Author: H. R. McMaster
Publisher: Harper Collins
ISBN: 006203118X
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 474
Book Description
"The war in Vietnam was not lost in the field, nor was it lost on the front pages of the New York Times or the college campuses. It was lost in Washington, D.C." —H. R. McMaster (from the Conclusion) Dereliction Of Duty is a stunning analysis of how and why the United States became involved in an all-out and disastrous war in Southeast Asia. Fully and convincingly researched, based on transcripts and personal accounts of crucial meetings, confrontations and decisions, it is the only book that fully re-creates what happened and why. McMaster pinpoints the policies and decisions that got the United States into the morass and reveals who made these decisions and the motives behind them, disproving the published theories of other historians and excuses of the participants. A page-turning narrative, Dereliction Of Duty focuses on a fascinating cast of characters: President Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, General Maxwell Taylor, McGeorge Bundy and other top aides who deliberately deceived the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the U.S. Congress and the American public. McMaster’s only book, Dereliction of Duty is an explosive and authoritative new look at the controversy concerning the United States involvement in Vietnam.
Dereliction of Duty
The Lessons of Vietnam
Author: Willard Scott Thompson
Publisher: Crane Russak, Incorporated
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 320
Book Description
Publisher: Crane Russak, Incorporated
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 320
Book Description
Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam
Author: John Nagl
Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing USA
ISBN: 0313077037
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 273
Book Description
Armies are invariably accused of preparing to fight the last war. Nagl examines how armies learn during the course of conflicts for which they are initially unprepared in organization, training, and mindset. He compares the development of counterinsurgency doctrine and practice in the Malayan Emergency from 1948-1960 with that developed in the Vietnam Conflict from 1950-1975, through use of archival sources and interviews with participants in both conflicts. In examining these two events, he argues that organizational culture is the key variable in determining the success or failure of attempts to adapt to changing circumstances. Differences in organizational culture is the primary reason why the British Army learned to conduct counterinsurgency in Malaya while the American Army failed to learn in Vietnam. The American Army resisted any true attempt to learn how to fight an insurgency during the course of the Vietnam Conflict, preferring to treat the war as a conventional conflict in the tradition of the Korean War or World War II. The British Army, because of its traditional role as a colonial police force and the organizational characteristics that its history and the national culture created, was better able to quickly learn and apply the lessons of counterinsurgency during the course of the Malayan Emergency. This is the first study to apply organizational learning theory to cases in which armies were engaged in actual combat.
Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing USA
ISBN: 0313077037
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 273
Book Description
Armies are invariably accused of preparing to fight the last war. Nagl examines how armies learn during the course of conflicts for which they are initially unprepared in organization, training, and mindset. He compares the development of counterinsurgency doctrine and practice in the Malayan Emergency from 1948-1960 with that developed in the Vietnam Conflict from 1950-1975, through use of archival sources and interviews with participants in both conflicts. In examining these two events, he argues that organizational culture is the key variable in determining the success or failure of attempts to adapt to changing circumstances. Differences in organizational culture is the primary reason why the British Army learned to conduct counterinsurgency in Malaya while the American Army failed to learn in Vietnam. The American Army resisted any true attempt to learn how to fight an insurgency during the course of the Vietnam Conflict, preferring to treat the war as a conventional conflict in the tradition of the Korean War or World War II. The British Army, because of its traditional role as a colonial police force and the organizational characteristics that its history and the national culture created, was better able to quickly learn and apply the lessons of counterinsurgency during the course of the Malayan Emergency. This is the first study to apply organizational learning theory to cases in which armies were engaged in actual combat.
The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76
Author: Robert A. Doughty
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Military art and science
Languages : en
Pages : 68
Book Description
This paper focuses on the formulation of doctrine since World War II. In no comparable period in history have the dimensions of the battlefield been so altered by rapid technological changes. The need for the tactical doctrines of the Army to remain correspondingly abreast of these changes is thus more pressing than ever before. Future conflicts are not likely to develop in the leisurely fashions of the past where tactical doctrines could be refined on the battlefield itself. It is, therefore, imperative that we apprehend future problems with as much accuracy as possible. One means of doing so is to pay particular attention to the business of how the Army's doctrine has developed historically, with a view to improving methods of future development.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Military art and science
Languages : en
Pages : 68
Book Description
This paper focuses on the formulation of doctrine since World War II. In no comparable period in history have the dimensions of the battlefield been so altered by rapid technological changes. The need for the tactical doctrines of the Army to remain correspondingly abreast of these changes is thus more pressing than ever before. Future conflicts are not likely to develop in the leisurely fashions of the past where tactical doctrines could be refined on the battlefield itself. It is, therefore, imperative that we apprehend future problems with as much accuracy as possible. One means of doing so is to pay particular attention to the business of how the Army's doctrine has developed historically, with a view to improving methods of future development.
The US Air Force after Vietnam : postwar challenges and potential for responses
Author: Donald J. Mrozek
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1428993347
Category : Public opinion
Languages : en
Pages : 142
Book Description
This book probes various groups of Americans as they come to grips with the consequences of the Vietnam War. Dr. Mrozek examines several areas of concern facing the United States Air Force, and the other services in varying degrees, in the years after Vietnam.
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1428993347
Category : Public opinion
Languages : en
Pages : 142
Book Description
This book probes various groups of Americans as they come to grips with the consequences of the Vietnam War. Dr. Mrozek examines several areas of concern facing the United States Air Force, and the other services in varying degrees, in the years after Vietnam.
