Essays on the Economics of Human Capital PDF Download
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Author: Hye Mi You
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Education
Languages : en
Pages : 206
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Author: Hye Mi You
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Education
Languages : en
Pages : 206
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Book Description
Author: Charles J. Whalen
Publisher: W.E. Upjohn Institute
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 317
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This book honors Vernon Briggs's professional contributions. This book contains important discussions on issues of human resource economics, which is now often described as workforce development. This book offers much research information and policy analysis that can be used to develop what is needed for an active set of national human resource policies.
Author: Chiara Pastore
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Paloma Lopez de mesa Moyano
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 274
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Author: Lucia Rizzica
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Author: Wei-Cheng Chen (Economist)
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Electronic dissertations
Languages : en
Pages : 108
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Chapter 1. "Growth in a Patrilocal Economy: Female Schooling, Household Savings, and China's One-Child Policy," joint with Ting-Wei Lai. In this chapter, we answer the following question: What are the economic consequences of China's One-Child policy? We develop a model of parental education decision to analyze how a population control policy affects saving and schooling in a patrilocal society, where sons are responsible to support parents, but daughters are not. Parent's investment on education depends on the degree of parental altruism and the need for old-age security. A tighter population control policy increases parental altruism and the rate of return on schooling, and shortens gender gap in education. There is also a dynamic incentive for daughter's education, since lower fertility promotes female labor market participation, and increases the value of female education. We then calibrate our model to the Chinese economy and show the extent to which the "One-Child" policy explains the rapid growth of household saving and female schooling. Chapter 2. "Limiting Applications in College Admissions and Evidence from Conflicting Examinations," joint with Yi-Cheng Kao. One of the most distinctive trends in global education over the past few decades is the rapid expansion of higher education. Moreover, since 2000, East Asia has had the fastest growth and the largest share of student enrollment in higher education. However, one might suspect that the overall quality of education has not improved as well. In this paper, my coauthor and I explore the micro-aspect of education as a joint product between a school and a student in order to understand how the quality of education evolves. In particular, for many Asian countries, entrance examination is the primary screening device for college admissions. We present a college admissions problem in which schools may gain from limiting students' application portfolios, and derive conditions under which a lower ranked school can attract better students by applying such strategy We argue that top schools in Taiwan have strategically used the date of entrance examination to limiting students' application, and nd supporting empirical evidence. The empirical results suggest that departments with prestige close to the top could improve their students' quality by setting the same examination dates as the best school. These findings are consistent with the predictions of our theory. Chapter 3. "Calming the Crazed or Fueling the Flames: A Noisy Screening Model of Lending Standards and Credit Cycle." This chapter discusses the difficulty of funding ideas. Why is credit pro-cyclical? More importantly, why does a credit boom-bust cycle happen? These empirical facts seem to contradict the theory of intertemporal consumption smoothing, and suggest that financial intermediaries play an important role. In this paper, I present a statistical model of bank lending standards, and analyze the conditions under which a credit boom-bust emerges. In this model, a bank needs to screen borrowers who hold private information. For each loan application, the bank receives a noisy signal about the quality of the project. A bank's funding policy is a decision rule conditional on the signal received. Because borrowers face application costs, their decision to participate is affected by the bank's funding policy. I show that the bank's optimal funding policy can be summarized by a lending standard, defined as the significance level of the bank's screening test while reviewing loan applications, which is to say, the probability a bad project will be funded. While bank lending standard is countercyclical, whether it stabilizes or amplifies shocks on fundamentals depends on borrowers' participation decisions. In particular, credit booms happen when banks lower lending standards to attract low-quality borrowers, and busts happen when banks tighten standards to exclude them. I also show that credit booms are likely to be triggered by TFP gains or cheaper capital, consistent with empirical findings.
Author: Emma Louise Gorman
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Prathibha V. Joshi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economic development
Languages : en
Pages : 194
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Author: Rodrigo Azuero Melo
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 448
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This dissertation deals with two different aspects of human capital accumulation: early childhood development and tertiary education. Specifically, it analyzes the role that public policies or changes in regulations affect incentives of agents in a way that ends up affecting the aggregate endowment of human capital in an economy. The first chapter is related to early childhood development. Recent literature has shown that skills shaped during childhood have long lasting consequences later in life. This fact has promoted a large number of programs aimed at stimulating the skill formation process for children in disadvantage. However, little is known about how cost-effective are these policies. In this chapter I evaluate the cost-effectiveness of three alternative policies aimed at improving the living standards of families in disadvantage: cash transfers, childcare subsidies, and subsidies for child investments. I find that subsidies promoting child investments are much more productive than the other two alternatives. In the second chapter, co-authored with David Zarruk, we analyze the consequences that subsidized loans for higher education have on the quality of education offered by colleges in the context of a developing country. We find that subsidized student loan policies lead to a widening gap in the quality of services provided by higher education institutions. This happens because the demand for elite institutions unambiguously increases when individuals can borrow. This does not happen in non-elite institutions, since relaxing borrowing constraints makes some individuals move from non-elite to elite institutions. The higher increase in demand for elite institutions allows them to increase prices and investment per student. If investment and average student ability are complementary inputs in the quality production function, elite universities also increase their acceptance cut-offs. In this new equilibrium, the differentiation of the product offered by colleges increases, where elite universities provide higher quality education to high-ability students and non-elite universities offer lower quality to less-able students. We calibrate the model to Colombia, which implemented massive student loan policies during the last decade and experienced an increase in the gap of quality of education provided by elite and non-elite universities. We show that the increase in the quality gap can be a by-product of the subsidized loan policies. Such results show that, when analyzed in a general equilibrium setting, subsidized loan policies can have negative effects in equilibrium.
