Author: George J. Mailath
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0198041217
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 664
Book Description
Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of the fundamental concepts in these theories, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. They also present more recent developments, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. Repeated Games and Reputations synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in this area, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout, interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research.
Repeated Games and Reputations
The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games
Author: Dilip Abreu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 11
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 11
Book Description
The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting and with Incomplete Information
Author: Drew Fudenberg
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 36
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 36
Book Description
The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games and Continuous Decision Rules
Author: James W. Friedman
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
A Long-run Collaboration on Long-run Games
Author: Drew Fudenberg
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 9812818464
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 417
Book Description
This book brings together the joint work of Drew Fudenberg and David Levine (through 2008) on the closely connected topics of repeated games and reputation effects, along with related papers on more general issues in game theory and dynamic games. The unified presentation highlights the recurring themes of their work.
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 9812818464
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 417
Book Description
This book brings together the joint work of Drew Fudenberg and David Levine (through 2008) on the closely connected topics of repeated games and reputation effects, along with related papers on more general issues in game theory and dynamic games. The unified presentation highlights the recurring themes of their work.
The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games
Author: Luca Anderlini
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 76
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 76
Book Description
The Folk Theorem for Discounted Repeated Games
Author: Dilip Abreu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 9
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 9
Book Description
The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Observation Costs
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
Author: Robert J. Aumann
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262011471
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 372
Book Description
The basic model studied throughout the book is one in which players ignorant about the game being played must learn what they can from the actions of the others.
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262011471
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 372
Book Description
The basic model studied throughout the book is one in which players ignorant about the game being played must learn what they can from the actions of the others.
A Folk Theorem for Finitely Repeated Games with Public Monitoring
Author: Johannes Hörner
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description