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Author: Rudolf Kerschbaumer
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Rudolf Kerschbaumer
Publisher:
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Joel S. Demski
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Karl Shell
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 548
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Author: Qi Luo
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 17
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Incentive contracts with multiple agents is a classical decentralized decision-making problem with asymmetric information. Contract design aims to incentivize noncooperative agents to act in the principal's interest over a planning horizon. We extend the single-agent incentive contract to a multiagent setting with history-dependent terminal conditions. Our contributions include: (a) Finding sufficient conditions for the existence of optimal multiagent incentive contracts and conditions under which they form a unique Nash Equilibrium; (b) Showing that the optimal multiagent incentive contracts can be solved by a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation with equilibrium constraints; (c) Proposing a backward iterative algorithm to solve the problem.
Author: Jacques Paul Lawarrée
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 418
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Author: Bernard Salanie
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262257874
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 257
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A concise introduction to the theory of contracts, emphasizing basic tools that allow the reader to understand the main theoretical models; revised and updated throughout for this edition. The theory of contracts grew out of the failure of the general equilibrium model to account for the strategic interactions among agents that arise from informational asymmetries. This popular text, revised and updated throughout for the second edition, serves as a concise and rigorous introduction to the theory of contracts for graduate students and professional economists. The book presents the main models of the theory of contracts, particularly the basic models of adverse selection, signaling, and moral hazard. It emphasizes the methods used to analyze the models, but also includes brief introductions to many of the applications in different fields of economics. The goal is to give readers the tools to understand the basic models and create their own. For the second edition, major changes have been made to chapter 3, on examples and extensions for the adverse selection model, which now includes more thorough discussions of multiprincipals, collusion, and multidimensional adverse selection, and to chapter 5, on moral hazard, with the limited liability model, career concerns, and common agency added to its topics. Two chapters have been completely rewritten: chapter 7, on the theory of incomplete contracts, and chapter 8, on the empirical literature in the theory of contracts. An appendix presents concepts of noncooperative game theory to supplement chapters 4 and 6. Exercises follow chapters 2 through 5. Praise for the previous edition: “The Economics of Contracts offers an excellent introduction to agency models. Written by one of the leading young researchers in contact theory, it is rigorous, clear, concise, and up-to-date. Researchers and students who want to learn about the economics of incentives will want to read this primer.”—Jean Tirole, Institut D'Économie Industrielle, Universite des Sciences Sociales, France “Students will find this a very useful introduction to the ideas of contract theory. Salanié has managed to summarize a large amount of material in a relatively short number of pages in a highly accessible and readable manner.”—Oliver Hart, Professor of Economics, Harvard University
Author: Seok-Young Lee
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 282
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Author: Benoit Julien
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 40
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Principals seek to trade with agents by posting incentive contracts in a search environment. A contract solves the ex ante search problem, and adverse selection and moral hazard ex post. We fully characterise the equilibrium for quasi linear preferences, and derive some comparative statics. If using appropriate transfers the equilibrium allocation is constrained welfare optimal, in contrast to the one-to-one principal-agent problem. Search frictions thus correct that inefficiency because searching requires internalizing the utility of agents. Incentives are weaker than in bilateral contracting, and agents enjoy more efficient risk sharing. With a constraint on transfers search and moral hazard interact and may induce an inefficient allocation; principal competition results in over-insurance of the agents and too little effort in equilibrium.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 492
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Author: Nabil I. Al-Najjar
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business ethics
Languages : en
Pages : 23
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