On the Association between Voluntary Disclosure and Earnings Management

On the Association between Voluntary Disclosure and Earnings Management PDF Author: Ron Kasznik
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 49

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Book Description
This paper investigates the association between corporate voluntary disclosure and management's discretion over accounting choices. In particular, it examines the role of earnings management in mitigating costs associated with management earnings forecast errors. The empirical results are consistent with the prediction that managers, fearing costly legal actions by shareholders and loss of reputation for credibility, use discretionary accruals to reduce their forecasting errors. Specifically, the paper documents that managers who overestimate the earnings number manage reported earnings upward, and that the extent of discretionary accruals is associated with various securities litigation cost factors and the amount of management's accounting flexibility. Having identified the role of accounting discretion in mitigating costs associated with management earnings forecast errors, the study raises the possibility that the degree of accounting discretion affects corporate voluntary disclosure policies.

On the Association between Voluntary Disclosure and Earnings Management

On the Association between Voluntary Disclosure and Earnings Management PDF Author: Ron Kasznik
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 49

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Book Description
This paper investigates the association between corporate voluntary disclosure and management's discretion over accounting choices. In particular, it examines the role of earnings management in mitigating costs associated with management earnings forecast errors. The empirical results are consistent with the prediction that managers, fearing costly legal actions by shareholders and loss of reputation for credibility, use discretionary accruals to reduce their forecasting errors. Specifically, the paper documents that managers who overestimate the earnings number manage reported earnings upward, and that the extent of discretionary accruals is associated with various securities litigation cost factors and the amount of management's accounting flexibility. Having identified the role of accounting discretion in mitigating costs associated with management earnings forecast errors, the study raises the possibility that the degree of accounting discretion affects corporate voluntary disclosure policies.

On the Association Between Corporate Voluntary Disclosure and Earnings Management

On the Association Between Corporate Voluntary Disclosure and Earnings Management PDF Author: Ron Kasznik
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 262

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Book Description


Earnings Quality

Earnings Quality PDF Author: Jennifer Francis
Publisher: Now Publishers Inc
ISBN: 1601981147
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 97

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Book Description
This review lays out a research perspective on earnings quality. We provide an overview of alternative definitions and measures of earnings quality and a discussion of research design choices encountered in earnings quality research. Throughout, we focus on a capital markets setting, as opposed, for example, to a contracting or stewardship setting. Our reason for this choice stems from the view that the capital market uses of accounting information are fundamental, in the sense of providing a basis for other uses, such as stewardship. Because resource allocations are ex ante decisions while contracting/stewardship assessments are ex post evaluations of outcomes, evidence on whether, how and to what degree earnings quality influences capital market resource allocation decisions is fundamental to understanding why and how accounting matters to investors and others, including those charged with stewardship responsibilities. Demonstrating a link between earnings quality and, for example, the costs of equity and debt capital implies a basic economic role in capital allocation decisions for accounting information; this role has only recently been documented in the accounting literature. We focus on how the precision of financial information in capturing one or more underlying valuation-relevant constructs affects the assessment and use of that information by capital market participants. We emphasize that the choice of constructs to be measured is typically contextual. Our main focus is on the precision of earnings, which we view as a summary indicator of the overall quality of financial reporting. Our intent in discussing research that evaluates the capital market effects of earnings quality is both to stimulate further research in this area and to encourage research on related topics, including, for example, the role of earnings quality in contracting and stewardship.

Voluntary Disclosure and Corporate Innovation

Voluntary Disclosure and Corporate Innovation PDF Author: Ziyao San
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
This research consists of two parts. In the first part, I examine whether a firm whose chief executive officer (CEO) is more future-oriented (as measured by commitment to voluntary disclosure practices, i.e., issuing more frequent and more disaggregated earnings forecasts) is likely to be more successful in corporate innovation investment. Using a global sample of 26,364 firms from 27 countries and a single-country sample of 8,980 firms (domiciled in the US), I find that firms with more future-oriented CEO are granted more patents and receive more citations per patent. The results of additional cross-sectional analyses indicate that the relationship between commitments to voluntary disclosure and corporate innovation varies with various CEO-, firm-, and country-level factors. In the second part of this research, I investigate the role of CEOs personality traits in corporate innovation and in the association between commitment to voluntary disclosure and corporate innovation. I find that firms with more extraverted CEOs tend to be more successful in their innovation investment in the future and that the signaling role of commitment to voluntary disclosure in corporate innovation success is more pronounced in firms with more extraverted CEOs. My findings also indicate that voluntary disclosure by more extraverted CEOs attracts more investor attention. Collectively, the results of this research support the conjecture that future-oriented CEOs are likely to commit to voluntary disclosure practices to signal their ability to manage uncertainties associated with innovation investment and thereby achieve innovation success. Additionally, such signaling tends to be driven by more extraverted CEOs. This research should be important for the investors and other stakeholders, as it shows how the likelihood of firms future innovation success can be inferred from CEOs observable earnings forecasting behavior. The findings may also be of interest to firms, as they highlight the importance of considering candidates level of extraversion when hiring a CEO. Finally, the findings of this research should be helpful to policymakers who develop initiatives to enhance firms voluntary financial disclosure, because this research highlights how the effectiveness of management earnings forecasts in signaling corporate innovation success varies with country-level institutional characteristics.

