J. M. Keynes, Like Benoit Mandelbrot, Was Right. They (Econometricians, Statisticians) Do Not Know What They Are Doing PDF Download
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Author: Michael Emmett Brady
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Languages : en
Pages : 0
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S. Stigler's University of Chicago view of J M Keynes's A Treatise on Probability, that only its literary style recommends it to a potential reader, is based entirely on a completely worthless book review written by Ronald Fisher in 1923. However, Stigler is an excellent example of a profession that has lost its way by conflating, like Jerry Bentham and Frank Ramsey did before him, rationality with adherence to the strictly mathematical laws of the calculus of probability. Stigler, like Fisher before him, overlooked that Keynes's A Treatise on Probability (1921) was constantly being monitored, while Keynes was writing it, by the most illustrious names in the fields of philosophy and mathematical logic at the beginning of the 20th century, namely J Nevile Keynes, Bertrand Russell, Alfred North Whitehead, William Ernest Johnson, and CD Broad. Of course, everyone, except Broad and Edgeworth, overlooked the seminal role of George Boole, upon whose work in Chapters 16-21 of The Laws of Thought (1854) Keynes built the foundation for his logical theory of probability using interval valued probabilities. None of Stigler's conclusions, as regards his evaluation of Keynes's A Treatise on Probability, make any sense.
Author: Michael Emmett Brady
Publisher:
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Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
S. Stigler's University of Chicago view of J M Keynes's A Treatise on Probability, that only its literary style recommends it to a potential reader, is based entirely on a completely worthless book review written by Ronald Fisher in 1923. However, Stigler is an excellent example of a profession that has lost its way by conflating, like Jerry Bentham and Frank Ramsey did before him, rationality with adherence to the strictly mathematical laws of the calculus of probability. Stigler, like Fisher before him, overlooked that Keynes's A Treatise on Probability (1921) was constantly being monitored, while Keynes was writing it, by the most illustrious names in the fields of philosophy and mathematical logic at the beginning of the 20th century, namely J Nevile Keynes, Bertrand Russell, Alfred North Whitehead, William Ernest Johnson, and CD Broad. Of course, everyone, except Broad and Edgeworth, overlooked the seminal role of George Boole, upon whose work in Chapters 16-21 of The Laws of Thought (1854) Keynes built the foundation for his logical theory of probability using interval valued probabilities. None of Stigler's conclusions, as regards his evaluation of Keynes's A Treatise on Probability, make any sense.
Author: Michael Brady
Publisher: Xlibris Corporation
ISBN: 1524544892
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 179
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Book Description
The standard view of the economics profession is that Keynes was a brilliant, intuitive, nonrigorous innovator. These essays show that Keynes backed up his intuitions with a rigorous mathematical and logical supporting analysis, which has been overlooked.
Author: John Maynard Keynes
Publisher: Cosimo, Inc.
ISBN: 1602066965
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 485
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Book Description
There is, first of all, the distinction between that part of our belief which is rational and that part which is not. If a man believes something for a reason which is preposterous or for no reason at all, and what he believes turns out to be true for some reason not known to him, he cannot be said to believe it rationally, although he believes it and it is in fact true. On the other hand, a man may rationally believe a proposition to be probable, when it is in fact false. -from Chapter II: Probability in Relation to the Theory of Knowledge" His fame as an economist aside, John Maynard Keynes may be best remembered for saying, "In the long run, we are all dead." That phrase may well be the most succinct expression of the theory of probability every uttered. For a longer explanation of the premise that underlies much of modern mathematics and science, Keynes's A Treatise on Probability is essential reading. First published in 1920, this is the foundational work of probability theory, which helped establish the author's enormous influence on modern economic and even political theories. Exploring aspects of randomness and chance, inductive reasoning and logical statistics, this is a work that belongs in the library of any interested in numbers and their application in the real world. AUTHOR BIO: British economist JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES (1883-1946) also wrote The Economic Consequences of the Peace (1919), The End of Laissez-Faire (1926), The Means to Prosperity (1933), and General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936).
