Fixing Reference

Fixing Reference PDF Author: Imogen Dickie
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0198755619
Category : Language Arts & Disciplines
Languages : en
Pages : 344

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Book Description
Imogen Dickie develops an account of aboutness-fixing for thoughts about ordinary objects, and of reference-fixing for the singular terms we use to express them. Extant discussions of this topic tread a weary path through descriptivist proposals, causalist alternatives, and attempts to combine the most attractive elements of each. The account developed here is a new beginning. It starts with two basic principles. The first connects aboutness and truth: a belief is about the object upon whose properties its truth or falsity depends. The second connects truth and justification: justification is truth conducive; in general and allowing exceptions, a subject whose beliefs are justified will be unlucky if they are not true, and not merely lucky if they are. These principles--one connecting aboutness and truth; the other truth and justification--combine to yield a third principle connecting aboutness and justification: a body of beliefs is about the object upon which its associated means of justification converges; the object whose properties a subject justifying beliefs in this way will be unlucky to get wrong and not merely luck to get right. The first part of the book proves a precise version of this principle. Its remaining chapters use the principle to explain how the relations to objects that enable us to think about them--perceptual attention; understanding of proper names; grasp of descriptions--do their aboutness-fixing and thought-enabling work. The book includes discussions of the nature of singular thought and the relation between thought and consciousness.

Fixing Reference

Fixing Reference PDF Author: Imogen Dickie
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0198755619
Category : Language Arts & Disciplines
Languages : en
Pages : 344

Get Book Here

Book Description
Imogen Dickie develops an account of aboutness-fixing for thoughts about ordinary objects, and of reference-fixing for the singular terms we use to express them. Extant discussions of this topic tread a weary path through descriptivist proposals, causalist alternatives, and attempts to combine the most attractive elements of each. The account developed here is a new beginning. It starts with two basic principles. The first connects aboutness and truth: a belief is about the object upon whose properties its truth or falsity depends. The second connects truth and justification: justification is truth conducive; in general and allowing exceptions, a subject whose beliefs are justified will be unlucky if they are not true, and not merely lucky if they are. These principles--one connecting aboutness and truth; the other truth and justification--combine to yield a third principle connecting aboutness and justification: a body of beliefs is about the object upon which its associated means of justification converges; the object whose properties a subject justifying beliefs in this way will be unlucky to get wrong and not merely luck to get right. The first part of the book proves a precise version of this principle. Its remaining chapters use the principle to explain how the relations to objects that enable us to think about them--perceptual attention; understanding of proper names; grasp of descriptions--do their aboutness-fixing and thought-enabling work. The book includes discussions of the nature of singular thought and the relation between thought and consciousness.

Reference

Reference PDF Author: Jeanette K. Gundel
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0190450258
Category : Language Arts & Disciplines
Languages : en
Pages : 288

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Book Description
The ability to produce and understand referring expressions is basic to human language use and human cognition. Reference comprises the ability to think of and represent objects (both real and imagined/fictional), to indicate to others which of these objects we are talking about, and to determine what others are talking about when they use a nominal expression. The articles in this volume are concerned with some of the central themes and challenges in research on reference within the cognitive sciences - philosophy (including philosophy of language and mind, logic, and formal semantics), theoretical and computational linguistics, and cognitive psychology. The papers address four basic questions: What is reference? What is the appropriate analysis of different referring forms, such as definite descriptions? How is reference resolved? and How do speaker/writers select appropriate referring forms, such as pronouns vs. full noun phrases, demonstrative vs. personal pronouns, and overt vs. null/zero pronominal forms? Some of the papers assume and build on existing theories, such as Centering Theory and the Givenness Hierarchy framework; others propose their own models of reference understanding or production. The essays examine reference from a number of disciplinary and interdisciplinary perspectives, informed by different research traditions and employing different methodologies. While the contributors to the volume were primarily trained in one of the four represented disciplines-computer science, linguistics, philosophy and psychology, and use methodologies typical of that discipline, each of them bridges more than one discipline in their methodology and/or their approach.