Voluntary Disclosure and Increases in Earnings

Voluntary Disclosure and Increases in Earnings PDF Author: Gregory Smith Miller
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business forecasting
Languages : en
Pages : 198

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Book Description


How do Auditors View Managers' Voluntary Disclosure Strategy? The Effect of Earnings Guidance on Audit Fees

How do Auditors View Managers' Voluntary Disclosure Strategy? The Effect of Earnings Guidance on Audit Fees PDF Author: Gopal V. Krishnan
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

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Book Description
The objective of this study is to examine the relation between attributes of earnings forecasts issued by managers and audit fees. Although there is an extensive literature on managers' disclosure of earnings forecasts, there is a paucity of research on how auditors incorporate information from these voluntary disclosures. We find that the issuance of an annual or quarterly management earnings forecast in the prior period is positively associated with the current period audit fees. Our results indicate that on average, audit fees are higher by about 7% for firm-years associated with an annual forecast. Among the firms that issue earnings forecasts, we find no association between audit fees and likelihood of updating a previously issued earnings forecast, indicating that auditors do not view such behavior negatively. Further, we find audit fees to be positively associated with the error and the bias (or optimism) in the forecasts for annual forecasts but not for quarterly forecasts. Overall, these results suggest that management's forecast behavior captures higher business risk for the auditor via greater risk of earnings management or litigation risk.

The Evolution of Corporate Disclosure

The Evolution of Corporate Disclosure PDF Author: Alessandro Ghio
Publisher: Springer Nature
ISBN: 3030422992
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 183

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Book Description
This book provides a critical analysis of the evolution of corporate disclosure. Building upon prior academic literature, it assesses the most important changes in mandatory corporate disclosure, the growing relevance of social and environmental disclosure, and revolutionary new forms of corporate communication, in particular social media. It also includes empirical analyses that shed further light on the impact of voluntary communication, i.e. social and environmental reporting and corporate social media communication, on managerial and investment decisions. Lastly, it discusses new directions for accounting and corporate governance research on the theoretical and empirical challenges of corporate disclosure. Offering a wealth of relevant and timely advice, the book will help regulators design policies that allow businesses to overcome current and emerging economic, social, and technological challenges.

Voluntary Disclosure in Corporate Control Contests--evidence of Management Earnings Forecast Characteristics and Consequences

Voluntary Disclosure in Corporate Control Contests--evidence of Management Earnings Forecast Characteristics and Consequences PDF Author: Jinqiu Yan
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

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Book Description
This dissertation examines how managerial incentives in contested takeovers affect voluntary disclosure strategies. I study characteristics of voluntary disclosure around contested takeovers, based on the conjecture that good news in earnings forecasts serves as a defensive strategy to resist a takeover and/or to negotiate a higher offer price. To gauge the relation of voluntary disclosure on takeover consequences, I examine the association between voluntary disclosure and target premiums as well as the length of time to resolve the acquisition. Using a difference-in-differences research design, I find that relative to friendly targets, target management in contested target firms alters the timing of normal information flows by forecasting more good news during the takeover. Managers also manipulate the content of information by releasing optimistically biased forecasts during the takeover to favorably influence the market. Further investigations indicate that target firms adopt voluntary disclosure and alter strategies at the time of contested takeover as a means to convey favorable inside information. The stock market responds positively to optimistic forecasts issued during the contested takeover. Moreover, voluntary disclosure influences contested takeovers by helping target firms negotiate better offers and postpone the M&A process. As a whole, this study demonstrates that target firms adopt voluntary disclosure and alter their strategies under the threat of contested takeover to reveal their true worth and enhance their bargaining power. Unlike prior literature that documents value-destroying managerial entrenchment resistance, voluntary disclosure by targets with favorable information induces information leakage and is one of the resistance tactics that potentially benefits target shareholders.

