Incentive Schemes with Multiple Agents and Bankruptcy Constraints PDF Download
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Author: Joel S. Demski
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Joel S. Demski
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Rudolf Kerschbaumer
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Pascal Courty
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Incentive awards
Languages : en
Pages : 48
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Author: Eirik Grundtvig Furubotn
Publisher: Mohr Siebeck
ISBN: 9783161457647
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 394
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Book Description
Author: Peter Ove Christensen
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 0387265996
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 675
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Book Description
This book provides an integrated, technical exposition of key concepts in agency theory, with particular emphasis on analyses of the economic consequences of the characteristics of contractible performance measures, such as accounting reports. It provides a succinct source for learning the fundamentals of the economics of incentives. It will appeal to accounting researchers as well as those in other disciplines who are interested in the economics of management incentives.
Author: Massimo Marrelli
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 1461515831
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 212
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Book Description
The problems arising from the existence of asymmetric information in public decision making have been widely explored by economists. Most of the traditional analysis of public sector activities has been reviewed to take accountofthe possible distortions arising from an asymmetric distribution of relevant information among the actors of the public decision-making process. A normative approach has been developed to design incentive schemes which tackle adverse selection and moral hazard problems within public organisations: our understanding of these problems is now much better, and some of the mechanisms designed have had important practical implications. While this analysis is still under way in many fields of public economics, as the papers by Jones and Zanola, and Trimarchi witness, a debate is ongoing on the possible theoretical limitations ofthis approach and on its actual relevance for public sector activities. This book encompasses different contributions to these issues, on both theoretical and practical areas, which were firstly presented at a conference in Catania. The innermost problem in the current discussion arises from the fact that this normative analysis is firmly rooted in the complete contracting framework, with the consequence that, despite the analytical complexities of most models, their results rely on very simplified assumptions. Most complexities of the organisation of public sector, and more generally, of writing "contracts", are therefore swept away.
Author: Richard Schmalensee
Publisher: Elsevier
ISBN: 0444824359
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 943
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Book Description
Annotation This is Vol 3 of the Handbook of Industrial Organization series (HIO). Vols 1 & 2 published simultaneously in 1989 under the editorship of Richard Schmalensee and Robert Willig. Many of the chapters in these successful volumes were widely cited and appeared on graduate reading lists, and some continue to appear even recently. Since the first volumes published, the field of industrial organization has continued to evolve. As the editors acknowledge in the Preface, these volumes had some gaps and this new volume aims to fill some of those gaps. The aim is to serve as a source, reference and teaching supplement for industrial organization, or industrial economics, the microeconomics field that focuses on business behavior and its implications for both market structures and processes, and for related public policies. The first two volumes of the HIO appeared at roughly the same time as Jean Tirole's book The Theory of Industrial Organization. Together they helped revolutionize the teaching of industrial organization, and provided a state-of-the-art summary. Tirole's book is concerned with the relevant theory, and several reviewers noted that the first two volumes of HIO contained much more discussion of the theoretical literature than of the empirical literature. In most respects, this imbalance was an accurate reflection of the field. Since then, the empirical literature has flourished, while the theoretical literature has continued to grow, and this new volume reflects that change of emphasis. *Part of the renown Handbooks in Economics series *Chapters are contributed by some of the leading experts in their fields. *A source, reference and teaching supplement for industrial organizations, or industrial economicists.
Author: Jacques Paul Lawarrée
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 418
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Author: Mark J. Ready
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 408
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Author: Joshua Ronen
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 0387257713
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 587
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Book Description
This book is a study of earnings management, aimed at scholars and professionals in accounting, finance, economics, and law. The authors address research questions including: Why are earnings so important that firms feel compelled to manipulate them? What set of circumstances will induce earnings management? How will the interaction among management, boards of directors, investors, employees, suppliers, customers and regulators affect earnings management? How to design empirical research addressing earnings management? What are the limitations and strengths of current empirical models?
