Author: Iwan Bos
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

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Author: Alberto Cavaliere
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 31

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Author: Nirvikar Singh
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 32

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Author: Piercarlo Zanchettin
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Duopolies
Languages : en
Pages : 32

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Author: Krina Griva
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 26

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Author: John Beath
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9780521335522
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 220

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Book Description
There are few industries in modern market economies that do not manufacture differentiated products. This book provides a systematic explanation and analysis of the widespread prevalence of this important category of products. The authors concentrate on models in which product selection is endogenous. In the first four chapters they consider models that try to predict the level of product differentiation that would emerge in situations of market equilibrium. These market equilibria with differentiated products are characterised and then compared with social welfare optima. Particular attention is paid to the distinction between horizontal and vertical differentiation as well as to the related issues of product quality and durability. This book brings together the most important theoretical contributions to these topics in a succinct and coherent manner. One of its major strengths is the way in which it carefully sets out the basic intuition behind the formal results. It will be useful to advanced undergraduate and graduate students taking courses in industrial economics and microeconomic theory.

Author: Michael Kopel
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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We show that a frequently used direct demand system with product differentiation in a duopoly market generates unexpected effects of increasing the substitutability of firms' products on prices, outputs, profits and welfare. Using the original demand system introduced by Bowley (The Mathematical Groundwork of Economics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1924) as a reference, we argue that this alternative model does not capture a consumer's taste for variety. Moreover, we demonstrate that positive values for the parameter which represents cross-price effects in the alternative demand system corresponds to the regime of complementary products in the original Bowley model. As a consequence, for increasing values of this parameter--meant to capture increasing competition in the usual sense--prices do not converge towards marginal costs and profits do not vanish. Finally, we study a duopoly with international transfer pricing and demonstrate that conflicting policy conclusions are derived depending on which of the models is used to capture demand.

Author: Piercarlo Zanchettin
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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In this paper, we compare Bertrand and Cournot equilibria in a differentiated duopoly with linear demand and cost functions. We extend the Singh and Vives (1984) model by allowing for a wider range of cost and demand (product quality) asymmetry between firms. Focusing on the case of substitute goods, we show that both the efficient firm's profits and industry profits are higher under Bertrand competition when asymmetry is strong and/or products are weakly differentiated. Therefore, Singh and Vives's ranking of profits between the two modes of competition is reversed in a sizeable portion of the relevant parameter space. Contrary to the standard result with symmetric firms, we also show that product differentiation can reduce both the efficient firm's and industry profits, implying that a local incentive towards less differentiation may arise.

Author: Sonja Brangewitz
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 26

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Author: Dominique Olie Lauga
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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One of the hallmarks of competitive interaction is each firm's desire to differentiate from rivals. Although differentiation may be achieved through product related choices, advertising levels may constitute another key mechanism. In this paper, we examine under what conditions firms will elect to differentiate through product quality vs. advertising intensity and characterize the set of equilibria that emerge. Consumers can only purchase from the set of products they are informed about through advertising, and choose the alternative that maximizes their utility. Firms select product quality in a first stage, advertising levels in a second stage, and prices in the last stage. We study two forms of advertising-blanket and targeted. Under blanket advertising, firms communicate indiscriminately and a consumer's probability of seeing an ad depends on the level of ad expenditure. We find that when advertising is ineffective, i.e., the additional awareness generated by a heavy level is modest relative to the cost, both firms choose a light ad spending. This allows them to minimally differentiate in qualities without concern of intense price competition, as each firm expects to have a segment of 'captive' consumers that are only aware of its product. When advertising is moderately effective, one firm shifts to expending heavily on advertising, hence all consumers are aware of its product. However, the rival prefers to differentiate by advertising lightly, while choosing the same maximal quality level. This strategy softens price competition by inducing the heavy-advertiser to price highly more often in order to capitalize on its captive segment and allows the light-advertiser to increase its average price. Interestingly, we show that even if advertising heavily entails no extra cost, one firm will choose to advertise lightly in equilibrium for strategic reasons. When advertising is very effective, both firms advertise heavily. In this scenario, firms must differentiate in qualities in order to achieve positive profits. Under targeted advertising, we let firms choose the segment(s) they wish to inform. We identify conditions such that both firms choose equally high quality products, but advertise to distinct segments; thereby achieving differentiation through ad targeting. We further show that this can result in a pocket of unserved consumers, even though consumers with lower willingness to pay purchase. Generally speaking, we show that allowing market awareness to be determined endogenously suggests far less product differentiation than previously suspected and reveals regions where advertising creates viable differentiation.