The Competitive Pricing Response in Sealed-bid Auction Markets PDF Download
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Author: James L. Smith (professor of economics.)
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 56
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Book Description
Author: James L. Smith (professor of economics.)
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 56
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Yili Hong
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 21
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Book Description
Online labor markets are web-based platforms that enable buyers to identify and contract for IT services with service providers using Buyer-Determined (BD) auctions. BD auctions in online labor markets either follow an open or a sealed bid format. We compare open and sealed bid auctions in online labor markets to identify which format is superior in terms of obtaining more bids and a higher buyer surplus. Our theoretical analysis suggests that the relative advantage of open versus sealed bid auctions hinges on the role of reducing service providers' valuation uncertainty (difficulty in assessing the cost to execute a project) and competition uncertainty (difficulty in assessing the intensity of the competition from other service providers), which largely depends on the relative importance of the common value (versus the private value) component of the auctioned IT services, calling for an empirical investigation to compare open and sealed bid auctions. Based on a unique dataset of 71,437 open bid auctions and 7,499 sealed bid auctions posted by 21,799 buyers at a leading online labor market, we find that, an average, albeit sealed bid auctions attract 18.4% more bids, open bid auctions offer buyers $10.87 higher surplus. Furthermore, open bid auctions are 55.3% more likely to result in a buyer's selection of a certain service provider, 22.1% more likely to reach a contract (conditional on the buyer's making a selection) with a provider, and they generate higher buyer satisfaction. In contrast to conventional wisdom that “the more bids the better” and industry practice of treating sealed bid auctions as a premium feature, our results suggest that the buyer surplus gained from the reduction in valuation uncertainty enabled by open bid auctions outweighs the buyer surplus gained from the higher competition uncertainty in sealed bid auctions, which renders open bid auctions a superior auction design in online labor markets.
Author: Gerald Thompson
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 19
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Book Description
In an earlier paper 7, we suggested employing the sealed-bid auction as a format for modelling the marketing of a wide range of heterogeneous products, including the marketing of most brand names. The formation of prices in such markets is described as if it resulted from an actual sealed-bid auction, with buyers inspecting the goods offered by sale by the various manufacturers, and making sealed bids which later are opened by a hypothetical auctioneer. While surely putative, this model nevertheless seems superior to the standard assumptions of perfect competition where a homogeneous commodity is transacted and all buyers offer identical prices. Extending the use of the sealed bid auction, we here consider cases where the manufacturers or distributors promote their sales by advertising. While the maximum quantity demanded by each customer is fixed and given, his bids on the various brands are determined by the advertising and other promotional efforts. The bid response function for each consumer is supposed to be given and known. The preceding vertical production and distribution chain, from the supply of raw materials and primary commodities, via the successive processing, manufacturing and distribution of the product is described as a transshipment auction game. We formulate a complementarity model that in one step solves this entire logistics system, including a possible formation of coalitions between suppliers and/or distributors, the market prices of the various brands, the optimal distribution of the product, and the bids of the consumers. A numerical example is provided and the solution routine is discussed.
Author: V. L. Smith
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 29
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Book Description
Author: Clemon F. Sirmans
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 568
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Book Description
Author: David Easley
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1139490303
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 745
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Book Description
Are all film stars linked to Kevin Bacon? Why do the stock markets rise and fall sharply on the strength of a vague rumour? How does gossip spread so quickly? Are we all related through six degrees of separation? There is a growing awareness of the complex networks that pervade modern society. We see them in the rapid growth of the internet, the ease of global communication, the swift spread of news and information, and in the way epidemics and financial crises develop with startling speed and intensity. This introductory book on the new science of networks takes an interdisciplinary approach, using economics, sociology, computing, information science and applied mathematics to address fundamental questions about the links that connect us, and the ways that our decisions can have consequences for others.
Author: Keith Waehrer
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 42
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Book Description
Author: Ahmad Faruqui
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 1461545293
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 463
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Book Description
Electricity markets are being deregulated or face new regulatory frameworks. In such changing markets, new pricing strategies will need to consider such factors as cost, value of service and pricing by objective. Pricing in Competitive Electricity Markets introduces a new family of pricing concepts, methodologies, models, tools and databases focused on market-based pricing. This book reviews important theoretical pricing issues as well as practical pricing applications for changing electricity markets.
Author: Paul Milgrom
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1139449168
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 378
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Book Description
This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
Author: Donald L. Hertig
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 111
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Book Description
This study analyzes the use of second price theory as it pertains to competitive Government contracting. Second price theory, which was originally introduced by William Vickery in 1961, entails awarding the lowest responsible and responsive bidder in a sealed bid competition a Firm-Fixed Price (FFP) type contract, where the award price is set at the second lowest bidder's bid price. This study first defines the Second Price Sealed Bid (SPSB) method, a variant of second pricing, and provides the theoretical advantages for its applications in Government contracting. Following this, the thesis presents two sets of experimentation which identify bidding behavior when the SPSB method is applied in Government contracting. The study then discusses and analyzes survey responses received from both Government and private industry contracting professionals concerning the applicability of the SPSB method in Government contracting.
