Strictly Perfect Equilibrium Points of Bimatrix Games PDF Download
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Author: Akira Okada
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 20
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Author: Akira Okada
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 20
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Book Description
Author: E. van Damme
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642499708
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 161
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Book Description
In this monograph, noncooperative games are studied. Since in a noncooperative game binding agreements are not possible, the solution of such a game has to be self enforcing, i. e. a Nash equilibrium (NASH [1950,1951J). In general, however, a game may possess many equilibria and so the problem arises which one of these should be chosen as the solution. It was first pointed out explicitly in SELTEN [1965J that I not all Nash equilibria of an extensive form game are qualified to be selected as the solution, since an equilibrium may prescribe irrational behavior at unreached parts of the game tree. Moreover, also for normal form games not all Nash equilibria are eligible, since an equilibrium need not be robust with respect to slight perturba tions in the data of the game. These observations lead to the conclusion that the Nash equilibrium concept has to be refined in order to obtain sensible solutions for every game. In the monograph, various refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept are studied. Some of these have been proposed in the literature, but others are presented here for the first time. The objective is to study the relations between these refine ments;to derive characterizations and to discuss the underlying assumptions. The greater part of the monograph (the chapters 2-5) is devoted to the study of normal form games. Extensive form games are considered in chapter 6.
Author: Eric van Damme
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 364296978X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 331
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Book Description
The last decade has seen a steady increase in the application of concepts from noncooperative game theory to such diverse fields as economics, political science, law, operations research, biology and social psychology. As a byproduct of this increased activity, there has been a growing awareness of the fact that the basic noncooperative solution concept, that of Nash equilibrium, suffers from severe drawbacks. The two main shortcomings of this concept are the following: (i) In extensive form games, a Nash strategy may prescribe off the equilibrium path behavior that is manifestly irrational. (Specifically, Nash equilibria may involve incredible threats), (ii) Nash equilibria need not be robust with respect to small perturbations in the data of the game. Confronted with the growing evidence to the detriment of the Nash concept, game theorists were prompted to search for more refined equilibrium notions with better properties and they have come up with a wide array of alternative solution concepts. This book surveys the most important refinements that have been introduced. Its objectives are fourfold (i) to illustrate desirable properties as well as drawbacks of the various equilibrium notions by means of simple specific examples, (ii) to study the relationships between the various refinements, (iii) to derive simplifying characterizations, and (iv) to discuss the plausibility of the assumptions underlying the concepts.
Author: Mathijs Jansen
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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In this paper a procedure is described that computes for a given bimatrix game all stable sets in the sense of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986). Further the procedure is refined to find the strictly perfect equilibria (if any) of such a game. Keywords and Phrases: Bimatrix game, Computation, Stable equilibrium, Strictly perfect equilibrium.
Author: Luis G. Quintas
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 8
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Author: Guillermo Owen
Publisher: Emerald Group Publishing
ISBN: 1781905088
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 463
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Book Description
Game Theory has served as a standard text for game theory courses since the publication of the First Edition in 1968. The Fourth Edition updates several recently developed subfields.
Author: Jati Sengupta
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9401582025
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 267
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Book Description
Econometrics as an applied discipline attempts to use information in a most efficient manner, yet the information theory and entropy approach developed by Shannon and others has not played much of a role in applied econometrics. Econometrics of Information and Efficiency bridges the gap. Broadly viewed, information theory analyzes the uncertainty of a given set of data and its probabilistic characteristics. Whereas the economic theory of information emphasizes the value of information to agents in a market, the entropy theory stresses the various aspects of imprecision of data and their interactions with the subjective decision processes. The tools of information theory, such as the maximum entropy principle, mutual information and the minimum discrepancy are useful in several areas of statistical inference, e.g., Bayesian estimation, expected maximum likelihood principle, the fuzzy statistical regression. This volume analyzes the applications of these tools of information theory to the most commonly used models in econometrics. The outstanding features of Econometrics of Information and Efficiency are: A critical survey of the uses of information theory in economics and econometrics; An integration of applied information theory and economic efficiency analysis; The development of a new economic hypothesis relating information theory to economic growth models; New lines of research are emphasized.
Author: Hans Peters
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 3662469502
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 493
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Book Description
This textbook presents the basics of game theory both on an undergraduate level and on a more advanced mathematical level. It is the second, revised version of the successful 2008 edition. The book covers most topics of interest in game theory, including cooperative game theory. Part I presents introductions to all these topics on a basic yet formally precise level. It includes chapters on repeated games, social choice theory, and selected topics such as bargaining theory, exchange economies, and matching. Part II goes deeper into noncooperative theory and treats the theory of zerosum games, refinements of Nash equilibrium in strategic as well as extensive form games, and evolutionary games. Part III covers basic concepts in the theory of transferable utility games, such as core and balancedness, Shapley value and variations, and nucleolus. Some mathematical tools on duality and convexity are collected in Part IV. Every chapter in the book contains a problem section. Hints, answers and solutions are included.
Author: Sherman Xiewei Bai
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 12
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Author: Hans J. M. Peters
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 358
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Book Description