Naming and Necessity

Naming and Necessity PDF Author: Saul A. Kripke
Publisher: Harvard University Press
ISBN: 9780674598461
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 196

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Book Description
If there is such a thing as essential reading in metaphysics or in philosophy of language, this is it. Ever since the publication of its original version, Naming and Necessity has had great and increasing influence. It redirected philosophical attention to neglected questions of natural and metaphysical necessity and to the connections between these and theories of reference, in particular of naming, and of identity. From a critique of the dominant tendency to assimilate names to descriptions and more generally to treat their reference as a function of their Fregean sense, surprisingly deep and widespread consequences may be drawn. The largely discredited distinction between accidental and essential properties, both of individual things (including people) and of kinds of things, is revived. So is a consequent view of science as what seeks out the essences of natural kinds. Traditional objections to such views are dealt with by sharpening distinctions between epistemic and metaphysical necessity; in particular by the startling admission of necessary a posteriori truths. From these, in particular from identity statements using rigid designators whether of things or of kinds, further remarkable consequences are drawn for the natures of things, of people, and of kinds; strong objections follow, for example to identity versions of materialism as a theory of the mind. This seminal work, to which today's thriving essentialist metaphysics largely owes its impetus, is here published with a substantial new Preface by the author.

Modes of Representation

Modes of Representation PDF Author: Richard Kimberly Heck
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0198861591
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 444

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Book Description
Modes of Presentation analyses a collection of problems, known as 'Frege's puzzle', resulting from how thinkers and speakers have a limited perspective on reference in thought and language. Heck argues that these puzzles have much to teach us both about the foundations of cognition and the nature of linguistic communication.

The Parliamentary Debates

The Parliamentary Debates PDF Author: Great Britain. Parliament. House of Lords
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Great Britain
Languages : en
Pages : 432

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Parliamentary Debates

Parliamentary Debates PDF Author: New Zealand. Parliament
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : New Zealand
Languages : en
Pages : 1212

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In Search of a Theory of Reference Fixing

In Search of a Theory of Reference Fixing PDF Author: Ori Beck
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 200

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Official Journal of the European Communities

Official Journal of the European Communities PDF Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 770

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Water Diversion from Lake Michigan

Water Diversion from Lake Michigan PDF Author: United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Public Works
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Illinois Waterway (Ill.)
Languages : en
Pages : 502

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Book Description
Considers H.R. 1 and S. 308, to authorize HEW and Army Corps of Engineers to study the effects of increased water diversion from Lake Michigan into the Illinois Waterway and the effects upon the Great Lakes. Includes "Memorandum for U.S. as Amicus Curiae in the Supreme Court, States of Wisconsin, Minnesota, Ohio, and Pennsylvania v State of Illinois and the Sanitary District of Chicago, On Amended Application of the States of Wisconsin, Minnesota, Ohio, Pennsylvania and New York for a Reopening and Amendment of the Decree of Apr. 21, 1930, and the Granting of Further Relief," Oct. Term, 1958 (p. 63-123).

Roads to Reference

Roads to Reference PDF Author: Mario Gómez-Torrente
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0192585231
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 240

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Book Description
How is it that words come to stand for the things they stand for? Is the thing that a word stands for - its reference - fully identified or described by conventions known to the users of the word? Or is there a more roundabout relation between the reference of a word and the conventions that determine or fix it? Do words like 'water', 'three', and 'red' refer to appropriate things, just as the word 'Aristotle' refers to Aristotle? If so, which things are these, and how do they come to be referred to by those words? In Roads to Reference, Mario Gómez-Torrente provides novel answers to these and other questions that have been of traditional interest in the theory of reference. The book introduces a number of cases of apparent indeterminacy of reference for proper names, demonstratives, and natural kind terms, which suggest that reference-fixing conventions for them adopt the form of lists of merely sufficient conditions for reference and reference failure. He then provides arguments for a new anti-descriptivist picture of those kinds of words, according to which the reference-fixing conventions for them do not describe their reference. This book also defends realist and objectivist accounts of the reference of ordinary natural kind nouns, numerals, and adjectives for sensible qualities. According to these accounts these words refer, respectively, to 'ordinary kinds', cardinality properties, and properties of membership in intervals of sensible dimensions, and these things are fixed in subtle ways by associated reference-fixing conventions.