Technical Abstract Bulletin
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 850
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 850
Book Description
Learning to Forget
Author: David Fitzgerald
Publisher: Stanford University Press
ISBN: 0804786429
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 298
Book Description
Learning to Forget analyzes the evolution of US counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine over the last five decades. Beginning with an extensive section on the lessons of Vietnam, it traces the decline of COIN in the 1970s, then the rebirth of low intensity conflict through the Reagan years, in the conflict in Bosnia, and finally in the campaigns of Iraq and Afghanistan. Ultimately it closes the loop by explaining how, by confronting the lessons of Vietnam, the US Army found a way out of those most recent wars. In the process it provides an illustration of how military leaders make use of history and demonstrates the difficulties of drawing lessons from the past that can usefully be applied to contemporary circumstances. The book outlines how the construction of lessons is tied to the construction of historical memory and demonstrates how histories are constructed to serve the needs of the present. In so doing, it creates a new theory of doctrinal development.
Publisher: Stanford University Press
ISBN: 0804786429
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 298
Book Description
Learning to Forget analyzes the evolution of US counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine over the last five decades. Beginning with an extensive section on the lessons of Vietnam, it traces the decline of COIN in the 1970s, then the rebirth of low intensity conflict through the Reagan years, in the conflict in Bosnia, and finally in the campaigns of Iraq and Afghanistan. Ultimately it closes the loop by explaining how, by confronting the lessons of Vietnam, the US Army found a way out of those most recent wars. In the process it provides an illustration of how military leaders make use of history and demonstrates the difficulties of drawing lessons from the past that can usefully be applied to contemporary circumstances. The book outlines how the construction of lessons is tied to the construction of historical memory and demonstrates how histories are constructed to serve the needs of the present. In so doing, it creates a new theory of doctrinal development.
Lessons from the Vietnam War
Author: Leonard M. Scruggs
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781886057951
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
In Lessons from the Vietnam War: Truths the Media Never Told You, decorated Vietnam veteran Leonard M. Scruggs tells the gripping and ultimately tragic story of America's military involvement in Southeast Asia from 1960 to its heartbreaking conclusion in 1975.
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781886057951
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
In Lessons from the Vietnam War: Truths the Media Never Told You, decorated Vietnam veteran Leonard M. Scruggs tells the gripping and ultimately tragic story of America's military involvement in Southeast Asia from 1960 to its heartbreaking conclusion in 1975.
The U.S. Army Infantryman Vietnam Pocket Manual
Author: Chris McNab
Publisher: Casemate
ISBN: 1636240313
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 161
Book Description
Pocket manuals bring together a wealth of information from a wide variety of training manuals and tactical documents. Between 1964 and 1975, 2.6 million American personnel served within the borders of South Vietnam during the Vietnam War, of whom an estimated 1–1.6 million actually fought in combat. At the tip of the spear was the infantry, the "grunts" who entered an extraordinary tropical combat zone completely alien to the world they had left behind in the United States. In South Vietnam, and occasionally spilling over into neighboring Laos and Cambodia, they fought a relentless counterinsurgency and conventional war against the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Viet Cong (VC). The terrain was as challenging as the enemy – soaring mountains or jungle-choked valleys; bleached, sandy coastal zones; major urban centers; riverine districts. Their opponents fought them with relentless and terrible ingenuity with ambushes, booby traps, and mines, then occasionally with full-force offensives on a scale to rival the campaigns of World War II. This pocket manual draws its content not only from essential U.S. military field manuals of the Vietnam era, but also a vast collection of declassified primary documents, including rare after-action reports, intelligence analysis, firsthand accounts, and combat studies. Through these documents the pocket manual provides a deep insight into what it was like for infantry to live, survive, and fight in Vietnam, whether conducting a major airmobile search-and-destroy operation or conducting endless hot and humid small-unit patrols from jungle firebases. The book includes infantry intelligence documents about the NVA and VC threats, plus chapters explaining hard-won lessons about using weaponry, surviving and moving through the jungle, tactical maneuvers, and applications of the ubiquitous helicopter for combat and support.
Publisher: Casemate
ISBN: 1636240313
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 161
Book Description
Pocket manuals bring together a wealth of information from a wide variety of training manuals and tactical documents. Between 1964 and 1975, 2.6 million American personnel served within the borders of South Vietnam during the Vietnam War, of whom an estimated 1–1.6 million actually fought in combat. At the tip of the spear was the infantry, the "grunts" who entered an extraordinary tropical combat zone completely alien to the world they had left behind in the United States. In South Vietnam, and occasionally spilling over into neighboring Laos and Cambodia, they fought a relentless counterinsurgency and conventional war against the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Viet Cong (VC). The terrain was as challenging as the enemy – soaring mountains or jungle-choked valleys; bleached, sandy coastal zones; major urban centers; riverine districts. Their opponents fought them with relentless and terrible ingenuity with ambushes, booby traps, and mines, then occasionally with full-force offensives on a scale to rival the campaigns of World War II. This pocket manual draws its content not only from essential U.S. military field manuals of the Vietnam era, but also a vast collection of declassified primary documents, including rare after-action reports, intelligence analysis, firsthand accounts, and combat studies. Through these documents the pocket manual provides a deep insight into what it was like for infantry to live, survive, and fight in Vietnam, whether conducting a major airmobile search-and-destroy operation or conducting endless hot and humid small-unit patrols from jungle firebases. The book includes infantry intelligence documents about the NVA and VC threats, plus chapters explaining hard-won lessons about using weaponry, surviving and moving through the jungle, tactical maneuvers, and applications of the ubiquitous helicopter for combat and support.
Annual Department of Defense Bibliography of Logistics Studies and Related Documents
Author: United States. Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Military research
Languages : en
Pages : 584
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Military research
Languages : en
Pages : 584
Book Description