Price Mechanism in Russia

Price Mechanism in Russia PDF Author: Nandini Ramanujam
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Prices
Languages : en
Pages : 788

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Book Description

Price Mechanism in Russia

Price Mechanism in Russia PDF Author: Nandini Ramanujam
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Prices
Languages : en
Pages : 788

Get Book Here

Book Description


Price Mechanism in Russia

Price Mechanism in Russia PDF Author: Nandini Ramanujam
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Prices
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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The Soviet Price System

The Soviet Price System PDF Author: Naum Jasny
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Prices
Languages : en
Pages : 202

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Russia's Virtual Economy

Russia's Virtual Economy PDF Author: Clifford G. Gaddy
Publisher: Brookings Institution Press
ISBN: 9780815731115
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 322

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Book Description
Clifford Gaddy's and Barry Ickes' thesis-- that Russia's economy is based on illusion or pretense about nearly every important economic yardstick, including prices, sales, wages and budgets-- has forced broad recognition of the inadequacies of the intended market reform policies in Russia and provided a coherent framework for understanding how and why so much of Russia's economy has resisted reform.

Prices in the Russian Economy

Prices in the Russian Economy PDF Author: M. Yu Ksenofontov
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

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Prices in the Russian Economy

Prices in the Russian Economy PDF Author: Mikhail Yurievich Ksenofontov
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Monetary policy
Languages : en
Pages : 31

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Privatizing Russia

Privatizing Russia PDF Author: Maxim Boycko
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262522281
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 180

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Book Description
Privatizing Russia offers an inside look at one of the most remarkable reforms in recent history. Having started on the back burner of Russian politics in the fall of 1991, mass privatization was completed on July 1, 1994, with two thirds of the Russian industry privately owned, a rapidly rising stock market, and 40 million Russians owning company shares. The authors, all key participants in the reform effort, describe the events and the ideas driving privatization. They argue that successful reformers must recognize privatization as a process of depoliticizing firms in the face of massive opposition: making the firm responsive to market rather than political influences. The authors first review the economic theory of property rights, identifying the political influence on firms as the fundamental failure of property rights under socialism. They detail the process of coalition building and compromise that ultmately shaped privatization. The main elements of the Russian program -- corporatization, voucher use, and voucher auctions -- are described, as is the responsiveness of privatized firms to outside investors. Finally, the market values of privatized assets are assessed for indications of how much progress the country has made toward reforming its economy. In many respects, privatization has been a great success. Market concepts of property ownership and corporate management are shaking up Russian firms at a breathtaking pace, creating powerful economic and political stimuli for continuation of market reforms. At the same time, the authors caution, the political landscape remains treacherous as old-line politicians reluctantly cede their property rights and authority over firms.

Testing Russia's Virtual Economy

Testing Russia's Virtual Economy PDF Author: Vlad Ivanenko
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
In the aftermath of sovereign default of August 1998, the hypothesis of virtual economy in Russia developed by Gaddy and Ickes has gained popularity. The hypothesis states that the country has not moved towards free-market economy but developed a system of implicit price subsidization similar to what had existed before. Non-viable sectors that the state supported with subsidies before survive by over-pricing their output. Customers pass the bill back to the government by reducing their tax liabilities. We test the proposition that the distribution of the value-added across sectors is biased because of price distortions and estimate the distribution at world prices. The results support the claim that Russian price structure is different from the world level and three out of fifteen sectors, for which we construct price indices, become "value-destroying". We investigate the reasons behind price differentials and find that difference in processing and the use of barter explain a large part of it.

The Russia Balance Sheet

The Russia Balance Sheet PDF Author: Anders Åslund
Publisher: Peterson Institute
ISBN: 0881325457
Category : Post-communism
Languages : en
Pages : 222

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Book Description
Introduction : why Russia matters and how -- Russia's historical roots -- Political development : from disorder to recentralization of power -- Russia's economic revival : past recovery, future challenges -- Policy on oil and gas -- International economic integration, trade policy, and investment -- Challenges of demography and health -- Russian attitudes toward the West -- Russia as a post-imperial power -- Pressing the "reset button" on US-Russia relations -- Key facts on Russia, 2000-2008.

The Sanctions Paradox

The Sanctions Paradox PDF Author: Daniel W. Drezner
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9780521644150
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 372

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Book Description
Despite their increasing importance, there is little theoretical understanding of why nation-states initiate economic sanctions, or what determines their success. This book argues that both imposers and targets of economic coercion incorporate expectations of future conflict as well as the short-run opportunity costs of coercion into their behaviour. Drezner argues that conflict expectations have a paradoxical effect. Adversaries will impose sanctions frequently, but rarely secure concessions. Allies will be reluctant to use coercion, but once sanctions are used, they can result in significant concessions. Ironically, the most favourable distribution of payoffs is likely to result when the imposer cares the least about its reputation or the distribution of gains. The book's argument is pursued using game theory and statistical analysis, and detailed case studies of Russia's relations with newly-independent states, and US efforts to halt nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula.--Publisher description.