Price-cap Versus Rate-of-return Regulation PDF Download
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Author: Catherine Liston
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Catherine Liston
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Kevin M. Currier
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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The two forms of natural monopoly regulation that are typically discussed in Intermediate Microeconomics textbooks are marginal cost pricing and average cost pricing (rate of return regulation). However, within the last 20 years, price cap regulation has largely replaced rate of return regulation due to the formers' potential to generate more efficient pricing structures and strong incentives for cost reduction. Price cap regulation, however, has received little attention in Microeconomics textbooks. This paper provides a simple model of price cap regulation that demonstrates its superiority over conventional rate of return regulation. The present paper thus forms the basis for a lecture on contemporary natural monopoly regulation.
Author: Yukihiro Kidokoro
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 33
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Author: Catherine Liston
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Price regulation
Languages : en
Pages : 40
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Author: Andrew C. Barrett
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Telecommunication policy
Languages : en
Pages : 14
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Author: Ian Alexander
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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This Note compares the effects of price cap and rate-of-return regulation on the risk borne by regulated utilities. It present evidence that price cap regulation subjects firms to greater risks and therefore raises their cost of capital. This result has one clear implication: firms regulated by price caps must be permitted to earn higher returns. If they are not, they will be unable to attract new investment capital and the quality of their service will decline.
Author: Howard E. Thompson
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 146153948X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 241
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This monograph is concerned with the determination of the allowed rate ofreturn in rate cases which, in part, determines the rates ofcharge to customers of public utilities. Rate of return determination has been a central topic in utility regulation for a century. Recent changes in the traditionally regulated markets - electricity, gas, and telephone - have shoved discussion of rate of return determination into the background, replacing it by technology changes, competition, downsizing, deregulation, and reg'ulatory incentive systems. These new issues have made the regula tory sector, which had the reputation of being stodgy and uninteresting, an exciting field ofstudy. But rate ofreturn is not dead. It will playa key role in whatever the new structure ofthe regulated sector. Separating generation from transmis sion and distribution will not eliminate the need for rate of return analysis in the electric utility industry. Rather, it may well increase the number of companies for which the rate of return needs to be determined. It will playa fundamental role in the new regulatory environment. Incentive systems in the regulated sector may be the wave of the future but they will use the required rate ofreturn as a benchmark. Rate case will persist. Most rate cases include opposing testimony as to the "fair" rate of return or even the cost ofcapital for a public utility whose rates are at issue.
Author: D. Bös
Publisher: Elsevier
ISBN: 0080514707
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 472
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This clear, precisely written text presents an important branch of the modern, micro-economically based theory of industrial organization and of public finance, utilizing calculus only. Answers are provided to some pertinent economic questions, such as the pricing policies of vote-seeking politicians, of empire-building bureaucrats and of out-put-maximizing and energy-saving public utilities. These policies are compared with the welfare economic benchmark rules e.g. on marginal cost pricing and Ramsey pricing. Great significance is attached to price regulation. The book elucidates the recent replacement of rate of return regulation by price-cap regulation. It also explains why many simple rules like yardstick regulation fail to achieve optimal prices, which shows how complicated it is to induce managers to truthfully reveal their private information. How this can be achieved properly is shown in various principal-agent models on regulation with uncertain costs, uncertain demand and with soft budget constraints.
Author: Kenneth Train
Publisher: Mit Press
ISBN: 9780262200844
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 338
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Book Description
Optimal Regulation addresses the central issue of regulatory economics - how toregulate firms in a way that induces them to produce and price "optimally." It synthesizes the majorfindings of an extensive theoretical literature on what constitutes optimality in various situationsand which regulatory mechanisms can be used to achieve it. It is the first text to provide aunified, modern, and nontechnical treatment of the field.The book includes models for regulatingoptimal output, tariffs, and surplus subsidy schemes, and presents all of the material graphically,with clear explanations of often highly technical topics.Kenneth E. Train is Associate AdjunctProfessor in the Department of Economics and Graduate School of Public Policy at the University ofCalifornia, Berkeley. He is also Principal of the firm Cambridge Systematics.Topics include: Thecost structure of natural monopoly (economies of scale and scope). Characterization of firstandsecond-best optimality. Surplus subsidy schemes for attaining first-best optimality. Ramsey pricesand the Vogelsang-Finsinger mechanism for attaining them. Time-ofuse (TOU) prices and Riordan'smechanisms for attaining the optimal TOU prices' Multipart and self-selecting tariffs, and Sibley'smethod for using self-selecting tariffs to achieve optimality. The Averch-Johnson model of howrate-of-return regulation induces inefficiencies. Analysis of regulation based on the firm's returnon Output, costs, or sales. Price-cap regulation. Regulatory treatment of uncertainty and its impacton the firm's behavior. Methods of attaining optimality without direct regulation (contestability,auctioning the monopoly franchise.)
Author: Ronald Ray Braeutigam
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Price regulation
Languages : en
Pages : 8
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