Optimal Non-linear Pricing with Regulatory Preference Over Customary Types PDF Download
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Author: William W. Sharkey
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Price regulation
Languages : en
Pages : 66
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Book Description
Author: William W. Sharkey
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Price regulation
Languages : en
Pages : 66
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: William W. Sharkey
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Pricing
Languages : en
Pages : 66
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Book Description
Author: Robert B. Wilson
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 9780195115826
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 446
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Book Description
What do phone rates, frequent flyer programs, and railroad tariffs all have in common? They are all examples of nonlinear pricing. Pricing is nonlinear when it is not strictly proportional to the quantity purchased. The Electric Power Research Institute has commissioned Robert Wilson to review the various facets of nonlinear pricing. The work starts with a general non-mathematical discussion, followed by a more technical presentation intended for readers with a fairly advanced background. Thorough and detailed, this study has ample examples of case studies from a variety of industries.
Author: Daniel Krähmer
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
We introduce consumers with intrinsic privacy preferences into the monopolistic non-linear pricing model. Next to classical consumers, there is a share of data-sensitive consumers who incur a privacy cost if their purchase reveals information to the monopolist. The monopolist discriminates between privacy types using privacy mechanisms which consist of a direct mechanism and a privacy option, targeting, respectively, classical and data-sensitive consumers. We show that a privacy mechanism is optimal if privacy costs are large and that it yields classical consumers a higher utility than data-sensitive consumers with the same valuation. If, by contrast, privacy preferences are public information, data-sensitive consumers with a low valuation obtain a strictly higher utility than classical consumers. With public privacy preferences, data-sensitive consumers and the monopolist are better off, whereas classical consumers are worse off. Our results are relevant for policy measures that target the data-awareness of consumers, such as the European GDPR.
Author: Yossi Spiegel
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Pricing
Languages : en
Pages : 24
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Book Description
Author: Susanna Esteban
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
This paper studies optimal nonlinear pricing for a monopolist when consumers' preferences exhibit temptation and self-control as in Gul and Pesendorfer (2001). Consumers are subject to temptation inside the store but exercise self-control, and those foreseeing large self-control costs do not enter the store. Consumers differ in their preferences under temptation. When all consumers are tempted by more expensive, higher quality choices, the optimal menu is a singleton, which saves consumers from self-control and extracts consumers' commitment surplus. When some consumers are tempted by cheaper, lower quality choices, the optimal menu may contain a continuum of choices.
Author: Chaozheng Li
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Author: Yong Chao
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 47
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Book Description
We consider a nonlinear pricing problem faced by a dominant firm which competes with a capacity-constrained minor firm for a downstream buyer who may purchase the product from the firms under complete information. Specifically, we analyze a three-stage game in which the dominant firm offers a general tariff first and then the minor firm responds with a per-unit price, followed by the buyer choosing her purchases. By establishing an equivalence between the subgame perfect equilibrium of our asymmetric competition game and the optimal mechanism in a “virtual” principal-agent model, we characterize the dominant firm's optimal nonlinear tariff, which exhibits convexity and yet can display quantity discounts. Our analysis provides a rationale for nonlinear pricing under competition in the absence of private information: The dominant firm can use unchosen offers to constrain its rival's possible deviations and extract more surplus from the buyer. Antitrust implications are also discussed.
Author: Daniel F. Spulber
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 64
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Book Description
Author: David Martimort
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consumers
Languages : en
Pages : 28
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Book Description
Empirical evidence suggests that consumers facing complex nonlinear pricing often make choices based on average (not marginal) prices. Given such behavior, we characterize a monopolist's optimal nonlinear price schedule. In contrast to the textbook setting, nonlinear prices designed for "average-price bias" distort consumption downward for consumers at the top, may produce efficient consumption for consumers at the bottom, and typically feature quantity premia rather than quantity discounts. These properties arise because the bias replaces consumer information rents with curvature rents. Whether or not a monopolist prefers consumers with average-price bias depends upon underlying preferences and costs.
