Rationalizability in Incomplete Information Games

Rationalizability in Incomplete Information Games PDF Author: Pierpaolo Battigalli
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics, Mathematical
Languages : en
Pages : 80

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Book Description

Rationalizability in Incomplete Information Games

Rationalizability in Incomplete Information Games PDF Author: Pierpaolo Battigalli
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics, Mathematical
Languages : en
Pages : 80

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Book Description


Epistemic Game Theory

Epistemic Game Theory PDF Author: Andrés Perea
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107008913
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 581

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Book Description
The first textbook to explain the principles of epistemic game theory.

Game Theory

Game Theory PDF Author: Michael Maschler
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1108659950
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 1054

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Book Description
Now in its second edition, this popular textbook on game theory is unrivalled in the breadth of its coverage, the thoroughness of technical explanations and the number of worked examples included. Covering non-cooperative and cooperative games, this introduction to game theory includes advanced chapters on auctions, games with incomplete information, games with vector payoffs, stable matchings and the bargaining set. This edition contains new material on stochastic games, rationalizability, and the continuity of the set of equilibrium points with respect to the data of the game. The material is presented clearly and every concept is illustrated with concrete examples from a range of disciplines. With numerous exercises, and the addition of a solution manual for instructors with this edition, the book is an extensive guide to game theory for undergraduate through graduate courses in economics, mathematics, computer science, engineering and life sciences, and will also serve as useful reference for researchers.

Game Theory

Game Theory PDF Author: Steve Tadelis
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 0691129088
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 416

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Book Description
The definitive introduction to game theory This comprehensive textbook introduces readers to the principal ideas and applications of game theory, in a style that combines rigor with accessibility. Steven Tadelis begins with a concise description of rational decision making, and goes on to discuss strategic and extensive form games with complete information, Bayesian games, and extensive form games with imperfect information. He covers a host of topics, including multistage and repeated games, bargaining theory, auctions, rent-seeking games, mechanism design, signaling games, reputation building, and information transmission games. Unlike other books on game theory, this one begins with the idea of rationality and explores its implications for multiperson decision problems through concepts like dominated strategies and rationalizability. Only then does it present the subject of Nash equilibrium and its derivatives. Game Theory is the ideal textbook for advanced undergraduate and beginning graduate students. Throughout, concepts and methods are explained using real-world examples backed by precise analytic material. The book features many important applications to economics and political science, as well as numerous exercises that focus on how to formalize informal situations and then analyze them. Introduces the core ideas and applications of game theory Covers static and dynamic games, with complete and incomplete information Features a variety of examples, applications, and exercises Topics include repeated games, bargaining, auctions, signaling, reputation, and information transmission Ideal for advanced undergraduate and beginning graduate students Complete solutions available to teachers and selected solutions available to students

Fixed-Equilibrium Rationalizability in Signaling Games

Fixed-Equilibrium Rationalizability in Signaling Games PDF Author: Lars Stole
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

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Book Description
This paper studies equilibrium refinements in signaling games through an examination of rationalizability in derived games obtained by replacing the equilibrium path with a sure outcome that yields the equilibrium payoff to all players. The informed player chooses between the sure payoff and sending an out-of-equilibrium signal from the original game. Whether or not the strategy of choosing the sure payoff is rationalizable is related to the iterated intuitive condition (divinity) when the original game is viewed as having imperfect (incomplete) information. Our results also demonstrate the significance of testing out-of-equilibrium signals as a set rather than individually.

Stochastic Orders and Their Applications

Stochastic Orders and Their Applications PDF Author: Moshe Shaked
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 580

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Book Description
Stochastic orders and inequalities are being used at an accelerated rate in many diverse areas of probability and statistics. This book provides the first unified, systematic, and accessible treatment of stochasticorders, addressing the growing importance of these orders with the presentation of numerous results that illustrate their usefulness and applicability. Ten insightful chapters emphasize the applications by specialists in probability and statistics, economics, operations research, and reliability theory. Applications include multivariate variability, epidemics, comparisons of risk and risk aversion, scheduling, and systems reliability theory.

Refinements of Rationalizability for Normal-form Games

Refinements of Rationalizability for Normal-form Games PDF Author: P. Jean-Jacques Herings
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 74

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Book Description


Belief Free Incomplete Information Games

Belief Free Incomplete Information Games PDF Author: Dirk Bergemann
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 28

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Book Description
We consider the following belief free solution concepts for games with incomplete information: (i) incomplete information rationalizability, (ii) incomplete information correlated equilibrium and (iii) ex post equilibrium. We present epistemic foundations for these solution concepts and establish relationships between them. The properties of these solution concepts are further developed in supermodular games and potential games.

Hierarchies of Belief and Interim Rationalizability

Hierarchies of Belief and Interim Rationalizability PDF Author: Jeffrey C. Ely
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 42

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Book Description


Existence of Equilibria in Incomplete Information Games with Disturbed Payoffs

Existence of Equilibria in Incomplete Information Games with Disturbed Payoffs PDF Author: Brian John Crone
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 212

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Book Description