Risk Aversion and Optimal Reserve Prices in First and Second-Price Auctions, Second Version PDF Download
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Author: Audrey Hu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
This paper analyzes the effects of buyer and seller risk aversion in first and second-price auctions. The setting is the classic one of symmetric and independent private values, with ex ante homogeneous bidders. However, the seller is able to optimally set the reserve price. In both auctions the seller's optimal reserve price is shown to decrease in his own risk aversion, and more so in the first-price auction. Thus, greater seller risk aversion increases the ex post efficiency of both auctions, and especially that of the first-price auction. The seller's optimal reserve price in the first-price, but not in the second-price, auction decreases in the buyers' risk aversion. Thus, greater buyer risk aversion also increases the ex post efficiency of the first but not the second-price auction. At the interim stage, the first-price auction is preferred by all buyer types in a lower interval, as well as by the seller.
Author: Audrey Hu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
This paper analyzes the effects of buyer and seller risk aversion in first and second-price auctions. The setting is the classic one of symmetric and independent private values, with ex ante homogeneous bidders. However, the seller is able to optimally set the reserve price. In both auctions the seller's optimal reserve price is shown to decrease in his own risk aversion, and more so in the first-price auction. Thus, greater seller risk aversion increases the ex post efficiency of both auctions, and especially that of the first-price auction. The seller's optimal reserve price in the first-price, but not in the second-price, auction decreases in the buyers' risk aversion. Thus, greater buyer risk aversion also increases the ex post efficiency of the first but not the second-price auction. At the interim stage, the first-price auction is preferred by all buyer types in a lower interval, as well as by the seller.
Author: Steven Matthews
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Letting of contracts
Languages : en
Pages : 42
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Book Description
Author: Audrey Hu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 27
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Book Description
Received auction theory prescribes that a reserve price which maximizes expected profit should be no less than the seller's own value for the auctioned object. In contrast, a common empirical observation is that many auctions have reserve prices set below sellers' values, even at zero. This paper revisits the theory to find a potential resolution of the puzzle for second-price auctions. The main result is that an optimal reserve price may be less than the seller's value if bidders are risk averse and have interdependent values. Moreover, the resulting outcome may be arbitrarily close to that of an auction that has no reserve price, an absolute auction.
Author: Indranil Chakraborty
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Analysis of standard auction rules when bidders are risk averse is usually carried out under the assumption that the seller is able to set an optimal reserve. The role of entry fees has been generally overlooked in that analysis. We consider bidders with constant absolute risk aversion and show that reserve price is an essential tool in the second price auction while entry fee is essential in the first price auction. Furthermore, setting a reserve price and entry fee combination optimally may change some of the rankings of the standard auctions that hold under optimal reserves.
Author:
Publisher: ScholarlyEditions
ISBN: 1464965056
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 875
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Book Description
Issues in General Economic Research and Application: 2011 Edition is a ScholarlyEditions™ eBook that delivers timely, authoritative, and comprehensive information about General Economic Research and Application. The editors have built Issues in General Economic Research and Application: 2011 Edition on the vast information databases of ScholarlyNews.™ You can expect the information about General Economic Research and Application in this eBook to be deeper than what you can access anywhere else, as well as consistently reliable, authoritative, informed, and relevant. The content of Issues in General Economic Research and Application: 2011 Edition has been produced by the world’s leading scientists, engineers, analysts, research institutions, and companies. All of the content is from peer-reviewed sources, and all of it is written, assembled, and edited by the editors at ScholarlyEditions™ and available exclusively from us. You now have a source you can cite with authority, confidence, and credibility. More information is available at http://www.ScholarlyEditions.com/.
Author:
Publisher: ScholarlyEditions
ISBN: 1464921075
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 593
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Book Description
Economics: Advances in Research and Application: 2011 Edition is a ScholarlyEditions™ eBook that delivers timely, authoritative, and comprehensive information about Economics and Organizations. The editors have built Economics: Advances in Research and Application: 2011 Edition on the vast information databases of ScholarlyNews.™ You can expect the information about Economics and Organizations in this eBook to be deeper than what you can access anywhere else, as well as consistently reliable, authoritative, informed, and relevant. The content of Economics: Advances in Research and Application: 2011 Edition has been produced by the world’s leading scientists, engineers, analysts, research institutions, and companies. All of the content is from peer-reviewed sources, and all of it is written, assembled, and edited by the editors at ScholarlyEditions™ and available exclusively from us. You now have a source you can cite with authority, confidence, and credibility. More information is available at http://www.ScholarlyEditions.com/.
Author: Paul Milgrom
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1139449168
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 378
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Book Description
This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
Author: Vasiliki Skreta
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Allan Hernandez-Chanto
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
We justify the prevalence of small reserve prices in real-life auctions in spite of empirical findings that suggest optimal reserve prices in those contexts should be higher. We reconcile such discrepancy within the standard paradigm of independent private valuations rather than exploring richer environments capable to rationalize the adoption of small reserve prices. The key driver of our characterization is the uncertainty on the distribution of valuations the seller faces. The uncertainty may arise when the bid sample lacks some variables to determine the valuation distribution or when its point estimate differs from the true distribution. We show that (i) the optimal reserve price under uncertainty decreases as the number of bidders grows; (ii) revenue gains from the optimal reserve price relative to any smaller reserve price disappear at an exponential rate. Finally, we show that when the seller is risk-averse or the amount of uncertainty in the distribution increases, the reserve price decreases further.
Author: Paul Klemperer
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 712
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Book Description
This two-volume set collects critical papers in the economic theory of auctions. Klemperer (economics, Oxford U.) starts with an introduction that summarizes the most basic concepts of auction theory. Next, 31 papers discuss early literature; introduction to the recent literature; the basic analysis of optimal auctions, revenue, equivalence, and marginal revenues; risk aversion; correlation and affiliation; asymmetries; entry costs and the number of bidders; and collusion. In Volume II, 27 papers cover multiunit auctions; royalties, incentive, contracts and payments for quality; double auctions, etc.; other topics (budget constraints, externalities between bidders, jump bidding, war of attrition, and competing auctioneers); and testing the theory. The set lacks a subject index. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR
