Price Fluctuations and Competition in the Retail Gasoline Market

Price Fluctuations and Competition in the Retail Gasoline Market PDF Author: Mark B. Schupack
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Gasoline
Languages : en
Pages : 90

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Price Fluctuations and Competition in the Retail Gasoline Market

Price Fluctuations and Competition in the Retail Gasoline Market PDF Author: Mark B. Schupack
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Gasoline
Languages : en
Pages : 90

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Book Description


Gasoline price changes the dynamic of supply, demand, and competition.

Gasoline price changes the dynamic of supply, demand, and competition. PDF Author:
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1428950044
Category : Gasoline
Languages : en
Pages : 166

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The Nature of Competition in Gasoline Distribution at the Retail Level

The Nature of Competition in Gasoline Distribution at the Retail Level PDF Author: Ralph Cassady
Publisher: Univ of California Press
ISBN: 0520350065
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 232

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Book Description
This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press’s mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1951.

Perfect Competition, Spatial Competition, and Tax Incidence in the Retail Gasoline Market

Perfect Competition, Spatial Competition, and Tax Incidence in the Retail Gasoline Market PDF Author: James Alm
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 33

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Book Description
In this paper we use monthly gasoline price data for all fifty U.S. states over the period 1984 to 1999 to examine the incidence of state gasoline excise taxes. Standard economic theory predicts full shifting of the excise tax to consumers when the supply of gasoline is perfectly elastic, and our empirical results are largely consistent with this prediction. In general, we find full shifting of gasoline taxes to the final consumer, with changes in gasoline taxes fully reflected in the tax-inclusive gasoline price almost instantly, a result consistent with a retail gasoline market in which firms are perfectly competitive and produce at constant cost. In addition, although we find that gasoline retail prices demonstrate asymmetric responses to changes in gasoline wholesale prices, we find only limited evidence of such behavior for retail prices with respect to gasoline excise taxes. Importantly, we also present a novel application of a spatial price discrimination model to examine tax incidence in markets that are not perfectly competitive. In this alternative framework, the incidence of excise taxes depends upon the competitiveness of retail gasoline markets, which depends in turn on spatial aspects of the market. Consistent with this alternative theoretical framework, our empirical estimates demonstrate that gasoline markets in urban states exhibit full shifting, but those in rural states demonstrate somewhat less than full shifting.

Anticompetitive Practices in the Retail Gasoline Market

Anticompetitive Practices in the Retail Gasoline Market PDF Author: United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopolies, and Business Rights
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 624

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The State of Competition in Gasoline Marketing

The State of Competition in Gasoline Marketing PDF Author: James B. Delaney
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition, Unfair
Languages : en
Pages : 228

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Gas Prices

Gas Prices PDF Author: United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Governmental Affairs. Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 754

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Vertical Relationships and Competition in Retail Gasoline Markets

Vertical Relationships and Competition in Retail Gasoline Markets PDF Author: Justine S. Hastings
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
This study examines how much, if any, of the differences in retail gasoline prices between markets is attributable to differences in the composition of vertical contract types at gasoline stations in each market. The purchase of the independent retail gasoline chain, Thrifty, by ARCO provides a unique opportunity to examine the effects of changes in different vertical contract types on local retail prices. This event caused sharp changes in the market share of i) fully vertically integrated stations, and ii) independent stations; differentially affecting local markets in the Los Angeles and San Diego Metropolitan areas. Using unique and detailed station-level data, this study examines how these sharp changes affected local retail prices. The detailed data and the research design based on the Thrifty station conversions allow for credible estimation of the effects of the market share of independent retailers and vertically integrated retailers on local market prices, controlling for any omitted factors at the station level, and the city level over time. Results for the Los Angeles and San Diego metropolitan areas indicate that a decrease in the market share of independent stations has a significant positive impact on local retail price. However, a change in the market share of refiner owned and operated branded stations does not have a significant impact on local market price. These results have important implications as policy makers consider the regulation of vertical contracts as a means to increase competition in gasoline markets. The research design and detailed data also allow for inference on the underlying nature of retail gasoline competition.

Competition and Pricing Strategies

Competition and Pricing Strategies PDF Author: Marc Remer
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 41

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Book Description
I analyze the extent to which competitors adopt similar pricing strategies. Using an extensive panel data set, I find substantial heterogeneity in the price setting behavior of nearby competitors. The differences in strategy can be explained, in part, by the size of firms and relative profitability of gasoline within a firm's overall product offerings. More generally, I investigate the degree to which retail gasoline stations change over time (i) price-cost margins, (ii) regular fuel prices, and (iii) the price-gap between different grades of fuel. I pinpoint specific firm and market characteristics that explain the substantial variation in each measure, both within and across local markets. Competition increases price and margin variation. Conversely, independent and smaller firms react less frequently to changes in cost and other economic shocks. Also, premium and mid-grade fuel, relatively low demand products, are more likely than regular fuel to be priced using a rule-of-thumb. These results, and others, demonstrate a positive relationship between the relative profitability of a product and the incentive to invest in sophisticated pricing policies.

Dynamic Pricing in Retail Gasoline Markets

Dynamic Pricing in Retail Gasoline Markets PDF Author: Severin Borenstein
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Gasoline
Languages : en
Pages : 50

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Book Description
This paper tests for price patterns in retail gasoline markets consistent with those predicted by models of implicit collusion among firms. Recent supergame models show that the highest supportable collusive price is a function of today's profit relative to expected future profit: collusive prices are higher when predictable changes in demand or cost lead firms to expect that collusive profits are increasing rather than declining. Ceteris paribus, collusive profits will be expected to increase when demand is expected to increase and/or costs are expected to decline. Using panel data on sales volume, and retail and wholesale prices in 59 cities over 72 months, we find results consistent with these predictions. Controlling for current demand and input price, the elasticity of current retail margins with respect to expected next-month demand is about 0.37. The elasticity of current margins with respect to next-month wholesale price is about -0.37. The results are inconsistent with inventory effects.