity truly predict arbitration filing as reported by Fizel, Krautmann, and Hadley (2002)? I find that previous salary inequity is unrelated to the threat of filing for arbitration except for the specific time period used by Fizel, Krautmann, and Hadley. Second, what factors underlie both parties' final offers and their initial disagreement? Specifically, does relative performance significantly impact the players' salary demands and team offers? I find that relative performance is important to offer formation and initial disagreement, though the results are sensitive to the time period under analysis and the type of relative comparison that is made. Finally, what factors predict negotiation impasse that results in arbitration? In particular, does increased offer aggressiveness always imply that a private resolution is less likely as found by Farmer, Pecorino, and Stango (2004)? Furthermore, is the definition of offer aggressiveness important to this conclusion? Fizel (1996), Farmer, Pecorino, and Stango (2004), and Hadley and Ruggiero (2006) each propose a different technique of estimating offer aggressiveness. I find that disputes containing aggressive offers were more likely to result in bargaining impasse for salary negotiations prior to 2003. In addition, the definition of offer aggression is important.
Publisher: ProQuest
ISBN: 9780549811725
Category : Collective bargaining
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Final offer arbitration is a conflict resolution device that has been the subject of extensive theoretical and empirical research during the last 30 years. Data from 1985 to 2008 Major League Baseball salary negotiations are used to answer three questions concerning bargaining in the presence of final offer arbitration. First, what explains the player's decision to threaten his team with final offer arbitration? In particular, does previous salary inequity truly predict arbitration filing as reported by Fizel, Krautmann, and Hadley (2002)? I find that previous salary inequity is unrelated to the threat of filing for arbitration except for the specific time period used by Fizel, Krautmann, and Hadley. Second, what factors underlie both parties' final offers and their initial disagreement? Specifically, does relative performance significantly impact the players' salary demands and team offers? I find that relative performance is important to offer formation and initial disagreement, though the results are sensitive to the time period under analysis and the type of relative comparison that is made. Finally, what factors predict negotiation impasse that results in arbitration? In particular, does increased offer aggressiveness always imply that a private resolution is less likely as found by Farmer, Pecorino, and Stango (2004)? Furthermore, is the definition of offer aggressiveness important to this conclusion? Fizel (1996), Farmer, Pecorino, and Stango (2004), and Hadley and Ruggiero (2006) each propose a different technique of estimating offer aggressiveness. I find that disputes containing aggressive offers were more likely to result in bargaining impasse for salary negotiations prior to 2003. In addition, the definition of offer aggression is important.
Last Best Offer
Author: Charles C. Mulcahy
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Arbitration, Industrial
Languages : en
Pages : 32
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Arbitration, Industrial
Languages : en
Pages : 32
Book Description
Final Offer Arbitration and the Incentive to Bargain
Author: Brian Patrick McCall
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Arbitration, Industrial
Languages : en
Pages : 34
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Arbitration, Industrial
Languages : en
Pages : 34
Book Description