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Author: Susan Pickard Ravenscroft
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Bonuses (Employee fringe benefits)
Languages : en
Pages : 356
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Author: Susan Pickard Ravenscroft
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Bonuses (Employee fringe benefits)
Languages : en
Pages : 356
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Author: Hideshi Itō
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Incentives in industry
Languages : en
Pages : 50
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This paper concerns moral hazard problems in multi-agent situations where cooperation is an issue. Each agent chooses his own effort, which improves stochastically the outcome of his own job. Agents also choose the amount of 'help' to extend to other agents, which improves the performance of other agents. By selecting appropriate compensation schemes, the principal can design the task structure of the firm: The principal may prefer an unambiguous division labor, where each agent is inclined not to help other agents and specializes in his own job. Or the principal may prefer teamwork where each agent is motivated to help other agents. The analysis identifies two important determinants in choosing the optimal task structure; the effect of 'interpersonal interaction' and the attitude of the agents in providing 'small' amounts of help.
Author: Omar Ahmed Nayeem
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 334
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This dissertation comprises three papers, each of which analyzes a mechanism design issue that arises in a setting with multiple agents that need to either acquire or aggregate information for use in a decision. The decision affects all agents as well as a principal, who also plays the role of mechanism designer. The theoretical models that I develop in these papers can be applied to a wide range of diverse settings, but I emphasize applications in the areas of organizational economics and political economics. The first paper, titled ``The Value of `Useless' Bosses, '' presents a novel view of the role of middle managers in organizations. Conventional wisdom regarding middle management suggests that a principal that can administer her organization independently has no reason to hire a manager, and that a principal that can benefit from a manager's services should hire one with aligned interests. The paper highlights a channel through which virtually any principal can benefit from the services of a manager, particularly of one whose interests differ. Specifically, when a principal relies on a worker to acquire information for an organizational decision, she can strengthen the worker's incentives by delegating the decision to a ``biased'' manager. Although casual observation of the game suggests that the manager's position is redundant, delegation benefits the principal. Thus, the paper helps to reconcile the prevalence of middle management with its widespread lamentation. It also illustrates how discord between a manager and a worker can improve an organization's performance. The results are consistent with outcomes from various knowledge-based organizations. The second paper, titled ``Communication and Preference (Mis)alignment in Organizations, '' conveys insights that are similar to the ones from ``The Value of `Useless' Bosses.'' Like the previous paper, this one explains the benefits of biased agents (both workers and managers) in organizations. However, unlike the previous paper, this one assumes that an organization's principal--whose time, technical expertise, and attention are limited--relies upon division managers to produce reports, which summarize information acquired by workers, to inform her decisions. Given this assumption, a pressing question for the principal is not whether to appoint a manager, but rather which type of manager to appoint. Note that two types of agency problems can arise in the setting described above. First, workers that bear private costs for their information acquisition efforts may not exert as much effort as the principal would like. Second, managers that do not share the principal's preferences over decisions can produce false reports. The paper shows that, although preference alignment within the organization may be expected to minimize the principal's losses from agency, the principal may benefit from intraorganizational conflict. In particular, the principal can use a manager's bias to strengthen a worker's incentives to acquire information. Since a manager's incentive to mislead the principal vanishes if the acquired information is of sufficiently high quality, the principal realizes an unambiguous welfare gain by hiring a biased manager. The principal can further enhance her welfare by also hiring a biased worker, whose bias clashes with the manager's. The third paper, titled ``Efficient Electorates, '' analyzes a social choice setting with pure common values, private noisy information about an unobservable payoff-relevant state of the world, and costless voting. In such a setting, an economic argument in favor of direct democracy is essentially one about information aggregation: if all citizens vote according to their private information--which, on average, is correct--then, in large majority-rule elections, the probability that the welfare-maximizing outcome is implemented is close to one. This argument, formalized first by the Marquis de Condorcet in his celebrated ``jury theorem'' and later extended to cover more general environments, is an asymptotic result that requires voters' information to be sufficiently uncorrelated. The paper shows that, for a fixed number of sincere voters with shared information sources, direct democracy is often suboptimal. It then considers the problem of appointing an optimal electorate given the allocation of information. In special cases of this framework, the problem can be viewed as the choice of an electorate from a set of individuals that communicate with each other via a social network before the election. It provides a characterization of the optimal electorate for certain classes of networks. Because the optimal electorate is often a proper subset of the full set of agents, representative democracy--even in the absence of voting costs--is often more efficient than direct democracy. As the paper illustrates through various examples, though, the solution to the problem of optimal elector appointment is unstable, and so a general characterization of the optimal electorate is elusive.
