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Author: Hong Yuan
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 12
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Book Description
Price-matching guarantees are commonly used by sellers as promises to match the lowest price for an item that a customer can find elsewhere. In this paper, we use a market experiment approach to examine buyer search as well as sellers' pricing decisions in the presence versus absence of Price-Matching Guarantees. We use student subjects as well as real consumers in an interactive laboratory setting to trade with each other, acting as buyers and sellers. Our findings from two experiments indicate that when searchers' demand is more elastic than non-searchers, PMGs can result in more intense price competition, even when sellers are symmetric. Price-Matching sellers benefit from converting more consumers into searchers who buy a larger quantity at a lower price. The lower (average) market prices also benefit buyers. These implications should be of great interest to researchers, practitioners, and public policymakers.
Author: Hong Yuan
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 12
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Book Description
Price-matching guarantees are commonly used by sellers as promises to match the lowest price for an item that a customer can find elsewhere. In this paper, we use a market experiment approach to examine buyer search as well as sellers' pricing decisions in the presence versus absence of Price-Matching Guarantees. We use student subjects as well as real consumers in an interactive laboratory setting to trade with each other, acting as buyers and sellers. Our findings from two experiments indicate that when searchers' demand is more elastic than non-searchers, PMGs can result in more intense price competition, even when sellers are symmetric. Price-Matching sellers benefit from converting more consumers into searchers who buy a larger quantity at a lower price. The lower (average) market prices also benefit buyers. These implications should be of great interest to researchers, practitioners, and public policymakers.
Author: Juncai Jiang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 55
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Book Description
Price-matching guarantees (PMGs) are offered in a wide array of product categories in retail markets. PMGs offer consumers the assurance that, should they find a lower price elsewhere within a specified period after purchase, the retailer will match that price and refund the price difference. The goal of this study is to explain the following stylized facts: (1) many retailers that operate both online and offline implement PMG offline but not online; (2) the practices of PMG vary considerably across retail categories; and (3) some retailers launch specialized websites that automatically check competitors' prices for consumers after purchase. To this end, we build a sequential search model that endogenizes consumers' pre- and post-purchase search decisions. We find that PMG expands retail demand but intensifies price competition on two dimensions. PMG drives retailers to offer deeper promotions because it increases the overall extent of consumer search, which we call the primary competition-intensifying effect. We also find a new secondary competition-intensifying effect, which results from endogenous consumer search. As deeper promotions incentivize consumers to continue price search, retailers are forced to lower the “regular” price to deter consumers from searching. The strength of the secondary competition-intensifying effect increases with the ratio of product valuation to search cost, which explains the variation in PMG practices online vs. offline and across retail categories. We show that an asymmetric equilibrium exists such that one retailer offers PMG while the other does not. In this equilibrium the PMG retailer may benefit from launching a price check website to facilitate consumers' post-purchase search.
Author: Joydeep Srivastava
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Many retailers offer a price-matching guarantee that promises to pay consumers the difference if they find a lower price elsewhere. This article proposes that the effectiveness of a price-matching guarantee as a signal of low store prices depends on individuals' beliefs about the degree to which other consumers in the market engage in price search, enforce price-matching guarantees, or both. Consistent with signaling theory, results of a survey and two experimental studies demonstrate that market level factors affect consumer beliefs about the extent to which others engage in price search and thereby the effectiveness of price-matching guarantees in lowering perceptions of store prices. The implications of the findings for retail strategy are discussed along with directions for future research.
Author: Luis C. Corchón
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 1788112784
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 547
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Book Description
This second volume of the Handbook includes original contribution by experts in the field. It provides up-to-date surveys of the most relevant applications of game theory to industrial organization. The book covers both classical as well as new IO topics such as mergers in markets with homogeneous and differentiated goods, leniency and coordinated effects in cartels and mergers, static and dynamic contests, consumer search and product safety, strategic delegation, platforms and network effects, auctions, environmental and resource economics, intellectual property, healthcare, corruption, experimental industrial organization and empirical models of R&D.
Author: Charles Noussair
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
ISBN: 1118790685
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 374
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Book Description
Comprised of 10 surveys by leading scholars, this collection showcases the largest and fastest growing strands of research on market behaviour in experimental economics. Covers topics such as asset markets, contests, environmental policy, frictions, general equilibrium, labour markets, multi-unit auctions, oligopoly markets, and prediction markets Focuses on the literature that has helped economists best understand how markets operate Assesses the impact of developments in theory, policy, and research methods
Author: Subhasish Dugar
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Price-matching guarantees have been alleged to sustain collusive prices in a homogenous product market. Theories in this literature also suggest that there exists multiple equilibria (i.e., a set of price equilibria between the competitive and the monopoly price) when all sellers adopt these guarantees in such a market. Theoretical prediction in this case fails to pin down the actual behavior of players a priori. This paper illustrates the essential role of controlled experiment in testing the collusive theory of price matching guarantees and thereby shedding light on the embedded equilibrium selection problem. In particular, this paper studies two highly stylized market models, obtains testable predictions and lays out the design of the controlled experiment. Results indicate that these guarantees facilitate collusion among sellers and thus solve the equilibrium selection problem considerably.
Author: Arcan Nalca
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Author: Enrique Fatas
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
In this paper we experimentally test the ability of Price-Matching Guarantees (PMG) to rise prices above the competitive level. We implement three different treatments of symmetric duopolies to check the effect of PMG both as a market institution and as a business strategy. In the absence of any low-price guarantee, prices get close to the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium although in the 50 rounds of the experiment no full convergence is obtained. The existence of PMG as an institution in a market where firms decide only about prices results in a clear collusive outcome as all markets quickly and fully converge to the collusive prediction. If we allow subjects to decide whether they adopt price matching or not we observe that almost all subjects decide to adopt PMG; prices significantly increases over the first treatment observed prices and are very close to the collusive ones.
Author: Nicholas H. Lurie
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
In 3 experiments, we show that price-matching guarantees affect the process through which consumers translate price information into subjective judgments. In Experiment 1, we find that price-matching guarantees appear to change the standard used in price evaluation by raising consumers' estimates of the lowest and average prices in the market. This leads consumers to perceive products and stores that offer price-matching guarantees as less expensive. In Experiment 2, we show that evaluations of product price information are affected by the presence of a price-matching guarantee only when consumers do not know the range of market prices. In Experiment 3, we extend these findings to show that consumer evaluations of the cost of products in a store, inferred on the basis of store characteristics, are also influenced by the presence of a price-matching guarantee.
Author: Kalyan Chatterjee
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 1461470951
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 407
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Book Description
Game theory has been applied to a growing list of practical problems, from antitrust analysis to monetary policy; from the design of auction institutions to the structuring of incentives within firms; from patent races to dispute resolution. The purpose of Game Theory and Business Applications is to show how game theory can be used to model and analyze business decisions. The contents of this revised edition contain a wide variety of business functions – from accounting to operations, from marketing to strategy to organizational design. In addition, specific application areas include market competition, law and economics, bargaining and dispute resolution, and competitive bidding. All of these applications involve competitive decision settings, specifically situations where a number of economic agents in pursuit of their own self-interests and in accordance with the institutional “rules of the game” take actions that together affect all of their fortunes. As this volume demonstrates, game theory provides a compelling guide for analyzing business decisions and strategies.
