Russia and Beyond -- A Case for European Missile Defense PDF Download
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Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 50
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Book Description
On 15 August 2008, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice concluded a missile defense treaty with Poland permitting the deployment of a Ground-Based, Mid-Course Ballistic Missile Defense System (GMD) on Polish territory. Following years of negotiation among Poland, the Czech Republic (where the X-Band radar for the system is to be deployed), and the United States, the agreement fulfilled a key policy goal of the Bush administration. The National Security Presidential Directive 23 (NSPD-23) that President Bush signed in 2002 described the emerging ballistic missile threat from "rogue" nations, particularly North Korea and Iran, as the administration's highest priority. The signing of the bilateral Polish agreement, which came only days after Russia's ground incursion into the Republic of Georgia, signified the latest in a series of U.S. foreign policy moves challenging Russia's influence among its neighbors, and contributed to the Russian perception that GMD points squarely at Russia, practically and politically. This focus on Russia draws attention from a holistic understanding of the system's purpose. Beyond the practical aspects of defense, GMD provides essential tools for American policy across the Diplomatic, Informational, and Economic spectrum. GMD's suitability within the U.S. National Security Strategy is based on its ability to do the following: (1) provide diplomatic leverage with Russia, (2) compensate for the lack of a deterrent to Iran, (3) intercept a long-range missile originating in the Middle East that is aimed at Europe, and (4) be compatible with NATO security plans. The overall question is whether GMD's benefits outweigh the potential consequences of its deployment. Viewed broadly, the answer is a resounding "yes."
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 50
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Book Description
On 15 August 2008, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice concluded a missile defense treaty with Poland permitting the deployment of a Ground-Based, Mid-Course Ballistic Missile Defense System (GMD) on Polish territory. Following years of negotiation among Poland, the Czech Republic (where the X-Band radar for the system is to be deployed), and the United States, the agreement fulfilled a key policy goal of the Bush administration. The National Security Presidential Directive 23 (NSPD-23) that President Bush signed in 2002 described the emerging ballistic missile threat from "rogue" nations, particularly North Korea and Iran, as the administration's highest priority. The signing of the bilateral Polish agreement, which came only days after Russia's ground incursion into the Republic of Georgia, signified the latest in a series of U.S. foreign policy moves challenging Russia's influence among its neighbors, and contributed to the Russian perception that GMD points squarely at Russia, practically and politically. This focus on Russia draws attention from a holistic understanding of the system's purpose. Beyond the practical aspects of defense, GMD provides essential tools for American policy across the Diplomatic, Informational, and Economic spectrum. GMD's suitability within the U.S. National Security Strategy is based on its ability to do the following: (1) provide diplomatic leverage with Russia, (2) compensate for the lack of a deterrent to Iran, (3) intercept a long-range missile originating in the Middle East that is aimed at Europe, and (4) be compatible with NATO security plans. The overall question is whether GMD's benefits outweigh the potential consequences of its deployment. Viewed broadly, the answer is a resounding "yes."