An Investigation of the Causal Effect of Voluntary Disclosure Quality on Cost of Equity Capital

An Investigation of the Causal Effect of Voluntary Disclosure Quality on Cost of Equity Capital PDF Author: Andreas Zweifel
Publisher: GRIN Verlag
ISBN: 3668410623
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 100

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Book Description
Master's Thesis from the year 2012 in the subject Economics - Finance, grade: 5.5, University of Zurich (Department of Banking and Finance), course: Economics and Finance, language: English, abstract: Does voluntary disclosure quality pay off? And if so, what are the driving forces behind the relationship of voluntary disclosure quality and the cost of equity capital? This study addresses these and other questions in the context of analyzing the determinants of the cost of equity capital for Swiss firms. The relation between voluntary disclosure quality and cost of equity capital is widely known to be affected by self-selection. Potential endogeneity bias is controlled for by adopting a two-stage least squares approach in a cross-sectional setting. Voluntary disclosure quality is proxied by the annual reports disclosure scores for a well-diversified sample of Swiss firms as developed by the Department of Banking and Finance of the University of Zurich. Further, an ex-ante cost of capital metric derived from the dividend discount model is used in this study. Empirical evidence shows that the association between voluntary disclosure quality and cost of equity differs with a firm's stock listing history. While the relation is predicted to be negative for firms at the IPO stage, it is likely reversed at some point in a firm's stock listing history. These results suggest that analysts' information processing activities negatively moderate the impact of voluntary disclosure quality on firm value. Importantly, the predicted interaction between voluntary disclosure quality and stock listing history remains significant when adjusting for endogeneity.

Three Essays on the Voluntary Disclosure and Managerial Incentive

Three Essays on the Voluntary Disclosure and Managerial Incentive PDF Author: Ling Tuo
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

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Book Description
The importance of an effective corporate communication with all stakeholders including shareholders has been extensively debated in the business literature in the aftermath of 2007-2009 global financial crisis. The key indicator of business value have shifted from accounting profits and stock market performance, formerly, to firm reputation and sustainability performance, currently. Therefore, the transparency and value-relevance of conventional financial reporting has been questioned in terms of its capability to satisfy increasing information needs of all stakeholders. Many doubt whether those traditional financial metrics derived from financial statements can appropriately capture firm & rsquo;s long-term value creation ability. In recent years, users of corporate reports are demanding more relevant financial and non-financial on key performance indicators and forward looking information above and beyond conventional financial statements. To satisfy the demands of information users and decision makers, companies are expected to not only increase their reporting transparency in conventional financial statements but also disclose more inside information to outside public through different types of voluntary disclosure. The first dissertation investigates the role of sustainability report through examining the associations among voluntary disclosure, earnings quality and audit fee. Recently more and more firms begin to release sustainability reports, one important channel of voluntary disclosure, to satisfy the needs of information users and increase the transparency of financial reporting. In this paper, I especially examine the effect of voluntary disclosure quality on those associations. Through Difference-in-Difference test, I find that the release of sustainability report is positively correlated with innate earnings quality and negatively correlated with discretionary earnings quality. Moreover, the positive (negative) correlation between sustainability report and innate (discretionary) earnings quality is more (less) pronounced when the voluntary disclosure quality is high. I also find that the release of sustainability report is associated with higher audit fees and thus it suggests that the sustainability report cannot substitute the traditional financial statement. My conclusions are robust through additional tests of OLS regressions. This paper has important political, academic and industry application. The second dissertation investigates how the firm & rsquo;s cost stickiness strategy is associated with the firm & rsquo;s management earnings forecast (MEF). I conjecture that the managerial incentive regarding the cost strategy and voluntary disclosure strategy are interdependent. When managers choose their cost management, they will also choose the corresponding management earnings forecast strategy to align their interests. Through the empirical tests with a sample between year 2005 and 2011, I find that the firm & rsquo;s level of sticky cost is positively associated with the firm & rsquo;s propensity to issue MEF and the frequency of MEF. Moreover, I find that the firm & rsquo;s level of sticky cost is associated with more good earnings news forecasted by managers. Finally, I find that the relation between cost stickiness and MEF behaviors is more pronounced when the MEF is long-horizon oriented and when the firm efficiency is high. My research builds a link between financial accounting information and managerial accounting information, and also provides new evidence to understand the managerial incentives behind each strategy chosen by managers. This third dissertation investigates how industry peer firms tend to influence the specific firm & rsquo;s voluntary disclosure strategy. Through examining the empirical example of management earnings forecast between 2005 and 2011 and implementing the 2SLS regressions, I find that the specific firm & rsquo;s disclosure frequency, disclosure horizon and the disclosure of bad news are significantly influenced by its peers firms & rsquo; disclosure behaviors. Specifically, the increase in the peers & rsquo; disclosure frequency, disclosure horizon and disclosure of bad news tend to encourage the specific firm to increase its disclosure frequency, disclosure horizon and disclosure of bad news. Moreover, certain firms (such as firms with S & P credit rating, higher profit, larger size or higher market-to-book ratio) tend to be more sensitive to their peer firms & rsquo; voluntary disclosure strategy. Finally, I find that the specific leader-follower relation doesn & rsquo;t exist in the peer effects of disclosure strategy and thus the signaling theory, litigation risk and CEO reputation are more major reasons than herding theory and free rider theory in explaining this phenomenon.