Author: Michael Emmett Brady
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Over the course of their professional lives, Henry E. Kyburg, Isaac Levi, and Jochen Runde have maintained the claim that J M Keynes's contributions to probability and decision theory were of a comparative, qualitative nature only. They maintained that J M Keynes had some interesting, but undeveloped ideas, hints, suggestions, and intuitions about the structure of his logical approach to probability. They assert that he made some progress in clearing the way for later researchers who would then create the interval estimate approach to probability that he did not. They claimed that Keynes himself had never provided any detailed, formal mathematical structure at any time in his life to support his intuitions and brilliant ideas. It is a rather simple task to demonstrate that these claims are false by pointing out that there are 17 worked out problems provided by J M Keynes in chapters 15 and 17 of his A Treatise on Probability (1921,TP), as well as the applications of interval estimates used by Keynes in chapters 20, 22, and 26 of the TP, that show beyond any doubt that J M Keynes had created the first explicit interval estimate approach to probability in history. George Boole was the first to work out the mechanics of an interval estimate approach. However, Keynes was the first to emphasize the application and importance of such an approach in applied areas like decision theory. I have chosen Kyburg, Runde ,and Levi because they are representative of how academics in the fields of philosophy and economics handle Keynes's TP. It must be noted here that Kyburg , Levi, and Runde have an understanding of Keynes's A Treatise on Probability that is superior to that of any statistician or mathematician with the exception of Hailperin (1986) .My disagreement with Kyburg, Levi, and Runde is that they have failed to adequately complete the job of correctly identifying Keynes's theory because they restricted their analysis to basically one chapter of the TP, chapter III. The worst treatment of the TP comes at the hands of statisticians. This is due to their commitment to the assertion that all probabilities must be precise, single number answers. NO statistician who reviewed the TP had any inkling of the case Keynes was making.
Author: Henry Hazlitt
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 1786258633
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 663
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Book Description
First published in 1959, this is a line-by-line commentary and refutation of one of the most destructive, fallacious, and convoluted books of the century: John Maynard Keynes’s General Theory, published in 1936. In economic science, Keynes changed everything. He supposedly demonstrated that prices don’t work, that private investment is unstable, that sound money is intolerable, and that government was needed to shore up the system and save it. It was simply astonishing how economists the world over put up with this, but it happened. He converted a whole generation in the late period of the Great Depression. By the 1950s, almost everyone was Keynesian. However, Hazlitt, the nation’s economics teacher, would have none of it. And he did the hard work of actually going through the book to evaluate its logic according to Austrian-style logical reasoning. “Hazlitt’s fine critique of Keynes is a worthy complement to Mises’ Human Action. Henry Hazlitt, a renowned economic journalist, is a better economist than a whole host of sterile academicians, and, in contrast to many of them, he is distinguished by courage: the courage to remain an “Austrian” in the teeth of the Keynesian holocaust, alongside Mises and F. A. Hayek. On its merits, this book should conquer the economics profession as rapidly as did Keynes. But whether the currently fashionable economists read and digest The Failure of the “New Economics” or not is, in the long run, immaterial: it will be read and it will destroy the Keynesian System.”—Murray Rothbard
Author: Henry Hazlitt
Publisher: Ludwig von Mises Institute
ISBN: 1610164504
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 473
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Book Description
Author: Anatol Murad
Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield
ISBN: 9780808403203
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 228
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Book Description
The principal ideas and theories of John Maynard Keynes are discusses as the significance of his contribution to economics and pointing out inconsistencies and contradictions in his theories.