Author: Keir Giles
Publisher: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
ISBN: 9781545166093
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 78
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Book Description
In this monograph, Mr. Keir Giles, a British academic and long-term scholar of Russia, examines the history of missile defense, and the current dialogue, from a Russian perspective in order to explain the root causes of Russian alarm. He presents specific recommendations for managing the Russia relationship in the context of missile defense. Important conclusions are also drawn for the purpose of managing the dialogue over missile defense plans not only with Russia as an opponent, but also with European North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies as partners and hosts. The latter are especially significant in the light of these partners' heightened hard security concerns following Russian annexation of Crimea and continuing hostile moves against Ukraine. This monograph was completed before the start of Russia's annexation of Crimea in March 2014, but already warned of the prospect of direct military action by Russia in Europe to protect Moscow's selfperceived interests. Given the continuing hostility of Russian messaging over U.S. missile defense plans, the Strategic Studies Institute strongly recommends this monograph to policymakers contributing not only to missile defense planning, but also to any aspect of policy affecting the defense of Europe
Author: Keir Giles
Publisher: Department of the Army
ISBN: 9781584876359
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 73
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Book Description
This monograph examines the history of missile defense and the current dialogue from a Russian perspective, in order to explain the root causes of Russian alarm. Specific recommendations for managing the Russia relationship in the context of missile defense are given. Important conclusions are also drawn for the purpose of managing the dialog over missile defense plans not only with Russia as an opponent, but also with European NATO allies as partners and hosts. The latter are especially significant in the light of these partners' heightened hard security concerns following Russian annexation of Crimea and continuing hostile moves against Ukraine. This analysis was completed before the start of Russia's annexation of Crimea in March 2014, but already warned of the prospect of direct military action by Russia in Europe in order to protect Moscow's self-perceived interests. This text is strongly recommended to policymakers contributing not only to missile defense planning, but also to any aspect of policy affecting the defense of Europe. Political scientists, historians, military leaders and personnel, as well as strategic policy analysts, and the intelligence community may be interested in this work. Students conducting research on the history of the U.S. missile defense program as it relates to Russia for term paper assignments may be interested in this volume. Related products: Russian Ballistic Missile Defense: Rhetoric and Reality is available here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-000-01163-0 Russian Military Transformation: Goal in Sight? is available here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-000-01110-9 Another Brick in the Wall: The Israeli Experience in Missile Defense can be found here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-000-01138-9 NATO Cyberspace Capability: A Strategic and Operational Evolution is available here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-000-01110-9 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XXVI, Arms Control and Nonproliferation is available here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/044-000-02673-2
Author: U. S. Army War College
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781542544474
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 76
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Book Description
U.S. attitudes to missile defense capability, stemming from a continued failure to achieve meaningful dialogue over U.S. plans and Russian fears. Russia's vehement objections to U.S. plans for missile defense installations in Europe, and the range of unfriendly actions promised in response, are often portrayed as irrational, the arguments technically flawed, the behavior deliberately obstructive, and the underlying threat perception hopelessly out of date.2 Yet, an examination of the missile defense relationship between Russia and the United States over time shows that the fundamental Russian concerns stem from ideas of state security which, while discounted elsewhere, remain valid in the Russian security calculus. The fundamentally different weight and importance attached by Russia to nuclear weapons as both a guarantee and a symbol of statehood can be challenging for U.S. observers to grasp, but it is critical to understanding those Russian statements that do not, at first sight, make rational sense to U.S. policymakers. Furthermore, while the current Russian proposals for compromise-at least those stated in public-are wholly unrealistic, bear in mind that some of the security considerations behind them, at various times, have been both shared and voiced by the United States. This monograph will examine the historical precedents for the current missile defense impasse in order to explain the Russian attitude and draw conclusions about both the most recent developments in the conversation between the United States and Russia, and its likely further progress and prospects, if any, for a resolution.
Author: U. S. Army U.S. Army War College Press
Publisher: CreateSpace
ISBN: 9781505887112
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 74
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Book Description
When U.S. President Barack Obama cancelled a scheduled September 2013 summit meeting with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, "lack of progress on issues such as missile defense" was cited as the primary justification. Despite widespread and well founded assumption that the real trigger for the cancellation was the Russian decision to offer temporary asylum to Edward Snowden, the citing of missile defense was indicative. The comment marked one of the periodic plateaus of mutual frustration between the United States and Russia over U.S. attitudes to missile defense capability, stemming from a continued failure to achieve meaningful dialogue over U.S. plans and Russian fears. Russia's vehement objections to U.S. plans for missile defense installations in Europe, and the range of unfriendly actions promised in response, are often portrayed as irrational, the arguments technically flawed, the behavior deliberately obstructive, and the underlying threat perception hopelessly out of date. Yet an examination of the missile defense relationship between Russia and the United States over time shows that the fundamental Russian concerns stem from ideas of state security which, while discounted elsewhere, remain valid in the Russian security calculus. The fundamentally different weight and importance attached by Russia to nuclear weapons as both a guarantee and a symbol of statehood can be challenging for U.S. observers to grasp, but it is critical to understanding those Russian statements that do not, at first sight, make rational sense to U.S. policymakers. Furthermore, while the current Russian proposals for compromise-at least those stated in public-are wholly unrealistic, bear in mind that some of the security considerations behind them, at various times, have been both shared and voiced by the United States. This book will examine the historical precedents for the current missile defense impasse, in order to explain the Russian attitude, and draw conclusions about both the most recent developments in the conversation between the United States and Russia and its likely further progress and prospects, if any, for a resolution.