Author: Merle Ederhof
Publisher: Now Publishers Inc
ISBN: 1601984545
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 86
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Book Description
Discretion in Managerial Bonus Pools synthesizes and integrates a growing literature that has emerged over the past 10-15 years on the use of both objective and subjective performance indicators in managerial incentive plans. The authors examine the structure of efficient bonus pools (fixed payment schemes) in the presence of subjective performance indicators. The analysis covers a range of scenarios including single- and multi-agent settings, the interplay of objective and subjective indicators and short-term as opposed to long-term contracting relations. To synthesize the existing research, the authors frame their exposition around five recurring themes which collectively speak to the structure and the efficiency of incentive schemes based on subjective information i. Value of Subjective Performance Indicators. ii. Incremental Agency Cost. iii.Compression of Optimal Incentive Contracts. iv. Optimality of Proper Bonus Pools. v. Value of Multiperiod Contracting
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Dissertation abstracts
Languages : en
Pages : 760
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Author: Michal Pechoucek
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 3540317317
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 684
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Book Description
The aim of the CEEMAS conference series is to provide a biennial forum for the presentation of multi-agent research and development results. With its p- ticular geographicalorientation towards Central and Eastern Europe, CEEMAS has become an internationally recognised event with participants from all over the world. After the successful CEEMAS conferences in St. Petersburg (1999), Cracow (2001) and Prague (2003), the 2005 CEEMAS conference takes place in Budapest. The programme committee of the conference series consists of est- lished researchers from the region and renowned international colleagues, sh- ing the prominent rank of CEEMAS among the leading events in multi-agent systems. In the very competitive ?eld of agent oriented conferences and workshops nowadays(suchasAAMAS,WI/IAT,EUMAS,CIA,MATES)thespecialpro?le of CEEMAS is that it is trying to bridge the gap between applied research achievements and theoretical research activities. Our ambition is to provide a forum for presenting theoretical research with an evident application potential, implemented application prototypes and their properties, as well as industrial case studies of successful (but also unsuccessful) agent technology deployments. This is why the CEEMAS proceedings volume provides a collection of research and application papers. The technical research paper section of the proceedings (see pages 11–499) contains pure research papers as well as research results in application settings while the application papers section (see pages 500–530) contains papers focused on application aspects. The goal is to demonstrate the real life value and commercial reality of multi-agent systems as well as to foster communication between academia and industry in this ?eld.
Author: Catherine Ragasa
Publisher: Intl Food Policy Res Inst
ISBN:
Category : Social Science
Languages : en
Pages : 60
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Book Description
Agricultural extension is critical for agricultural growth and food security, but making the extension system effective, demand driven, and responsive to the needs of a diverse set of producers remains a challenge. As part of the institutional reforms in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the extension system is being reviewed to identify strategies and practical actions to transform the system to better respond to the knowledge needs in a rapidly changing agriculture and food sector. This paper provides an in-depth review of the agricultural extension system of DRC including an analysis of its policies and legal framework, organization, and management; links to critical institutions; and capacity and incentive of different actors in the system. This review involved document analyses, interviews with key informants, and surveys of 107 extension organizations and 162 extension agents in 156 randomly selected villages in western DRC. This review suggests serious funding constraints, human resource management problems, no linkage and coordination within the extension system and with research and education systems, and a majority of underserved communities and farmers. This review also highlights a good opportunity given the huge human resources (more than 11,000 agents) deployed into the sectors and territories as part of the Ministrys agricultural inspection system. However, their mandate is not clear and they currently focus on data collection (census) and checking what farmers do and limited in extension and advisory work. This review highlights the urgent need for human resource or civil service reform; public-sector commitment and funding; infrastructure rebuilding and skills upgrading in extension, education and training, and research organizations; and a unified policy or strategy with clear vision, mandate, targets, and performance-based incentive system.
Author: Peter Bogetoft
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 1461460433
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 270
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Book Description
"In this book, Peter Bogetoft - THE expert on the theory and practice of benchmarking - provides an in–depth yet very accessible and readable explanation of the best way to do benchmarking, starting from the ground up." Rick Antle William S. Beinecke Professor of Accounting, Yale School of Management CFO, Compensation Valuation, Inc. "I highly recommend this well-written and comprehensive book on measuring and managing performance. Dr. Bogetoft summarizes the fundamental mathematical concepts in an elegant, intuitive, and understandable way." Jon A. Chilingerian Professor, Brandeis University and INSEAD "Bogetoft gives in his book Performance Benchmarking an excellent introduction to the methodological basis of benchmarking." Christian Parbøl Director, DONG Energy "This book is the primer on benchmarking for performance management." Albert Birck Business Performance Manager, Maersk Oil "This excellent book provides a non technical introduction for performance management." Misja Mikkers, Director, Dutch Health Care Authority "With this very well written and comprehensive introduction to the many facets of benchmarking in hand, organizations have no excuse for not applying the best and cost effective benchmarking methods in their performance assessments." Stig P. Christensen Senior R&D Director, COWI
Author: Qiang Yang
Publisher: Springer Nature
ISBN: 3030630765
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 291
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Book Description
This book provides a comprehensive and self-contained introduction to federated learning, ranging from the basic knowledge and theories to various key applications. Privacy and incentive issues are the focus of this book. It is timely as federated learning is becoming popular after the release of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Since federated learning aims to enable a machine model to be collaboratively trained without each party exposing private data to others. This setting adheres to regulatory requirements of data privacy protection such as GDPR. This book contains three main parts. Firstly, it introduces different privacy-preserving methods for protecting a federated learning model against different types of attacks such as data leakage and/or data poisoning. Secondly, the book presents incentive mechanisms which aim to encourage individuals to participate in the federated learning ecosystems. Last but not least, this book also describes how federated learning can be applied in industry and business to address data silo and privacy-preserving problems. The book is intended for readers from both the academia and the industry, who would like to learn about federated learning, practice its implementation, and apply it in their own business. Readers are expected to have some basic understanding of linear algebra, calculus, and neural network. Additionally, domain knowledge in FinTech and marketing would be helpful.”
Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on Government Reform
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Administrative agencies
Languages : en
Pages : 152
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