Essays in Information Economics and Market Structure PDF Download
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Author: Andreas Uthemann
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Author: Andreas Uthemann
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Author: A. Uthemann
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Kenneth Joseph Arrow
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9780521553551
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 412
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Book Description
Leading theorists offer insights on the role of uncertainty and information in the market.
Author: Almarin Phillips
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 280
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Book Description
No detailed description available for "Market Structure, Organization, and Performance".
Author: Domenico Delli Gatti
Publisher:
ISBN: 9783642570063
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 312
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Author: Domenico Delli Gatti
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9783540669791
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 312
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This book is a collection of essays which examine how the properties of aggregate variables are influenced by the actions and interactions of heterogenous individuals in different economic contexts. The common denominator of the essays is a critique of the representative agent hypothesis. If this hypothesis were correct, the behaviour of the aggregate variable would simply be the reproduction of individual optimising behaviour. In the methodology of the hard sciences, one of the achievements of the quantum revolution has been the rebuttal of the notion that aggregate behaviour can be explained on the basis of the behaviour of a single unit: the elementary particle does not even exist as a single entity but as a network, a system of interacting units. In this book, new tracks in economics which parallel the developments in physics mentioned above are explored. The essays, in fact are contributions to the analysis of the economy as a complex evolving system of interacting agents.
Author: Xiao Lin
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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The dissertation comprises three papers in information economics that try to understand, respectively, how information is credibly disclosed, how information is robustly acquired, as well as how hard information is sold in the market by a third-party intermediary. The first chapter "Credible Persuasion," joint with Ce Liu, develops a new framework for understanding credibility considerations in Bayesian persuasion problems. We call a disclosure policy credible if the sender cannot profit from tampering with her messages while keeping the message distribution unchanged. We show that the credibility of a disclosure policy is equivalent to a cyclical monotonicity condition on its induced distribution over states and actions. We also characterize how credibility restricts the Sender's ability to persuade under different payoff structures. In particular, when the sender's payoff is state-independent, all disclosure policies are credible. We apply our results to the market for lemons, and show that no useful information can be credibly disclosed by the seller, even though a seller who can commit to her disclosure policy would perfectly reveal her private information to maximize profit. The second chapter "Robust Merging of Information," joint with Henrique de Oliveira and Yuhta Ishii, asks how people robustly combine different sources of information when the underlying correlation is unknown. Our main results characterize the strategies that are robust to possible hidden correlations. In particular, with two states and two actions, the robustly optimal strategy pays attention to a single information source, ignoring all others. More generally, the robustly optimal strategy may need to combine multiple information sources, but can be constructed quite simply by using a decomposition of the original problem into separate decision problems, each requiring attention to only one information source. An implication is that an information source generates value to the agent if and only if it is best for at least one of these decomposed problems. The third chapter "How to Sell Hard Information," joint with S. Nageeb Ali, Nima Haghpanah, and Ron Siegel, studies a setting where the seller of an asset has the option to buy hard information about the value of the asset from an intermediary. The seller can then disclose the acquired information before selling the asset in a competitive market. We study how the intermediary designs and sells hard information to robustly maximize her revenue across all equilibria. Even though the intermediary could use an accurate test that reveals the asset's value, we show that robust revenue maximization leads to a noisy test with a continuum of possible scores. In addition, the intermediary always charges the seller for disclosing the test score to the market, but not necessarily for running the test. This enables the intermediary to robustly appropriate a significant share of the surplus resulting from the asset sale.
Author: M. Nermuth
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642464475
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 246
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Book Description
This book is intended as a contribution to the theory of markets with imperfect information. The subject being nearly limitless, only certain selected topics are discussed. These are outlined in the Introduction (Ch. 0). The remainder of the book is divided into three parts. All results of economic significance are contained in Parts II & III. Part I introduces the main tools for the analysis, in particular the concept of an information structure. Although most of the material presented in Part I is not original, it is hoped that the detailed and self-contained exposition will help the reader to understand not only the following pages, but also the existing technical and variegated literature on markets with imperfect information. The mathematical prerequisites needed, but not explained in the text rarely go beyond elementary calculus and probability theory. Whenever more advanced concepts are used, I have made an effort to give an intuitive explanation as well, so that the argument can also be followed on a non-technical level (cf. e.g. the treatment of the "generic" viewpoint in Ch. 9). In the same spirit, discussion of mathematical assumptions is limited to those which have economic sig- ficance, whereas purely "technical" assumptions (like differentiability or integrability of certain functions) are usually made without comment whenever convenient. The logical interdependence of chapters is as follows: Ch. 3 . Ch. 1 /~I--=---- Ch. 4 Ch. 2 Ch. 8 ~I -=--- /"'-.... Ch.
Author: R.M. Goodwin
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 1349055077
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 186
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Author: Roy Harrod
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 134901494X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 332
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