Author: Ronald O'Rourke
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1437932770
Category : Technology & Engineering
Languages : en
Pages : 63
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Book Description
The Aegis BMD program gives Navy Aegis cruisers and destroyers a capability for conducting BMD operations. Under current plans, the number of BMD-capable Navy Aegis ships is scheduled to grow from 20 at the end of FY 2010 to 38 at the end of FY 2015. Contents of this report: (1) Intro.; (2) Background: Planned Quantities of Ships, Ashore Sites, and Interceptor Missiles; Aegis BMD Flight Tests; Allied Participation and Interest in Aegis BMD Program; (3) Issues for Congress: Demands for BMD-Capable Aegis Ships; Demands for Aegis Ships in General; Numbers of SM-3 Interceptors; SM-2 Block IV Capability for 4.0.1 and Higher Versions; (4) Legislative Activity for FY 2011. Charts and tables. This is a print on demand publication.
Author: Richard Krickus
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781461107903
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 122
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Book Description
How do we give Russia a voice but not a veto in crafting a new European security system? This question has preoccupied analysts in Brussels, Moscow, and Washington ever since Russian President Dmitry Medvedev proclaimed that the existing one was deeply flawed. Vladimir Putin's protégé observed last summer that the American "unipolar moment" upon which it rested was over. The United States could no longer dominate the international agenda nor could NATO do the same thing in Europe. The purpose of this monograph is to provide insight into the problems and prospects of the United States and Europe creating a new security relationship with Russia-one that can enhance the national security of all three of them. It will be comprised of three parts. First, it will address several compelling questions: What is the Russian case for a new security system? What are the arguments in opposition to it? And why, in spite of profound reservations about cooperation with Moscow, are Western statesmen prepared to consider it? In this connection, the factors that prevented a nuclear war between the Soviet Union and the West will provide a framework for our analysis: in sum, the triangular relationship between deterrence, arms control, and conflict management. Second, points of conflict between the Western alliance on the one hand and Russia on the other will be assessed: for example, friction associated with NATO, its eastward enlargement in particular; a U.S. missile defense system in Eastern Europe; the future of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) and the Organization of Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); and of most urgent significance the need to reconfigure the strategic nuclear balance between Washington and Moscow by providing a new START. Third, conclusions and recommendations will be provided that have a bearing on how the United States should respond to Medvedev's proposal and other issues associated with efforts to integrate Russia into the Western security system. A number of issues that will determine whether this campaign succeeds or fails will be assessed. For example, much has been said about a value gap that separates the West and Russia but little about differences within the Trans-Atlantic alliance and the European Union that will have a profound impact upon the prospects for security cooperation among the three partners. This assessment will provide insight into the compelling question: How to provide Russia with a voice but not a veto in crafting a new Trans-Atlantic security system? In this connection, the answer will involve a step-by-step process that rests upon renegotiating the START which expires at the end of this year. It also will investigate an initiative that borders on the unthinkable for most American defense analysts: providing Russia with a MAP for NATO membership. This recommendation represents a minority view, but there is mounting support for it as it is apparent that the time has come to think beyond the Cold War worldview that has restrained bold new thinking about the West's relationship with Russia. The wars in the Greater Middle East, of course, now preoccupy American strategists, but they cannot lose sight of the following observations: Russia is the only country capable of devastating the United States in a nuclear attack; major American security priorities cannot be achieved without its cooperation; and most of the world's people and resources exist in and around its territory. Changes that occur within it will have profound consequences for American global military planning, and they deserve our close attention.
