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Author: Song-ken Hsu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 10
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Book Description
Author: Song-ken Hsu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 10
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Book Description
Author: Song-Ken Hsu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economic policy
Languages : en
Pages : 48
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Author: Jie Shuai
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 8
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We allow a general (non-uniform) consumer distribution in a mixed duopoly Hotelling model. We characterize respective conditions under which socially optimal pricing location are achieved. We find that, while the condition for socially optimal pricing is fairly general, that for a socially optimal location is much more restrictive. Consequently, using a public firm to regulate a market may continue to yield a socially optimal price but not the socially optimal location. This implies that privatization of the public firm may be desirable.
Author: Gaurav Somenath Ghosh
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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In my first essay I report results from an analysis where representative methods of estimation from the Classical and Bayesian approaches to statistical inference are empirically compared. The chosen Classical methods are based on Least Squares and Maximum Likelihood and the chosen Bayesian method is the Hierarchical model. Each method is applied to a spatial hedonic property value model. The resulting estimates are then compared using nonparametric tests. The comparisons are then used to make inferences on the relative accuracy, precision and quality of the different methods of estimation. The Hierarchical Bayesian and Classical Maximum Likelihood methods are found to supply the best estimators of the spatial regression model and predictors of house price. Significant differences are also found in the relative accuracy and precision of the methods. I infer that the Hierarchical Bayesian and Classical Maximum Likelihood methods are best suited to prediction and estimation of spatial hedonic property value models. In my second essay I compare two tradable permit markets in their ability to meet a stated environmental target at least cost when some polluters have stochastic and non-measurable emissions. The environmental target is of the safety-first type, which requires probabilistic control of emissions. One market is built around the trading ratio, which defines the substitution rate between stochastic and deterministic pollution, and is modeled on existing markets for water quality trading. The other market is built around a new definition of the traded commodity as a multi-attribute good, where the attributes supply information to the market on the environmental risks associated with stochastic pollution. The latter market is found to out-perform the trading ratio market in its ability to satisfy the safety-first environmental target at least cost. This result comes about because polluters are able to directly price risk in the latter market. In the former market risk is not a factor in the trading decision and can only be controlled under highly restrictive conditions. In my third essay I report results from an economic experiment where the two markets developed in the previous essay are compared in a testbed that captures important features of existing markets for water quality trading. In the interests of tractability these features were abstracted from in the previous theoretical analysis. One feature is that of oligopsony and the second feature is that of a discrete trading environment where polluters generate credits by implementing one of a small set of emission-reducing technologies. The experimental results indicate that the market with multi-attribute goods generates a superior environmental outcome to the trading ratio market. Furthermore, the average cost of pollution control is lower in the former market. Market power is independent of the type of market institution, but I do find that large buyers have more market power than small buyers. Finally, I find that sellers of credits learn to resist market power as they gain experience, but at the cost of market efficiency since their resistance causes a fall in the number of trades. Overall, the results support the thesis of the second essay, that the market with multi-attribute goods generates better environmental outcomes than the trading ratio market.
Author: Stefano Colombo
Publisher: Springer Nature
ISBN: 3030400980
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 346
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Space is a crucial variable in any economic activity. Spatial Economics is the branch of economics that explicitly aims to incorporate the space dimension in the analysis of economic phenomena. From its beginning in the last century, Spatial Economics has contributed to the understanding of the economy by developing plenty of theoretical models as well as econometric techniques having the “space” as a core dimension of the analysis. This edited volume addresses the complex issue of Spatial Economics from a theoretical point of view. This volume is part of a more complex project including another edited volume (Spatial Economics Volume II: Applications) collecting original papers which address Spatial Economics from an applied perspective.
Author: Song-Ken Hsu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economic policy
Languages : en
Pages : 26
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Author: Ching-jen Sun
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Prices
Languages : en
Pages : 120
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Book Description
Abstract: This dissertation develops three essays on dynamic pricing to investigate two important topics in industrial organization: price dispersion and price discrimination. The first essay considers a stylized model of dynamic price competition in which each seller sells one unit of a homogeneous commodity by posting prices in every period to maximize the expected profits with discounting. A random number of buyers come to the market in each period. Each buyer demands at most one unit of the good, and they all have a common reservation price. They know all prices posted by all firms in the market; hence search is costless. I show that when there is a positive probability of excess demand, the model has a unique (symmetric) mixed-strategy equilibrium. In this equilibrium, each seller posts a price in every period according to a non-degenerate distribution, which is determined by the number of sellers remaining in the market in that period. Sellers play mixed strategies as they are indifferent between selling sooner at a lower price and waiting to sell at a higher price later. Thus, price dispersion not only exists in every period among firms, but also persists over time. In the second essay, I consider a monopolist who can sell vertically differentiated products over two periods to heterogeneous consumers. Consumers each demand one unit of the product in each period. In the second period, consumers are sorted into different segments according to their first-period choice, and the monopolist can offer different menus of contracts to different segments. In this way, the monopolist can price discriminate consumers not only by product quality, but also by purchase history. I fully characterize the monopolist's optimal pricing strategy when the type space is discrete and a simple condition is given to determine whether the monopolist should price discriminate consumers by product quality in the first period. When the consumers' type space is a continuum, I show that there is no fully separating equilibrium, and some properties of the optimal menu of contracts (price-quality pairs) are characterized within the class of partition PBE (Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium). The monopolist will offer only one quality in the first period when the social surplus function is log submodular or the firm and consumers are patient. If it is optimal for the firm to offer only one quality in the first period, the optimal market coverage in the first period is smaller than that in the static model. Furthermore, in equilibrium there are some high-type consumers choosing to downgrade the product in the second period, a phenomenon that has never been addressed in the literature. In the second essay, when the consumers' type space is a continuum, the analysis of the optimal menu of contracts is restricted within the class of partition PBE. The third essay provides a justification for this qualification. I ask whether an optimal menu of contracts can induce a non-partition continuation equilibrium by scrutinizing the example constructed by Laffont and Tirole (1988). They construct a non-partition continuation equilibrium for a given first-period menu of incentive contracts and conjecture that this continuation equilibrium need not be suboptimal for the whole game under small uncertainty. I construct two first-period incentive schemes leading to a partition continuation equilibrium and show that, regardless of the extent of uncertainty, their non-partition continuation equilibrium generates a smaller payoff than one of two partition continuation equilibria for the principal. In this sense, Laffont and Tirole's menu of contracts, giving rise to a non-partition continuation equilibrium, is not optimal. I provide an intuition behind this result, hoping to shed light on the problem of dynamic contracting without commitment.
Author: S.P. Anderson
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 26
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Author: Karl Gustaf Löfgren
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 48
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Author: Kakuya Matsushima
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 1785366068
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 385
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Book Description
This collection of 16 original research chapters by international scholars addresses the complementary roles of transportation and knowledge and their spatial manifestations in modern urban and regional economies. The authors provide research from North America, Europe and Asia. While the studies employ sophisticated methods and theory, there is a strong element of practical applications and policy implications in each chapter as well. This book will be of interest to communities of research and practice in urban and regional economics and planning, regional science and economic geography, transportation research, planning and management and the knowledge economy.
