Fixed-equilibrium Rationalizability in Signaling Games PDF Download
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Author: Joel Sobel
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 26
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Author: Joel Sobel
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 26
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Author: Lars Stole
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
This paper studies equilibrium refinements in signaling games through an examination of rationalizability in derived games obtained by replacing the equilibrium path with a sure outcome that yields the equilibrium payoff to all players. The informed player chooses between the sure payoff and sending an out-of-equilibrium signal from the original game. Whether or not the strategy of choosing the sure payoff is rationalizable is related to the iterated intuitive condition (divinity) when the original game is viewed as having imperfect (incomplete) information. Our results also demonstrate the significance of testing out-of-equilibrium signals as a set rather than individually.
Author: Drew Fudenberg
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262061414
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 616
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Book Description
This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point. This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory—including strategic form games, Nash equilibria, subgame perfection, repeated games, and games of incomplete information—in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point. The analytic material is accompanied by many applications, examples, and exercises. The theory of noncooperative games studies the behavior of agents in any situation where each agent's optimal choice may depend on a forecast of the opponents' choices. "Noncooperative" refers to choices that are based on the participant's perceived selfinterest. Although game theory has been applied to many fields, Fudenberg and Tirole focus on the kinds of game theory that have been most useful in the study of economic problems. They also include some applications to political science. The fourteen chapters are grouped in parts that cover static games of complete information, dynamic games of complete information, static games of incomplete information, dynamic games of incomplete information, and advanced topics.
Author: Eric van Damme
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642582427
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 354
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Book Description
I have been pleased with the favourable reception of the first edition of this book and I am grateful to have the opportunity to prepare this second edition. In this revised and enlarged edition I corrected some misprints and errors that occurred in the first edition (fortunately I didn't find too many) and I added a large number of notes that give the reader an impression of what kind of results have been obtained since the first edition was printed and that give an indication of the direction the subject is taking. Many of the notes discuss (or refer to papers discussing) applications of the refinements that are considered. Of course, it is the quantity and the quality of the insights and the applications that lend the refinements their validity. Although the guide to the applications is far from complete, the notes certainly allow the reader to form a good judgement of which refinements have really yielded new insights. Hence, as in the first edition, I will refrain from speculating on which refinements of Nash equilibria will survive in the long run. To defend this position let me also cite Binmore [1990] who compares writing about refinements to the Herculean task of defeating the nine-headed Hydra which grew too heads for each that was struck off. It is a pleasure to have the opportunity to thank my secretary, Marjoleine de Wit, who skilfully and, as always, cheerfully typed the manuscript and did the proofreading.
Author: Pennsylvania
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 474
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Author: Richard D Macminn
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 9814479837
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 121
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Book Description
This monograph represents a unified coherent perspective of financial markets and the theory of corporate finance. The Fisher model is used in corporate finance texts to note the foundations of the net present value rule, but has not been developed further in textbooks as a perspective for students of the finance discipline. This book articulates corporate finance from a common perspective and model: by generalizing the Fisher model to include risks, it is possible to exposit and prove the classic corporate finance theorems and to establish a common foundation for the discipline. The classic theorems of corporate finance are collected, stated, and some are proved. The reader is challenged to prove corollaries and theorems to see how the model provides the fundamental building blocks for the discipline.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics, Mathematical
Languages : en
Pages : 738
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Author: Pierpaolo Battigalli
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Focusing on signaling games, I illustrate the relevance of the rationalizability approach for the analysis multistage games with incomplete information. I define a class of iterative solution procedures, featuring a notion of "forward induction": the Receiver tries to explain the Sender's message in a way which is consistent with the Sender's strategic sophistication and certain given restrictions on beliefs. The approach is applied to some numerical examples and economic models. In a standard model with verifiable messages a full disclosure result is obtained. In a model of job market signaling the best separating equilibrium emerges as the unique rationalizable outcome only when the high and low types are sufficiently different. Otherwise, rationalizability only puts bounds on the education choices of different types.
Author: Pierpaolo Battigalli
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Equilibrium (Economics)
Languages : en
Pages : 72
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Book Description
Author: Econometric Society. World Congress
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9780521484596
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 342
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Book Description
This book gives the reader a unique survey of advances in economic theory.
