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Author: Hanming Fang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Bidders' risk attitudes have key implications for choices of revenue-maximizing auction formats. In ascending auctions, bid distributions do not provide information about risk preference. We infer risk attitudes using distributions of transaction prices and participation decisions in ascending auctions with entry costs. Nonparametric tests are proposed for two distinct scenarios: first, the expected entry cost can be consistently estimated from data; second, the data does not report entry costs but contains exogenous variations of potential competition and auction characteristics. In the first scenario, we exploit the fact that the risk premium required for entry - the difference between ex ante expected profits from entry and the certainty equivalent - is strictly positive if and only if bidders are risk averse. Our test is based on identification of bidders' ex ante profits. In the second scenario, our test builds on the fact that risk attitudes affect how equilibrium entry probabilities vary with observed auction characteristics and potential competition. We also show identification of risk attitudes in a more general model of ascending auctions with selective entry, where bidders receive entry-stage signals that are correlated with private values.
Author: Hanming Fang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Bidders' risk attitudes have key implications for choices of revenue-maximizing auction formats. In ascending auctions, bid distributions do not provide information about risk preference. We infer risk attitudes using distributions of transaction prices and participation decisions in ascending auctions with entry costs. Nonparametric tests are proposed for two distinct scenarios: first, the expected entry cost can be consistently estimated from data; second, the data does not report entry costs but contains exogenous variations of potential competition and auction characteristics. In the first scenario, we exploit the fact that the risk premium required for entry - the difference between ex ante expected profits from entry and the certainty equivalent - is strictly positive if and only if bidders are risk averse. Our test is based on identification of bidders' ex ante profits. In the second scenario, our test builds on the fact that risk attitudes affect how equilibrium entry probabilities vary with observed auction characteristics and potential competition. We also show identification of risk attitudes in a more general model of ascending auctions with selective entry, where bidders receive entry-stage signals that are correlated with private values.
Author: Hanming Fang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 218
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Book Description
The first chapter studies identification and estimation of first-price auctions if the bidders face ambiguity about the distribution of valuations. Ambiguity is modeled using Gilboa and Schmeidler's (1989) Maxmin Expected Utility preferences. We exploit variation in the number of bidders to identify the essential primitives of the model. The identification result yields a closed form for the inverse bid function, which suggests a two-step estimation procedure. We study asymptotic and finite sample properties of the estimators. We find evidence of ambiguity in USFS timber auctions which leads to aggressive bidding for bidders with high valuations and has important implications for auction design. The second chapter proposes a procedure to test restrictions on infinite-dimensional parameters (partially) identified by unconditional or conditional moment equalities. Our new method allows us to test restrictions involving a continuum of inequalities. Examples of such restrictions include weakly increasing, concavity and first-order stochastic dominance. We show that our testing procedure controls size uniformly and has power approaching 1 against fixed alternatives. We conduct Monte Carlo Experiments to study the finite sample properties of our procedure. The third chapter studies the inference problem of bidders' risk attitudes in Independent Private Value (IPV) first-price auctions with multiplicative auction-level unobserved heterogeneity. Bidders are assumed to have Constant Relative Risk Aversion. Under the exclusion restriction that bidders randomly select themselves into auctions given the auction-level unobserved heterogeneity, bidders' CRRA coefficient is point-identified from bid data of auctions with at least two different number of active bidders. Our exclusion restriction is consistent with a variety of models with endogenous entry. Empirical application to USFS timber auctions shows that we will conclude that timber firms are risk averse if we ignoring the unobserved heterogeneity. But once we take the unobserved heterogeneity into account, risk neutrality is consistent with the data.
Author: Xiaohong Chen
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Author: Hashimzade, Nigar
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 1788976487
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 672
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Book Description
Written in a comprehensive yet accessible style, this Handbook introduces readers to a range of modern empirical methods with applications in microeconomics, illustrating how to use two of the most popular software packages, Stata and R, in microeconometric applications.
Author: Xiaoyong Zheng
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 406
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Book Description
Author: Flávio Marques Menezes
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 32
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Book Description
In this paper, we study an auction where bidders only know the number of potential applicants. After seeing their values for the object, bidders decide whether or not to enter the auction. Players may not want to enter the auction since they have to pay participation costs. We characterize the optimal bidding strategies for both first- and second- price sealed-bid auction when participation is endogenous. We show that only bidders with values greater than a certain cut-off point will bid in these auctions. In this context, both auctions generate the same expected revenue. We also show that, contrarily to the predictions of the fixed-n literature, the seller's expected revenue may decrease when the number of potential participants increases. In addition, we show that it is optimal for the seller to charge an entry fee, which contrasts greatly with results from the existing literature on auctions with entry.
Author: Xing Lou
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Ascending auctions with buy prices are very popular on online auctions. By having a buy price in an ascending auction, the seller is actually offering risk averse bidders a chance to buy an insurance. The first bidder who call the buy price can get the insurance and hence secure his winning. During the auction, as the price increases incrementally, the premium becomes cheaper and bidders become more interested in buying this insurance. Because some trade-off can be made between the risk neutral seller and risk averse bidders, the seller can achieve a higher expected revenue than in a standard ascending auction. We are also able to solve the equilibrium under very general assumptions by using Revenue Equivalence Theorem.
Author: Paul Milgrom
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1139449168
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 378
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Book Description
This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
Author: Ali Hortaçsu
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 0691251002
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 281
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Book Description
A concise and rigorous introduction to widely used approaches in structural econometric modeling Structural econometric modeling specifies the structure of an economic model and estimates the model’s parameters from real-world data. Structural econometric modeling enables better economic theory–based predictions and policy counterfactuals. This book offers a primer on recent developments in these modeling techniques, which are used widely in empirical industrial organization, quantitative marketing, and related fields. It covers such topics as discrete choice modeling, demand modes, estimation of the firm entry models with strategic interactions, consumer search, and theory/empirics of auctions. The book makes highly technical material accessible to graduate students, describing key insights succinctly but without sacrificing rigor. • Concise overview of the most widely used structural econometric models • Rigorous and systematic treatment of the topics, emphasizing key insights • Coverage of demand estimation, estimation of static and dynamic game theoretic models, consumer search, and auctions • Focus on econometric models while providing concise reviews of relevant theoretical models
