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Author: Alisha Holland
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107174074
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 399
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Book Description
The book explains why and when laws go unenforced in developing countries. It argues that the tolerance of street vending and squatting is a form of informal welfare provision and a more effective means to mobilize the poor than conventional state social policies.
Author: Alisha Holland
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107174074
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 399
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Book Description
The book explains why and when laws go unenforced in developing countries. It argues that the tolerance of street vending and squatting is a form of informal welfare provision and a more effective means to mobilize the poor than conventional state social policies.
Author: Alisha Caroline Holland
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Why do governments tolerate the violation of their own laws and regulations, and when do they enforce them? Conventional wisdom is that state weakness erodes enforcement, particularly in the developing world. In contrast, I highlight the understudied political costs of enforcement. Governments choose not to enforce state laws and regulations that the poor tend to violate, a behavior that I call forbearance, when it is in their electoral interest.
Author: Agustina Giraudy
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 110849658X
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 389
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Book Description
Offers a groundbreaking analysis of the distinctive substantive, theoretical and methodological contributions of subnational research in the field of comparative politics.
Author: Daniel M. Brinks
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9781108738880
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 75
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Book Description
This Element introduces the concept of institutional weakness, arguing that weakness or strength is a function of the extent to which an institution actually matters to social, economic or political outcomes. It then presents a typology of three forms of institutional weakness: insignificance, in which rules are complied with but do not affect the way actors behave; non-compliance, in which state elites either choose not to enforce the rules or fail to gain societal cooperation with them; and instability, in which the rules are changed at an unusually high rate. The Element then examines the sources of institutional weakness.
Author: Daniel M. Brinks
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1108803172
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 359
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Book Description
Analysts and policymakers often decry the failure of institutions to accomplish their stated purpose. Bringing together leading scholars of Latin American politics, this volume helps us understand why. The volume offers a conceptual and theoretical framework for studying weak institutions. It introduces different dimensions of institutional weakness and explores the origins and consequences of that weakness. Drawing on recent research on constitutional and electoral reform, executive-legislative relations, property rights, environmental and labor regulation, indigenous rights, squatters and street vendors, and anti-domestic violence laws in Latin America, the volume's chapters show us that politicians often design institutions that they cannot or do not want to enforce or comply with. Challenging existing theories of institutional design, the volume helps us understand the logic that drives the creation of weak institutions, as well as the conditions under which they may be transformed into institutions that matter.
Author: Santiago Levy Algazi
Publisher: Inter-American Development Bank
ISBN: 1597823058
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 323
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Book Description
Why has an economy that has done so many things right failed to grow fast? Under-Rewarded Efforts traces Mexico’s disappointing growth to flawed microeconomic policies that have suppressed productivity growth and nullified the expected benefits of the country’s reform efforts. Fast growth will not occur doing more of the same or focusing on issues that may be key bottlenecks to productivity growth elsewhere, but not in Mexico. It will only result from inclusive institutions that effectively protect workers against risks, redistribute towards those in need, and simultaneously align entrepreneurs’ and workers’ incentives to raise productivity.
Author: Javier Auyero
Publisher: Duke University Press
ISBN: 9780822326212
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 276
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Book Description
DIVExamines how Argentina's urban poor use political networks and informal webs of reciprocal help to solve their everyday survival needs/div
Author: John Stuart Mill
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 632
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Book Description
Author: Eduardo A. Cavallo
Publisher: Inter-American Development Bank
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 121
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Book Description
The 2018 Macroeconomic Report, A Mandate to Grow, revisits the growth debate that has been raging in the region for the past half century. Viewing the debate from this long-term perspective allows for a focus on the structural factors that have prevented Latin America and the Caribbean from reaching the growth potential required to keep pace with faster growing regions and to fulfill the aspirations of its population.
Author: Michael Albertus
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 110819642X
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 326
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Book Description
This book argues that - in terms of institutional design, the allocation of power and privilege, and the lived experiences of citizens - democracy often does not restart the political game after displacing authoritarianism. Democratic institutions are frequently designed by the outgoing authoritarian regime to shield incumbent elites from the rule of law and give them an unfair advantage over politics and the economy after democratization. Authoritarianism and the Elite Origins of Democracy systematically documents and analyzes the constitutional tools that outgoing authoritarian elites use to accomplish these ends, such as electoral system design, legislative appointments, federalism, legal immunities, constitutional tribunal design, and supermajority thresholds for change. The study provides wide-ranging evidence for these claims using data that spans the globe and dates from 1800 to the present. Albertus and Menaldo also conduct detailed case studies of Chile and Sweden. In doing so, they explain why some democracies successfully overhaul their elite-biased constitutions for more egalitarian social contracts.