Author: Keir Giles
Publisher: Lulu.com
ISBN: 9781329783591
Category : Reference
Languages : en
Pages : 72
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Book Description
"Russia's actions in Ukraine are not the only challenge to relations with the United States. U.S. plans for ballistic missile defense (BMD) capability in Europe have led to aggressive rhetoric from Moscow, which continues at the time of this writing even though attention in the West is focused almost exclusively on Ukraine. Russia's strenuous opposition to the U.S. European Phased Adaptive Approach plans is based on claims that this capability is intended to compromise Russia's nuclear deterrent capability. Most of these claims have been dismissed as groundless. Yet, all discussion of the subject highlights the U.S. current and proposed deployments, and entirely ignores Russia's own missile interception systems, which are claimed to have comparable capability. Russia protests that U.S. missiles pose a potential threat to strategic stability, and has made belligerent threats of direct military action to prevent their deployment. But no mention at all is made of the strategic implications of Russia's own systems, despite the fact that if the performance and capabilities claimed for them by Russian sources are accurate, they pose at least as great a threat to deterrence as do those of the United States. This monograph aims to describe Russia's claims for its missile defense systems, and, where possible, to assess the likelihood that these claims are true. This will form a basis for considering whether discussion of Russian capabilities should be an integral part of future conversations with Russia on the deployment of U.S. and allied BMD assets"--Publisher's web site.
Author: Bilyana Lilly
Publisher: Lexington Books
ISBN: 0739183850
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 393
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Book Description
This book is devoted to one of the central issues in U.S.-Russian and NATO-Russian relations—ballistic missile defense. Drawing on more than 2,000 primary sources, interviews with Russian and NATO officials, and a variety of Russian and Western publications, this book offers an unparalleled, in-depth analysis of the reasons behind Russia’s policy towards the construction of a U.S ballistic missile defense in Europe. It provides a critical assessment of the decision-making mechanisms that shape Russia’s position on ballistic missile defense, as well as Russia’s strategic relations with the United States and Russia’s interaction with European and non-European powers. Lilly argues that contrary to Moscow’s official claims during the Putin era, Russian objections to the construction of ballistic missile defense in Europe have not been wholly dictated by security concerns. To Russia, missile defense is not purely an issue in and of itself, but rather a symbol and instrument of broader political considerations. At the international level, the factors that have shaped Russia’s response include Moscow’s perception of the overall state of U.S.-Russian relations, the Kremlin’s capacity to project influence and power abroad, and NATO’s behavior in the post-Soviet space. Domestically, the issue of missile defense has been a facilitating instrument for strengthening Putin’s regime and justifying military modernization. Taken together, these instrumental considerations and their fluctuating intensity in different periods prompt the Russian leadership to pursue contradictory policy approaches simultaneously. On the one hand, the Kremlin seeks U.S. cooperation, while on the other hand, it threatens retaliation and reinforces Russian offensive capabilities. The result is Moscow’s incoherence, inconsistency, and double-speak over the issue of missile defense.
Author: Steven A. Hildreth
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1437924875
Category : Technology & Engineering
Languages : en
Pages : 25
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Book Description
In early 2007, the Bush Admin. proposed deploying a ground-based mid-course defense element in Europe of the larger Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMD) to defend against an Iranian missile threat. On Sept. 17, 2009, the Obama Admin. canceled the Bush-proposed program. Instead, Defense Sec. Gates announced U.S. plans to deploy a regional BMD capability that can be deployed around the world on relatively short notice during crises or as the situation may demand. Contents of this report: (1) Recent Developments; (2) Historical Background: The Obama Admin.; (3) The Threat; (4) The Bush-Proposed System; (5) The Location; Poland; Czech Republic; (6) Debate in Poland and the Czech Republic; European/Russian Response. Illus.