Author: Warren Young
Publisher: Springer Nature
ISBN: 3030913422
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 168
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Book Description
This book examines the origins of the IS-LM model, one of the most significant innovations in the history of economic thought. It shows that the complete IS-LM model, including the equations and diagram, was produced by a group of economists who contributed their respective mathematical models of Keynes’s General Theory, including Champernowne, Reddaway, Harrod, and Meade, not to mention Hicks. Furthermore, the book discusses the implications of newly discovered archival material, including a previously overlooked document showing that John Maynard Keynes himself was the first to present the IS-LM model equations in a lecture he gave on December 4, 1933. It focuses on the implications of this material in terms of understanding the evolution of Keynes’s approach from 1933 to 1937, later interpreters of his General Theory, and the ongoing debate between Keynesians and Post-Keynesians on the nature of his system. Given the revelations it presents, this book will transform the profession’s understanding of the origins of the IS-LM model and modern macroeconomics.
Author: John Maynard Keynes
Publisher: Irvington Publishers
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 64
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Author: John Keynes
Publisher: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
ISBN: 9781505480481
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 550
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Book Description
The subject matter of this book was first broached in the brain of Leibniz, who, in the dissertation, written in his twenty-third year, on the mode of electing the kings of Poland, conceived of Probability as a branch of Logic. A few years before, "un probl�me," in the words of Poisson, "propos� � un aust�re jans�niste par un homme du monde, a �t� l''origine du calcul des probabiliti�s." In the intervening centuries the algebraical exercises, in which the Chevalier de la M�r� interested Pascal, have so far predominated in the learned world over the profounder enquiries of the philosopher into those processes of human faculty which, by determining reasonable preference, guide our choice, that Probability is oftener reckoned with Mathematics than with Logic. There is much here, therefore, which is novel and, being novel, unsifted, inaccurate, or deficient. I propound my systematic conception of this subject for criticism and enlargement at the hand of others, doubtful whether I myself am likely to get much further, by waiting longer, with a work, which, beginning as a Fellowship Dissertation, and interrupted by the war, has already extended over many years.It may be perceived that I have been much influenced by W. E. Johnson, G. E. Moore, and Bertrand Russell, that is to say by Cambridge, which, with great debts to the writers of Continental Europe, yet continues in direct succession the English tradition of Locke and Berkeley and Hume, of Mill and Sidgwick, who, in spite of their divergences of doctrine, are united in a preference for what is matter of fact, and have conceived their subject as a branch rather of science than of the creative imagination, prose writers, hoping to be understood.J. M. KEYNES.King''s College, Cambridge"J''ai dit plus d''une fois qu''il faudrait une nouvelle esp�ce de logique, qui traiteroit des degr�s de Probabilit�."-Leibniz.1. Part of our knowledge we obtain direct; and part by argument. The Theory of Probability is concerned with that part which we obtain by argument, and it treats of the different degrees in which the results so obtained are conclusive or inconclusive. In most branches of academic logic, such as the theory of the syllogism or the geometry of ideal space, all the arguments aim at demonstrative certainty. They claim to be conclusive. But many other arguments are rational and claim some weight without pretending to be certain. In Metaphysics, in Science, and in Conduct, most of the arguments, upon which we habitually base our rational beliefs, are admitted to be inconclusive in a greater or less degree. Thus for a philosophical treatment of these branches of knowledge, the study of probability is required.The course which the history of thought has led Logic to follow has encouraged the view that doubtful arguments are not within its scope. But in the actual exercise of reason we do not wait on certainty, or doom it irrational to depend on a doubtful argument. If logic investigates the general principles of valid thought, the study of arguments, to which it is rational to attach some weight, is as much a part of it as the study of those which are demonstrative.2. The terms certain and probable describe the various degrees of rational belief about a proposition which different amounts of knowledge authorise us to entertain. All propositions are true or false, but the knowledge we have of them depends on our circumstances; and while it is often convenient to speak of propositions as certain or probable, this expresses strictly a relationship in which they stand to a corpus of knowledge, actual or hypothetical, and not a characteristic of the propositions in themselves. A proposition is capable at the same time of varying degrees of this relationship, depending upon the knowledge to which it is related, so that it is without significance to call a proposition probable unless we specify the knowledge to which we are relating it.
